United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense/IV. A. 5. 1. Notes

by the Pentagon

1.	Public Statement of President Eisenhower of 21 July 1954 (White House Press Release that date; of Under Secretary Smith in Richard P. Stebbins, et. a1., The United States in World Affairs, 1954, (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), 255. The Administration was severely criticized in public. Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, for example, while the conference was in session on the eve of Dien Bien Phu's fall, asserted that: "American foreign policy has never in all its history suffered such a stunning reversal ...We stand in clear danger of being left naked and alone in a hostile world." New York Times, May 7, 1954. Anthony Eden, Toward Peace in Indochina, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), ix-13. The Administration analysis of public record is in Secretary Dulles, Department of State Press Release No. 400, July 23, 1954. For "inner councils" see OCB, "Progress Report on United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia," NSC 5405, August 6, 1954) TS; and, NSC, "Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East" (NSC 5429, August 4, 1954) TS.
2.	U .S. Department of State telegrams, DULTE 187 from Geneva, 16 June 1954 (TS) SECTO 553 from Geneva, 2 July 1954 (TS) Dillon 32 from Paris, 2 July 1954 (TS) SECTO 632 from Geneva, 17 July 1954 (TS) SECTO 638 from Geneva, 18 July 1954 (TS) SECTO 645 from Geneva, 18 July 1954 (TS) Jean Lacouture and Philippe Devillers, La Fin d'Une Guerre: Indochina 1954 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1960), 23-4236, 238–239, 268.
3.	Statement of Tran Van Do in George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, ed., The United States in Vietnam (New York: Delta, 1966), 374. U.S. Department of State, telegrams, No. 2757 from Paris, April 29, 1954; SECTO 654 and 655 from Geneva, 18 July 1954; and SECTO 673 from Geneva, 19 July 1954. "Ngo Dinh Diem on Elections in Vietnam," (July 16,1955) in Marvin E. Gettleman, ed., Vietnam (New York: Fawcett, 1965), 193–194.
4.	"Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, July 20, 1954," in U.S. Congress, Senate, Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Congress, 1st Session, Committee Print, 3d Revised Edition (Washington: GPO, July, 1967), 50–62.
5.	Ibid., 53·
6.	"Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference," Ibid., 81.
7.	Department of State telegrams SECTO 632 and 645 of 17 and 18 July, 1954, respectively.
8.	P. J. Honey quotes Pham's remarks to this effect to a Vietnamese friend of Honey's, in Communism in North Vietnam (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1963), 6. Also, U.S. Department of State, "Viet Minh Reactions to Indochina Settlement," (Intelligence Brief, 5 August 1954), C, in U.S. Interagency Intelligence Committee, "The North Vietnamese Role in the Origin, Direction and Support of the War in South Vietnam" (DIAAP-4, May, 1967) S, Draft, Supporting Documents, Vol. 1, No. 15; and Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 137–138: N. B., Ellen Hammer quotes Pham Van Dong to exactly the opposite: "Make no mistake, those elections will be held." Ellen T. Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), 344.
9.	Bernard B. Fall, ed., Ho Chi Minh On Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1967), 272.
10.	Donald Lancaster, "Power Politics at the Geneva Conference 1954," in Gettleman, ed. Viet Nam, op. cit., 134; Department of State telegram SECTO 633 from Geneva, July 17, 1954, S.
11.	U.S. Department of State, "Verbatim Minutes of Geneva Conference," 21 July 1954, VerbMin/8, 347–348.
12.	The French National Assembly ratified on 4 June 1954 two treaties, one providing for independence for Vietnam, the other for Vietnam's association as an equal with France in the French Union. The latter permitted Vietnam to determine subsequently the extent of association. The former recognized Vietnam "as a fully independent and sovereign state invested with all the competence recognized by international law." Vietnam agreed to assume France's part "in all the rights and obligations resulting from international treaties or conventions contracted by France on behalf or on account of the State of Vietnam or of any other treaties or conventions concluded by France on behalf of French Indochina insofar as those acts concern Vietnam." U.S. Department of State, Verbatim Minutes of the Geneva Conference, VerbMin/3 (May 12, 1954), 99–101. Department of State telegram, Dulles to Paris, 4398, June 4, 1955, (TS).
13.	E.g., George T. McT. Kahin, "Excerpts from National Teach-In on Viet Nam policy," in Marcus G. Paskin and Bernard B. Fall, ed., The Viet Nam Reader (New York: Vintage, 1965), 291; also, Kahin and Lewis, The United States in Vietnam, op. cit., 56–57.
14.	CF. U.S. Department of Defense Memorandum for Mr. Haydn Williams, from the Office of the General Counsel, "The Geneva Accords of 1954 and the Introduction of U.S. Combat and Logistic Forces into Vietnam" (26 October 1961) TS, which holds that: "Vietnam, although not a signatory to the cease-fire Agreement in question is, on the other hand, bound by its terms"; and, U. S. Department of State, "Legal Basis for U.S. Military Aid to South Vietnam," Vietnam Information Notes No. 10 (August 1967), which holds differently. Also, John Norton Moore, "The lawfulness of Military Assistance to the Republic of Vietnam," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 61, No. 1 (January, 1967), 2–4; and Honey, op. cit., 40–41.
