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  • Chapter IX:
  • The Korean War and its Aftermath
"It is apparent that the United States is required to increase its military strength and preparedness not only to deal with the aggression in Korea but also to increase our common defense, with other free nations, against further aggression."
  • President Harry S. Truman[1].

  • In June 1950, when a Soviet trained and armed North Korean army attacked South Korea, the Cold War turned hot. The U.S. Army was forced to adopt emergency expedients during the first months of the war, but the maintenance of a significant military sustaining base after World War II, a response to Soviet-American tensions, allowed the nation to mobilize more quickly and easily than in the past. Within a year and a half the number of Army combat divisions on active duty went from ten to twenty. The Army, reacting to changing political, strategic, and operational requirements worldwide, for the first time in its history reassessed its reserve forces during a major war. Nevertheless, the end of the fighting in Korea brought new reductions, which resulted in fewer Army divisions by the end of the decade than during the war.

Deployment of Forces to KoreaEdit

2d Infantry Division elements move through a mountain pass
south of Wonju, Korea, 1951.
40th Infantry Division troops prepare to replace the 24th Infantry Division, January 1952.
4th Infantry Division leaves New York en route to Germany, 1951.
3.5-inch rocket launcher in action against the North Koreans
An M41 light tank (Walker Bulldog) destined for the 705th Tank Battalion, 102d Infantry Division
37th Infantry Division passes 10th Infantry Division in review before leaving Fort Riley.
  • The invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950 exposed a hollow Army. Divisions in Japan were completing a reorganization that reflected greatly reduced manning and equipment levels. The 1st Cavalry Division and the 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions all lacked reconnaissance, military police, and replacement companies, medical detachments, and bands. Their infantry regiments were each short one battalion and the tank company, and the 105mm. howitzer battalions had only two firing batteries. Only one company or battery was filled in the tank and antiaircraft artillery battalions. Tank companies were equipped with the M24 light tank because the Far East Command had feared that heavier tanks would damage Japanese roads and bridges. The one exception was the 25th Infantry Division, which fielded a black regimental combat team built around the 24th Infantry. In that team the infantry regiment and the field artillery battalion had all their elements, but at reduced levels. The authorized strengths of the divisions ranged between 12,500 and 13,650 officers and enlisted men[2].
  • Although the divisions fell well below war levels, President Harry S. Truman responded to the United Nations resolution to stop aggression in South Korea by ordering troops to Korea on 30 June. The next day Task Force Smith, elements of the 24th Infantry Division, the closest to Korea at Kobura, Japan, deployed to Suwon, South Korea, by air. The rest of the division quickly followed by sea. Shortly after the 24th's departure, the Far East Command brought the 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division to some semblance of effective fighting strength by stripping the 7th Infantry Division. By the end of July both divisions had joined in the fight, with the almost totally gutted 7th Division remaining in Japan[3].
  • As the three understrength divisions fought in Korea, the Army Staff set about to bring them to full strength, along with the 7th Infantry Division in Japan. Personnel were involuntarily extended, and the length of their overseas tours was increased. Other commands were cannibalized for units, personnel, and equipment. Particularly scarce in the Far East Command were tanks and antiaircraft artillery. Because all the divisional tank and antiaircraft artillery battalions there had been reduced to a company or battery, replacement units had to come from the United States. With the divisions in Korea taking heavy casualties and the replacement system on the verge of bankruptcy, several months elapsed before the units neared war levels[4].
  • Heavy losses and the amount of time required for units and personnel to reach the Orient resulted in an agreement on 15 August between the Far East Command and the South Korean government for the temporary assignment of Korean nationals to U.S. Army units. Under the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA) program, approximately 8,600 Koreans were to serve in each American division as soldiers. Various barriers-language, cultural differences, inadequate training, and unfamiliarity with Army organization, weapons, and tactics-hindered the program from achieving its goal. A few months after the plan's inception, the command curtailed it because of improvements in the replacement system and the desire to concentrate on rebuilding the Republic of Korea Army. Although U.S. divisions continued to receive some Korean recruits, no division received the 8,600 initially envisaged[5].
