United States v. Thomas (82 U.S. 337)/Dissent Miller
Justices SWAYNE, MILLER, and STRONG dissented; Justice MILLER for himself saying as follows:
The case of United States v. Prescott [1] arose on a certificate of division of opinion of the Circuit judges, on the question whether 'the felonious taking and carrying away the public moneys in the custody of a receiver of public moneys, without any fault or negligence on his part, discharged him and his sureties, and may be set up as a defence to an action on his official bond.'
This question the court, without dissent, answered in the negative. The ruling was based, in the opinion of the court, on two grounds, clearly stated:
1. That the receiver, or other depositary of public funds in such cases, could not avail himself of the ordinary circumstances which would discharge a bailee for hire, by reason of an imperative principle of public policy. This policy was founded in the danger of collusive defences which the depositary could easily manage so as to make a strong case, and which the government could have no means of rebutting, however false or simulated it might be. And it was thought better to hold the party to the absolute payment or delivery of the money, than to open the door to such frauds.
2. That the depositary and his sureties, having given a bond, the condition of which was an express contract to pay or deliver, they were bound by that contract, according to the rigid terms which the law annexes to such covenants or promises.
In the subsequent case of United States v. Morgan, [2] the same question is decided on precisely the same grounds.
The case of United States v. Dashiel [3] was decided with merely a reference to the doctrine of the two cases just cited.
The case of United States v. Keehler [4] asserts the same doctrine and applies it to an action on a postmaster's bond, who had paid the money to an agent of the Confederate States on an order made by the insurrectionary government directing him to do so.
When the case of United States v. Dashiel came before the court I was not satisfied with the doctrine of the former cases. I do not believe now that on sound principle the bond should be construed to extend the obligation of the depositary beyond what the law imposes upon him, though it may contain words of express promise to pay over the money. I think the true construction of such a promise is to pay when the law would require it of the receiver, if no bond had been given; the object of taking the bond being to obtain sureties for the performance of that obligation. Nor do I believe that prior to these decisions there was any principle of public policy recognized by the courts, or imposed by the law, which made a depositary of the public money liable for it, when it had been lost or destroyed without any fault of negligence or fraud on his part, and when he had faithfully discharged his duty in regard to its custody and safe-keeping. Such were my opinions when, as a member of the court, I took part in the decision of United States v. Dashiel. But either no other judge shared those opinions, or, if any one did, he felt bound by the two previous decisions. I therefore acquiesced.
I understand the opinion in the present case to be directed to two points: 1. Mainly to undermining the ground on which the prior decisions on this subject rest. And, 2d. To establishing a distinction between this case and those.
As regards the first point. If the opinion or judgment of the court were based upon a frank overruling of those cases, and an abandonment of the doctrines on which they rest, I should acquiesce in that, though I did not in conference approve the judgment. But if the opinion of the court is to be construed as permitting those cases to stand as law while the principles on which alone they can be defended are weakened by its argument, I must express my dissent from that view of the case. And still more strongly do I dissent from the distinction attempted to be drawn between this case and those. If a theft or a robbery in time of profound peace can be so easily simulated, and the collusion can be so successful, that public policy requires that no such defence be listened to, I leave it to any ordinary understanding to say how much more easily the pretence of force by the rebels can be arranged and proved by consenting parties, and how much more difficult for the government to disprove such collusive arrangements than in the other case mentioned.
The Congress of the United States, recognizing the law as laid down in the former decisions of this court, provided by the act of March 3, 1865, for such cases of hardship as it thought worthy of relief. Unless, therefore, the doctrine be reviewed and placed on such basis of sound principle as would do justice in all cases, I see no reason to make exceptions in favor of persons who, like the present defendant, holding by virtue of his office the money of the United States, delivered it into the hands of its enemies, without the application of the slightest personal violence, or a moment's imprisonment, or any attempt to seize his person or property, on the ground that they were able to do these things and threatened to do them. Such excuse, easily made, easily proved, hard to be confuted, is, in my judgment, much weaker than that of theft admitted to be without fault or fraud on the part of the depositary.
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This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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