15.	U.S. Department of State, telegram, Dillon 5035 from Paris, June 24, 1951, TS; B.S.N. Murti, Vietnam Divided (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964), 176–177; Moore, op. cit., 3 (n.7).
16.	Philippe Devillers, "The Struggle for Unification of Vietnam," in Gettleman, ed., Vietnam, op. cit., 217–218; and Bernard B. Fall, "How the French Got Out of Vietnam," in The Viet-Nam Reader, op. cit., 90.
17.	Dennis Warner, The Last Confucian (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964), 94-95; U.S. Department of State, telegrams as follows: Paris 481, 5 August 1954 State to Paris for Dulles, TEDUL 14, 22 October 1954 Manila SECTO 50, 1 March 1955 Saigon 4661, 19 April 1955 Paris 4396, 9 April 1955 Paris 4576, 21 April 1955 Paris 4780, 24 April 1955 Also, CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, "Possible Developments in South Vietnam" (NIE 631-2-55, 26 April 1955), TS; Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) from his Deputy, "Programs for the Implementation of U.S. Policy Toward South Vietnam," (13 April 1955), TS; JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, "Indochina (Viet-nam)" (9 May 1955), TS; Staff Study, OSD/ISA, 13 April 1955, "Programs for the Implementation of U.S. Policy Toward South Vietnam," TS.
18.	CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 16 December 1954, 9–11.
19.	Ibid., and issues for 11 October 1954, 11 November 1954, 20 January 1955, and 5 May 1955. Also, CIA National Intelligence Estimate, "Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956" (NIE 63.1-55, 19 July 1955), S, 9–10.
20.	CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 5 May 1955, Part I.
21.	Ibid., 16 December 1954.
22.	Report of the Saigon Military Mission, 1954–1955 (Lansdale Report), S.
32.	Reported in the New York Times (March 5, 1956), and Economist (March 17, 1956).
24.	See Report in Manchester Guardian, March 5, 1956.
25.	Hammer, op. cit. 342–344, 346; P. J. Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today (New York: Praeger, 1962), 30–32; Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 85–86.
26.	Quoted in Gettleman, ed., Vietnam, op. cit., 193-194. U.S. Congress, Committee Print.
27.	Background Information..., op. cit., 83.
28.	U.S. Dept. of State, telegram, Secretary Dulles to Paris No. 77, 7 July 1954 (S). Also, President Eisenhower quoted in B. Fall, "How the French Got Out of Vietnam," op. cit., 89; U.S. Dept. of State, Memorandum dated 5 May 1955, "U.S. Views on All Vietnam Elections," (S), in Dept of State Research Memorandum, "The Shift in the United States Position towards Vietnamese Elections Under the Geneva Accords," (RM-765, 1 Sept 1965), (S); Dept. of State Memorandum of Conversation between Senator Mike Mansfield and Assistant Secretary of State Walter B. Robertson, 7 Dec 1954, (TS).
29.	OCB, "Progress Report...," NSC 5405, op. cit., and "Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East," NSC 5429, op. cit. Also, CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, "Post-Geneva Outlook in Indochina," (NIE 63-5-54, 3 August 1954) (S), 1, 4, 6.
30.	Dept of State, "U.S. Views on All Vietnam Elections," op. cit.
31.	Ibid., Dept. of State RM-765, "The Shift in U.S. Position...," op. cit.
32.	There were DRV communications with the GVN on this subject July, 1955; May and June, 1956; July, 1957; March, 1958; July, 1959; and July, 1960. Phillipe Devillers, in Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today, op. cit., 30–33. CIA, NSC Briefing for 12 July 1955; CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (7 July 1955); B.S.N. Murti, Vietnam Divided, op. cit., 181–184.
33.	Devillers, in Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today, loc. cit.; Murti, op. cit., 176; CIA, NIE 63.2-57 (14 May 1957) op. cit., 6.
34.	Documents Relating to British Involvement in the Indochina Conflict, 1954–1965, Misc. No. 25 (London: HMSO, 1965), 124–125.
35.	CIA, Memorandum for the Record, 8 February 1957; Murti, op. cit., 176–177; John Norton Moore, op. cit., 3, n.7. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Eleventh Session, Special Political Committee (18th Meeting, 24 January 1957, A/SPC/SR.18), 79–80.
