United States v. Kansas City Life Insurance Company/Dissent Douglas

by William O. Douglas

United States Supreme Court

339 U.S. 799

United States  v.  Kansas City Life Insurance Company

 Argued: March 29, 1950. --- Decided: June 5, 1950

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK, Mr. Justice REED, and Mr. Justice MINTON, concur, dissenting.

What respondent here purports to claim is a property right in the unfettered flow of Dardenne Creek in its natural state. But what respondent in substance claims is a property right in the unfettered flow of the Mississippi in its natural state. The two are necessarily the same, for water seeks its own level. No such right accrues to one who owns the shore and bed of the great river, until that river is raised above high-water mark. And we think that one who is riparian to a tributary has no greater claim upon the flow of the Mississippi. For this Court has held it to be 'inconceivable' that 'the running water in a great navigable stream is capable of private ownership.' United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69, 33 S.Ct. 667, 674, 57 L.Ed. 1063. It would be incongruous to deny compensation to owners adjacent to navigable rivers and require it for others bordering their tributaries for like injuries caused by the single act of lifting the river's mean level to the high-water mark. Because water seeks its own level, raising the level of the river necessarily raises that of the tributary at their conjunction and as far upstream on each as the effects of the lifting may go. These facts are equally apparent to both types of owners. We think they should be anticipated by both, and that the one has no more power to obstruct or burden the power of Congress in its control of the river's bed in the interest of navigation than the other. Neither has any greater right to have the river flow in its natural state than the other.

Basically the problem in this case is to locate a workable and reasonable boundary between Congress' power to control navigation in the public interest and the rights of landowners adjacent to navigable streams and their tributaries to compensation for injuries flowing from the exercise of that power. The Constitution does not require compensation for all injuries inflicted by the exercise of Congress' power. Neither is the power unlimited. The line therefore must be drawn in accommodation of the two interests. This could be done, as it was in United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 37 S.Ct. 380, 61 L.Ed. 746, by allowing compensation for all injuries inflicted by any change in the natural level and flow of the stream; it can be done, as in United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592, 61 S.Ct. 772, 85 L.Ed. 1064 and United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 65 S.Ct. 761, 89 L.Ed. 1101, by allowing change in the natural flow to the extent of lifting the mean level to high-water mark without liability for constitutional compensation; it could be done by applying the latter rule to owners riparian to the navigable stream, the former to those riparian to nonnavigable tributaries.

There is no sound reason for treating the two types of owners differently. Congress has power to regulate commerce by raising the level of a navigable stream to high-water mark without liability for compensation to any riparian owner. The effect upon the riparian owner of the river's tributaries, whether navigable or nonnavigable, is the same as that upon the owner riparian to the river itself. So is the congressional power and the dominant servitude. In this view no vested private right is given to anyone, as against the public Mr. Justice MINTON, dissenting.

I agree with all that Mr. Justice DOUGLAS says in his dissent, but I would for an additional reason reverse this case. The waters interfered with here were surface and percolating or subsurface waters. Respondent had always enjoyed the economic advantage of having its surface and subsurface water drain into Dardenne Creek. The raising of the water level in the Mississippi has interfered with this advantage. But surface and subsurface waters are outlaws in Missouri, as at common law, and anyone may defend against them and interfere with their natural drainage. ^[1] No right exists under Missouri law to have surface or subsurface water flow naturally onto adjoining land. Landowners may build embankments, dykes, or other obstructions to stop the flow of surface water upon their land. Although it appears that under Missouri law a riparian owner may not dam a watercourse so that it is obstructed or the lands of another are flooded, ^[2] no authority has been brought to my attention which would indicate that the obstruction of drainage by raising the water level of a stream confers a cause of action. I had not supposed that just compensation requires the Government to pay for that which a riparian owner may freely do under state law. The Government, by interfering with the drainage into Dardenne Creek, is not 'taking' any 'right' of respondent.

'* * * not all economic interests are 'property rights'; only those economic advantages are 'rights' which have the law back of them, and only when they are so recognized may courts compel others to forbear from interfering with them or to compensate for their invasion.' United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502, 65 S.Ct. 761, 764, 89 L.Ed. 1101.

Since the United States may with impunity cause land lying within the bed of the stream to be overflowed as a superior right to control navigation, and since respondent has no right to the unhampered drainage of surface and subsurface water, it follows that the Government has taken no right of respondent. Therefore it is not bound to pay compensation. It would be anomalous indeed that while the Government may flood lands lying between highand low-water marks without paying compensation, it is liable for an interference with drainage of surface water by raising the water level to high-water mark. I would reverse the judgment.

Notes

1. See, e.g., Goll v. Chicago & A.R. Co., 271 Mo. 655, 197 S.W. 244; Johnson v. Leazenby, 202 Mo.App. 232, 216 S.W. 49; Mehonray v. Foster, 132 Mo.App. 229, 111 S.W. 882; Applegate v. Franklin, 109 Mo.App. 293, 84 S.W. 347; Gottenetroeter v. Kapplemann, 83 Mo.App. 290; Collier v. Chicago & A.R. Co., 48 Mo.App. 398.
2. See Keener v. Sharp, 341 Mo. 1192, 111 S.W.2d 118; Greisinger v. Klinhardt, 321 Mo. 186, 9 S.W.2d 978; Springfield Waterworks Co. v. Jenkins, 62 Mo.App. 74.