36.	American Friends of Vietnam, America's Stake in Vietnam (New York: Carnegie Press, 1956), 69.
37.	NSC 5612/1 (September, 1956); NSC 5809 (2 April 1958). The First Indochina War culminated in Viet Minh military victory and the Geneva Conference of 1954, but during it a Vietnamese government under Bao Dai, like Ho Chi Minh's DRV claiming dominion over all the Vietnamese, but Nationalist, anti-Communist, and French-supported, came into being. From 1949 on, this nascent state provided the political alternative to the DRV; it was Bao Dai's regime which inherited South Viet Nam, and a counterclaim to a unified nation, after the 1954 Geneva settlement. (Fall, The Two Viet Nams, op. cit., 210–223). The United States recognized Bao Dai's regime, the GVN, on February 7, 1950. We had no relations with the DRV, although for six months after the departure of the French from the DRV in 1955, we maintained a vice-consulate in Hanoi, withdrawing it after persistent DRV isolation and harassment. Since, the United States has maintained full relations with GVN, but not even a postal exchange with the DRV. (Ibid., 191, 194). However, although no formal U.S. recognition has been extended, we have acknowledged DRV sovereignty, at first implicitly, and then, after 1962, explicitly. At the Geneva Conference in 1954, the U.S. "observer" related U.S. policy toward the DRV to that we have pursued re North Korea and East Germany. U.S. recognition of, consistent relations with, and increasingly strong support of the GVN after Geneva, were not accompanied by public policy statements more directly aimed at changing the status quo in North Viet Nam than that 1954 position. However, national policy papers of the period included the more ambitious objectives quoted.
38.	Ho on Revolution, op. cit., 298–299; also Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (10 May 1956). Ho's statement may also have been an answer to Kruschev's 11 April 1956 speech on "peaceful competition"; Cf. U.S. Dept. of State, Soviet World Outlook (publication 6836, July 1959), 98.
39.	"Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam," in U.S. Congress, Background Information..., op. cit., 54.
40.	The table is from Fourth Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (April 11, 1955 to August 10, 1955). (London: HMSO, 1955), 30, App. IV. Cf. B.S.N. Murti, op. cit.) 88–91. The U.S. Dept of State's "White Paper" of 1965 entitled Aggression from the North mentioned "more than 900,000 refugees" who fled from North Viet Nam.[1] Bernard Fall has used the figure 860,000 in his books and essays;[2] Fall also has reported that the French transported 610,000 refugees South.[3] The U.S. Navy alone moved 310,848 refugees in "Operation Exodus,"[4] and although U.S. National Intelligence Estimates in 1955 mention 650,000 refugees from the North,[5] a U.S. Department of state review of the issue in 1957 put the total at "nearly 900,000;" the current (1964) National Intelligence Survey refers to "nearly a million."[6] No better estimate is likely to be taken, given the paucity of reliable records.
41.	U.S. Dept. of State, "Information on Refugees in Vietnam," op. cit.
42.	Chester A. Bain, Vietnam, The Roots of Conflict (New York: Prentice Hall, 1967), 120–121; cf. Bui Van Luong and Bernard Fall in Richard W. Lindholm, ed., Viet Nam, The First Five Years, op. cit., 48–62; GVN, Directorate General of Information, Operation Exodus (Saigon: 1959 ?), 20.
43.	U.S. Dept. of Army, Pamphlet 550-40, U.S. Army Area Handbook for Vietnam (Washington: GPO, 1962), 132–133; Bernard Fall, The Two Viet Nams, op. cit., 154.
44.	Hoang Van Chi, From Colonialism to Communism (New York: Praeger, 1964), 166–168, 209–229. Hoang is a Vietnamese scholar and former Viet Minh cadre; Bernard B. Fall, The Viet-Minh Regime (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1956), 118-135; Bernard B. Fall, Le Viet Minh (Paris: A. Colin, 1960), 101–105 (RAND Translation, Incl to L-13439 of 19 July 1967); and George A. Carver, Jr., "The Faceless Viet Cong," Foreign Affairs (Vol 44, No. 3, April, 1966), 352–358. The proponent of these undertakings was Ho's Sino-phile lieutenant Tryong Chinh; see Central Intelligence Agency, Biographic Handbook, Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, (CIA/CR BH 6.6), item on Truong dated 15 March 1965; also Bernard B. Fall, ed., Primer for Revolt (New York: Praeger, 1963), XIX–XX; P. J. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963), 11–14, 32–35, 45–46; and William Kaye, "A Bowl of Rice Divided, The Economy of North Vietnam," in P. J. Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today (New York: Praeger, 1962), 107–108. For Ho's statement on Land Reform in late 1952, see Bernard B. Fall, ed., Ho Chi Minh's Revolution, op. cit., 258–269.
45.	The ICC source is Murti, op. cit., 70–92. Thomas A. Dooley, Deliver Us From Evil, in Dr. Tom Dooley's Three Great Books (New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1960), 63–70, describes the propaganda struggle. Also, Bernard Fall, The Two Viet Nams, loc. cit., Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 72–75; Jean Lacouture, Vietnam: Between Two Truces (New York: Random House, 1966), 102–104. The Lansdale role is described in the Report of the Saigon Military Mission," op. cit.
46.	Ibid.; Bain, op. cit.; CIA, NIS 43C, op. cit., 40.
47.	CINCPACFLT, "Role of the United States Navy," in Richard W. Lindholm, ed., Viet-Nam, The First Five Years (East Lansing, Mich: Michigan State University Press, 1959), 63–76. Part Two of ibid., 45–104 addresses "The Refugee Problem" in general, including the role of foreign aid, the GVN, and charitable organizations. Also, CIA, National Intelligence Survey, South Vietnam (NIS 43D, General Survey, April 1965), 21; U.S. Dept of State "Information on Refugees in Vietnam," op. cit.; "United States Policy with Respect to Vietnam: Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Washington, June 1, 1956," in U.S. Congress, Background Information..., op. cit., 92–95. The latter address by Walter S. Robinson was to the American Friends of Vietnam, and is included in America's Stake in Vietnam, op. cit., 15–19; in ibid., are speeches by Dr. Dooley and Magr Joseph J. Harnett on refugees, 36–49. Cf., Hammer, op. cit., 351–352.
48.	E.g., Dooley, Deliver Us From Evil, op. cit.; Leo Cherne in America's Stake in Vietnam, op. cit., 22–27. Robert Sheer of Ramparts magazine presents an unsympathetic critique of Dooley, Cherne, et al, in "The Genesis of United States Support for Ngo Dinh Diem," reprinted in Gettleman, ed., Viet Nam, op. cit., 235–253.
49.	E.g., a mob of refugees attacked the billets of the ICC in Saigon in July, 1955, just before the consultations came due, in an apparently manipulated protest. These and other uses of refugees by the GVN are elaborated in below.
50.	Frank N. Trager, Why Viet Nam? (New York: Praeger, 1966), 97.
51.	U.S. Intelligence Advisory Committee, Viet Minh Violations of the Geneva Agreements Through 31 December 1954 (IAC-D-93/2, 31 January 1965), 5–8; Also, Anita L. Nutt, Troika on Trial (MS Study for OSD/ISA, ARPA Contract SD-220, 1967), 410–419; CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (12 August 1954), 8; CIA, NSC Briefing, 25 January 1955—the latter cites a Canadian priest as source for reports of serious fighting in Vinh, Nghe An and Ba Lang, Thanh Hoa Province.
52.	ICC, Fourth Interim Report..., op. cit., 12.
53.	Ibid., 11, 21. The Canadians reported 11,422 first party petitions in the North, and not more than 1,000 in the South upon which no action had been taken as of 18 May 1955.
54.	Ibid., 12.
55.	Ibid.
56.	Murti, op. cit., 76–79; CIA, NSC Briefing, 25 Jan 55.
57.	ICC, Fourth Interim Report, op. cit., 12–13, 23-24 . The Canadian report includes the following: "The reports of the teams disclosed further that incidents of obstruction and hinderance made it difficult for them to complete their tasks effectively. A common experience was to encounter organized groups of persons presenting petitions about forced evacuation and demonstrating in a noisy and disorderly manner, with the effect that not only was the limited time available to the team for its investigation squandered, but also would-be evacuees were intimidated....In at least a dozen instances, intending evacuees were physically molested by such hostile crowds and sometimes forcibly dragged away before they had an opportunity of meeting the team. Team 56 on its visit to Ha Tinh on five occasions saw individuals physically molested and dragged by force from the presence of the team....In our view this phenomenon was not a mere social manifestation but an organized plan. While it has been impossible for the Commission to prove that these measures were organized as a matter of policy by the authority in control of the North, owing to the frequency and the common features of this form of obstruction in all provinces investigated there would seem to be little doubt that these obstructions and hinderances had been deliberately planned...it is still not possible to say whether all persons wishing to move from one zone to the other have been able to do so...."
58.	Hammer, op. cit., 345; Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 114-115; Murti, op. cit., 91-92.
59.	Fall, The Two Viet Nams, 154; Ellen Hammer, Vietnam Yesterday and Today, 149–150.
60.	First and Second Interim Reports of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam; Third Interim Report, and Fourth Interim Report. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, May, June and December 1955, respectively), passim. Cf. Murti, op. cit., 86–90; and IAC, Viet Minh Violations, op. cit.
61.	P. J. Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today, op. cit., 8–9; Fall, Le Viet Minh, op. cit.; Hoang, op. cit., 166. Bernard B. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness (New York: Praeger, 1966), 96–98.
62.	U.S. Dept. of State, "Information on Refugees in Vietnam," op. cit.
63.	Robert Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), 102–103; Senator John F. Kennedy, "America's Stake in Vietnam," in America's Stake in Vietnam, op. cit., 11–12; United States Operations Mission to Vietnam, Activity Report (June 30, 1954 through June 30, 1956) (Saigon: 1956); NIS 43D, op. cit., 35; Devillers, "Ngo Dinh Diem..." op. cit., 214.
64.	Anita Lauve, The Origins and Operations of the International Control Commission in Laos and Vietnam (U) (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, RM-2967-ARPA, April, 1962) (S), 198–203; Anita Lauve Nutt, Troika on Trial, op. cit., 690–691; the incident is referred to in the ICC's Fourth Interim Report, op. cit., 24–25. CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 21 July 1955.
65.	USOM, Activity Report 1954–1956, op. cit.; Lindholm, ed., Viet-Nam, op. cit., 90, 100, 184, 195, 337, 360.
66.	William A. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification in Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1966), 34–37; Scigliano, op. cit., 53–55, 169; Shaplen, The Lost Revolution, op. cit., 136-137; Report of the Saigon Military Mission, FY 1955, (Lansdale Report of 1955), op. cit., 24-25.
67.	Lindholm, ed., Viet-Nam, op. cit., 52–53; Scigliano, op. cit., 181–183.
68.	In part, this explains the political power of the Buddhists acquired in 1963—an amorphous religion, so essentially apolitical and unwieldy that it was among the few Vietnamese institutions ignored by the communists, became the focus of Viet nationalism and a prime contributor to Diem's undoing. Cf., Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 468–472. Bernard Fall's essay on the "Sears of Division" quotes a Vietnamese saying that success in life hinged on "3 D's:—Diem (family connections); Dao (religion); and Dia-phuong (province of origin). Fall, Viet-Nam Witness (New York: Praeger, 1966), 206–210.
69.	ICC, Fourth Interim Report, op. cit., 30.
70.	CIA, "Probable Developments in North and South Vietnam Through Mid-1957," (NIE 63–56, 17 July 1956), 10. A thesis advanced by Bernard Fall that the Viet Minh deliberately sent the families of the stay-behinds north, so that the hard-core regulars who remained in the south could engage in "mobile warfare, without having to worry about reprisals against their relatives," has not been substantiated in recent interviews with Viet Cong. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 358.
71.	B.S.N. Murti, Vietnam Divided, op. cit., 224; U.S. Dept. of State, "Southern Regroupees and Northerners in the Communist Military Force in South Vietnam," (Research Memorandum RFE-49, November 9, 1966), SECRET, iii. Fall once accepted a figure of 120,000, but later tended to a ceiling of 100,000. Cf., Fall in Lindholm, ed., Viet-Nam, op. cit., 57; and Fall, Vietnam Witness, op. cit., 216. The 130,000 total approximates the figures published by the Research Staff of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1956; 150,000 Viet Minh troops and their families.[7] Wilfred G. Burchett, the Australian communist, has referred to "the withdrawal of the 140,000 Viet Minh and the cadres to the north."[8] The statistic usually used in U.S. official publications—for example in the 1965 White Paper—is 90,000 Viet Minh troops moved north, and this is commonly regarded as an invaluable reservoir for the DRV's subsequent infiltration of South Vietnam.[9] But the dimension of this resource extended beyond 90,000 "warriors." There were Montagnards who proved particularly useful in building and protecting the infiltration routes down through the Laotian and Vietnamese Highlands. There were also children, an obvious long-range asset.[10] The DRV set up a special school for southern Montagnards, and some 14 elementary and higher schools were reserved for other southern children.[11] Moreover there is evidence that the Viet Minh systematically broadened its family ties in the South through hundreds of hasty, directed marriages for departing "warriors" and by recruiting very young men and boys just before departure.[12]
72.	NIE 63-56, op. cit., 10.
73.	U.S. Interagency Intelligence Committee, Draft Memorandum, "The North Vietnamese Role in the Origin, Direction, and Support of the War in South Vietnam," (DIAAP-4, May, 1967), op. cit., 16–17.
74.	"Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam, July 20, 1954," and "Final Declaration of Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954," in U.S. Congress, Senate, Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington: GPO, March, 1966), 39, 66. A senior captain in the Viet Cong intelligence service wrote a record of his experiences in a document entitled Regroupment Diary; according to this document, his political officer lectured the unit as follows:[13] "(1) Have confidence in the leadership of the General Committee. In two years, the country will be re-unified, because that was the decision of an international body, which gives us reason to trust it. This does not mean that we should be too trustful, but we must continue to struggle. "(2) The Party will never abandon the people of the South who will stay to fight; when the time comes, they will be led. "(3) Those who go north should feel happy in their duties. Those who remain behind should carry out the glorious missions entrusted to them by the Party, standing side by side with the people in every situation of struggle." The political officers also stressed the dangers to which the stay-behinds would be subjected. A Viet Cong cadre whose party history extended back to 1930 stated that:[14] "Those who did regroup did it voluntarily, after realizing that it was the thing to do. They did it to protect themselves from being arrested by the authorities in the South. They were afraid of being charged with having participated in the Resistance before. All cadres were afraid of future persecution by the South Vietnamese authorities; they all wanted to regroup....They were afraid...." Still, the Regroupment Diary records that one cadre bet his comrades "three to ten, the country won't be reunified in two years," and that many cadres were worried about leaving family and friends behind.[15] Asked, "Were you a volunteer for regroupment?": the following responses were typical:[16] (A Defector) At the time it was said that we were volunteers. In reality, they took measures to make sure that everyone left. At the time of regroupment, we had to go. If I had remained, I would have been arrested. I believed that I would remain in the North two years. (Another Defector) I was a political officer. I went to the North just like all the other combatants in my unit. I believed, at the time, that regroupment was only temporary, because from the study sessions on the Geneva Agreement we drew the conclusion that we could return to the South after the general elections. (A PA) [Our political officer] explained that: "we were granted Vietnam north of the 17th parallel now, but in 1956 there would be a general election and we would regain the South and be reunited with our families. Because of interest and curiosity and the opportunity to travel, everyone was happy. They thought they would be there in the North only two years and then would be able to return to their homes.
75.	Fourth Interim Report, op. cit., 12, 21; Murti, op. cit., 87–88.
76.	RM-5163, op. cit., 6–7.
77.	Ngo Dinh Diem on Elections in Vietnam (July 16, 1955) in Marvin E. Gettleman, ed., Vietnam (New York: Fawcett, 1965), 193–194. For the U.S. view, see for example, the March 8, 1955, Secretary Dulles, public statement on the consultations scheduled to take place between DRV and GVN preliminary to the general elections; inter alia, he opined that it would "be hard to create in the North conditions which allow genuine freedom of choice." U.S. Dept. of State, "Chronology on Vietnam" (Historical Studies Division, Research Project No. 747, Nov 1965), 12.
78.	RM-4703, op. cit., 8; U.S. Interagency Intelligence Committee, "The North Vietnamese Role in the Origin, Direction, and Support of the war in South Vietnam," op. cit., 17–18.
79.	Anita Lauve Nutt, Troika on Trial, op. cit., 296-360; ICC Interim Report (S).
80.	"Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam, July 20, 1954, in U.S. Congress, Background Information..., op. cit., 55-57.
81.	ICC, Eighth Interim Report (Saigon, 5 June 1958), 13.
82.	U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Office of Program Coordination, March 17, 1967), 57. The total through 1964 was over $1 billion; NIS 43D, op. cit., 70.
83.	V. J. Croizat, trans., A Translation from the French: Lessons of the War in Indochina (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, RM-5271-PR, May, 1967), 204–205.
84.	J. J. Zasloff, The Role of the Sanctuary in Insurgency: Communist China's Support of the Vietminh, 1946–1954 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation) RM-4618-PR, May, 1967), 57.
85.	NIS 43C, op. cit., 38; CIA, "North Vietnamese Violations of the Geneva Agreements on Vietnam," (Current Intelligence Memo, SC No. 03025/64).
86.	IAC-D-93/2, Viet Minh Violations...Through 31 December 1954, op. cit., 10–11; also CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 7 October 1954, 6.
87.	NIS 43C, op. cit., 59.
88.	Ibid., 56–59; Zasloff, Political Motivation...The Vietminh Regroupees, RM-4703-ISA/ARPA, op. cit., 44–52.
89.	CIA, "Prospects for North and South Vietnam" (NIE 14.3/53-61, 15 August 1961), 15; CIA, "The Outlook for North Vietnam," (SNIE 14.3-64, 4 March 1964), 8–9.
90.	Ibid., 10.
91.	U.S. Congress, Senate, Situation in Vietnam, Hearings before the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Public Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Congress, 1st Session, July 30 and 31, 1959 (Washington: GPO, 1959), 156–158; Irving Heymont, Ronald B. Emery, John G. Phillips, Cost Analysis of Counterinsurgency Land-Combat Operations: Vietnam, 1957–1964 (U) (McLean, Va.: Research Analysis Corp., RAC-TP-232, June, 1967), 10; Senator Mansfield, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "Report on Indochina," 83d Congress, 2nd Session, 15 October 1954 (Washington: GPO, 1954). On January 14, 1955, the French signed an agreement with the DRV supplementing the Geneva Agreement calling for detailed advance notice to the ICC and defining replacement arms as identical, or of similar "combat strength" but again did not establish the basic credit ceiling against which the GVN could draw replacements. Anita Lauve Nutt, Troika on Trial, op. cit., 329–342; RM-2967, op. cit., 105–106. For aid data, see MS, Office Chief of Military History, "U.S. Policy Toward Vietnam Since 1945," (May, 1962), 31, 49–50. The estimate of French removal of MDAP materiel 1954–1956 is based on the report of Asst SecDef Reuben Robertson, Jr., on trip to Vietnam in May, 1956; ibid., 49–50, n. 34. U.S. Military Assistance Group, Vietnam, "Country Statement on MDAP, Non-NATO Countries," 20 July 1956, p. 10, reports that contrary to a US–French agreement, shipments to North Africa and France 1955-1956 apparently included higher quality MDAP equipment than was being turned over to ARVN; the same report also states that details of ARVN–French transaction with NDAP materiel were "unknown."
92.	NIS 43D, op. cit., 67.
93.	Warner, The Last Confucian, op. cit., 128–219. Scigliano, South Vietnam, op. cit., 162–163.
94.	NIS 43D, op. cit., 69.
95.	Heymont, et al., Cost Analysis....1957–1964, op. cit., Vol. II, 77–84.
96.	U.S. Dept. of State Press Release No. 400, July 23, 1954.
97.	"Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol Thereto...," in U.S. Congress, Background Information..., op. cit., 84–88.
98.	"Direct Aid to the Associated States...," in ibid., 88–89.
99.	"Aid to the State of Vietnam...," in ibid., 89–90.
100.	Quoted in Nighswonger, op. cit., 42, from New York Times for February 13, 1955, p. 1. General Collins, the President's emissary to the GVN, was reported at the same time to be pressing for a "more reliable armed force chiefly designed to maintain internal security," with protection from external aggression supplied by SEATO. Ibid., quoting Baltimore Sun for 1 February 1955, p. 1.
101.	NSC 5612/1, "U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia," (September 5, 1956), 11, provides that the U.S. will: "assist Free Viet Nam to build up indigenous armed forces, including independent logistical and administrative services, which will be capable of assuring internal security and of providing limited initial resistance to attack by the Viet Minh." "United initial resistance" was defined by JCS memo for SecDef, dated 21 December 1956, subject as above, as follows: "resistance to Communist aggression by defending or by delaying in such manner as to preserve and maintain the integrity of the government and its armed forces for the period of time required to invoke the UN Charter and/or the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty or the period of time required for the U.S. Government to determine that considerations of national security require unilateral assistance and to commit U.S. or collective security forces to support or reinforce indigenous forces in defense of the country attacked."
102.	"Vietnam's Defense Capacity," in The American Stake in Vietnam, op. cit., 86.
103.	Scigliano, op. cit., 163; Judson J. Conner, "Teeth for the Free World Dragon," Army Information Digest (November, 1960), 43.
104.	U.S., Joint Chiefs of Staff, telegram JCS 974802 of 30 March 1960 to CINCPAC noted increasingly deteriorating internal security in Vietnam and informed that: "The JCS agree that anti-guerrilla capability should be developed within organization of the regular armed forces by changing emphasis in training selected elements ARVN and other forces from conventional to anti-guerrilla warfare." This cable among many of that period refocused the MAAG Mission on internal security, and this became the central theme of the military portions of the "Counter-insurgency Plan for South Viet-Nam" of January, 1961. U.S. Embassy, Saigon, Despatch No. 276, of January 4, 1961. The MAAG "Country Statements" for the period 1956-1960 record a concentration on developing the staff and logistic superstructure of ARVN, and on U.S. Army-type training programs; throughout, it is clear that the MAAG looked increasingly to the Self Defense Corps, the Civil Guard, and the National Police to meet the "Viet Minh" internal threat in order to free ARVN for conventional combat training. See especially U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, "Country Statement on MDAP, non-NATO Countries," paragraphs 1, 5, 6, and Section C, of the reports 15 January 1956, 20 July 1956, 21 January 1957, 15 July 1957; also, same headquarters, "Narrative Study," dated 24 August 1958, and "Narrative Statement," dated 25 November 1958 with changes dated 10 May 1959, 9 August 1959, and 8 November 1959. Cf., Shaplen, op. cit., 117–119, 137; Warner, op. cit., 129–136; Scigliano, op. cit., 162–167; Nighswonger, op. cit., 43–48, David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire (New York: Random House, 1965), 60–66.
105.	David Hotham, "South Vietnam – Shaky Bastion," New Republic, November 25, 1957, 15; Scigliano, op. cit., 118–119.
106.	Ibid., 111–115. The author concluded that the Saigon–Bien Hoa Highway had been undertaken for military reasons, and that "this 20-mile stretch of highway cost more money than the United States provided for all labor, community development, social welfare, housing, health, and education projects in Vietnam combined during the entire period 1954–1961."
107.	ICC, Second Interim Report..., op. cit., 55.
108.	U.S. Secretary of State Dulles, Memorandum for the President, 17 November 1954, subject: "General Collins' Recommendations Regarding Military Force Levels in Vietnam."
109	JCS, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 22 September 1954, subject: "Retention and Development of Forces in Indochina," sets an objective of a minimum French force of four divisions until four RVNAF divisions were available to replace them; it also stresses that the Geneva Agreement constituted in Vietnam "a major obstacle to the introduction of adequate U.S. MAAG personnel and of additional arms and equipment." In a JCS Memo of 19 October 1954, subject: "Development and Training of Indigenous Forces in Indochina," the Chiefs, noting the Geneva limit on personnel, recommended against MAAG's RVNAF unless "political considerations are overriding." In a Memo of 17 November 1954, subject: "Indochina," the JCS addressed the problem of a 77,000 man RVNAF, and found it adequate for internal security only; noting the Viet Minh strength, they stated that a force of that size could not provide for external security if French forces were withdrawn, but agreed that the MAAG could train RVNAF at that level while complying with Geneva ceilings on personnel. Other examples of the continuing U.S. concern for observing the Geneva Agreements on the one hand, and on the other hand proceeding with the task of providing for Vietnam's security within its restrictions are provided in the MAAG, Country Statements, op. cit., and in U.S. Dept of State telegram 2601 from Paris, of 19 December 1954, in which Secretary Dulles accepted the principle that U.S. should not contravene the settlement. Dept of State telegram 3441 from Saigon of 17 February 1955 discloses Ambassador Collins' concern for observing the agreements even when observance precluded U.S. assistance for refugees.
110.	Anita Lauve Nutt, Troika on Trial, op. cit., 315–328. Though questionable on some judgments—e.g., attributing to the "civilian branch of the U.S. Government" a view that was in opposition to that of "military authorities" and against U.S. assumption of RVNAF training, Mrs. Nutt is essentially correct in her assertion that the U.S. abided by the Geneva ceilings for six years. The principal departure from the 342 strength accommodated TERM, a 350-man Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission which from May 1956 to December 1960 worked to recover, control and outship MDAP supplies—albeit upgrading the RVNAF logistic capability significantly in the process. The first substantial increase in MAAG followed a February, 1960, GVN request, which raised the ceiling from 342 to 685—still below the figure of 888, the combined 1954 strength of French cadres with RVNAF and MAAGs.
111.	H.M.G., Documents Relating to British Involvement in the Indochina Conflict, 1954–1965 (London: H.M.S.O., December, 1965), 110–125.
112.	Ibid.
113.	Government of the Republic of Vietnam, Violations of the Geneva Agreements by the Viet-Minh Communists (Saigon, July 1959).
114.	ICC, Sixth Interim Report..., op. cit., 31–32.
115.	ICC, Seventh Interim Report..., op. cit., 16–17.
116.	ICC, Eighth Interim Report..., op. cit., 11–13; Lauve, RM-2967-ARPA, op. cit., 208.
117.	ICC, Eleventh Interim Report..., op. cit., 17.
118.	American Friends of Vietnam, America's Stake in Vietnam, op. cit., 8–14.
119.	Ibid. 15–19
120	Ibid., passim.
121	Ibid., 101–102.
122	Ibid., 106–107.
123	E.g., U.S. Dept of State, "Legal Basis for U.S. Military Aid to South Vietnam," (Viet-Nam Information Notes, No. 10, August 1967).

1. U.S. Dept. of State, "Aggression from the North," Bulletin, March 22, 1965, 404–425 (esp Part V), reproduced in U.S. Congress, Background Information..., op. cit., 195.
2. Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet Nams (New York: Praeger, Revised Edition, 1964), 153–154, 358; Fall, Viet Nam Witness (New York: Praeger, 1966), 76.
3. Fall, The Two Viet Nams, op. cit., 154; Fall, "How the French...," op.cit., 88.
4. U.S. Dept. of State, "Information on Refugees in Vietnam," Interoffice Memorandum, 10 September 1957, SP/F7-16; Report of CINCPACFLT in Richard W. Lindholm, ed., Vietnam, The First Five Years (Michigan State University Press, 1959), 63–76. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, History of Naval Operations, Vietnam (Naval History Division, June, 1964), 87–98.
5. U.S. Intelligence Board, NIE 63.1-55, "Probable Developments in North Vietnam Through July 1956" (19 July 1955) SECRET; NIE 63.1-3-55 "Probable Developments in Vietnam to July 1956" (11 October 1955) SECRET.
6. U.S. State Department "Information on Refugees...," op. cit.; CIA, National Intelligence Survey, North Vietnam (NIS 43C, General Survey, July 1964), iv.
7. R.P. Stebbins and the Research Staff of the Council on Foreign Relations, The United States in World Affairs, 1954 (New York: Harper and Bros., 1956), 285, quoted in Kahin and Lewis, United States in Vietnam, op. cit., 75.
8. Wilfred G. Bruchett, Vietnam, Inside Story of the Guerrilla War (New York: International Publishers, 1965), 128.
9. U.S. Dept. of State, Aggression from the North (Washington: GPO, 1965) (Dept. of State Publication 7839, February, 1965), 11. Intelligence estimates of the 1954–1956 period used the figure 95,000; e.g., HIE 63-56, op. cit., 6.
10. The Rand Corporation is sponsoring an extensive study of the DRV role in the southern insurgency, based on captured documents and interviews with prisoners and defectors; three reports published to date are germane: J. J. Zasloff, "The Role of North Vietnam in the Southern Insurgency," RM-4140-PR (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, August, 1966); Zasloff, "Political Motivation of the Viet Cong: the Viet Minh Regroupees," RM-4703-ISA/ARPA (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, August, 1966); Zasloff, "Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954-1960: The Role of the Southern Viet Minh Cadres," RM-5613-ISA/ARPA (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, March, 1967). For data on children and Montagnards, see RM-4140, 33–34; and RM-4703, 1, 25, 29–30; also Fall) The Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 358.
11. Report 204/64 of the GVN National Interrogation Center, Saigon, cited in RM-4703, op. cit., 30–31; Cf., Wilfred G. Burchett, The Furtive War (New York: International Publishers, 1963), 146–147.
12. Dennis Warner, The Last Confucian, op. cit., 142–143, reported 500 marriages in Quang Ngai Province alone—and 20,000 families there with close relatives in the North; Wesley Fishel, "Vietnam's War of Attrition," The New Leader (December 7, 1959), 17 identified 300 marriages with departing Viet Minh in Binh Dinh Province: both cited in RM-4140, op. cit., 33. Concerning the recruitment of youth, see RM-4703, op. cit., 26; and the Report of the Saigon Military Mission, FY 1955, (Lansdale Report of 1955), 34.
13. RM-4703, op. cit., 27, 35.
14. Ibid., 34.
15. Ibid., 35.
16. Ibid., 36.