  • With United Nations troops being overwhelmed in South Korea, General Douglas MacArthur, the United Nations Forces commander, requested immediate reinforcements from the United States. In July he asked for the 2d Infantry Division, stationed at Fort Lewis; a regimental combat team from the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg; and some smaller units. Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins refused to send a regimental combat team from the 82d Airborne Division, preferring to keep the division intact for other contingencies. Instead, he favored dispatching a team from the 11th Airborne Division at Fort Campbell built around the 187th Airborne Infantry. The Joint Chiefs of Staff obtained President Truman's approval for the moves on 9 July, but many units in the United States had to be stripped to fill the 2nd Division before it could deploy.
  • Elements of the 2d arrived in Korea on 31 July, and the division entered combat in late August. The 187th did not arrive until October[6].
  • The arrival of the 2d Infantry Division in Korea allowed Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, commanding the Eighth Army there, to withdraw the 24th Infantry Division from combat along the Naktong River. Due to the heavy losses sustained by the division, Walker decided to transfer all personnel and equipment from the 34th Infantry and the 63d Field Artillery Battalion to other units in the division, replacing them with the 5th Regimental Combat Team (organized around the 5th Infantry), which had recently arrived from Hawaii. With the infusion, the division was ready for combat again by the end of August. Subsequently the 34th Infantry and 63d Field Artillery Battalion returned to Japan, where they were reorganized to train replacements[7].
  • In August 1950 MacArthur planned an amphibious assault at Inchon, Korea, that would include the 7th Infantry Division, the only U.S. Army division left in Japan. To replace it in his reserve, he requested deployment of the 3d Infantry Division, the last Regular Army infantry division in the United States. After much debate in Washington, Truman sanctioned its deployment. Since a large portion of its personnel and equipment had been withdrawn earlier to meet other demands in Korea, the 3d Division had fewer than 5,000 men. To address the personnel problem, the division commander reassigned the personnel from one of its regimental combat teams and one general support field artillery battalion elsewhere in the division. At the same time, the Army Staff assigned two field artillery battalions and attached the 65th Infantry, the Puerto Rican regiment, to the division. The 3d Infantry Division arrived in Japan on 15 September, except for the 65th Infantry, which had moved directly to Korea from Camp Losey, Puerto Rico. In Japan the division received a Korean augmentation and began to train for combat. As elements of the 3d arrived in Japan, elements of the 7th Infantry Division landed at Inchon. Following the Chinese intervention in the war during the fall of 1950, the 3d Infantry Division also moved to Korea where the 65th Infantry joined it[8].
  • The attachment of the 65th Infantry to the 3d Infantry Division marked a departure in the Army's segregation policies. In the past native Puerto Ricans were assigned exclusively to Puerto Rican units. In September 1951 the only units in which Puerto Ricans could serve outside the Caribbean area were elements of the 65th Regimental Combat Team in Korea. However, since more Puerto Ricans had entered the Army than were needed for these segregated Spanish-speaking units, the Army removed all restrictions on the assignments of Puerto Ricans who spoke English[9].
  • The first few months of the war the Army relied on stopgap measures to field its six undermanned divisions in Korea but was still able to evolve a strategy for conducting the war. Under MacArthur, a strategy of attrition was quickly replaced by a strategy of annihilation. When the Chinese entered the war in the fall of 1950 the United Nations reverted to an attrition strategy, but one which depended on firepower rather than manpower. No major reinforcements would be provided to the forces in Korea. Although limited manpower mobilization in the United States solved many personnel problems in the Far East Command, divisions continued to lack trained infantry and artillery troops. After the United Nations spring counteroffensive, which ended on 8 July 1951, negotiations began for an armistice, with the number of Army divisions in Korea remaining fixed at six until the summer of 1953[10].

Rebuilding the General ReserveEdit

  • To field the divisions destined for Korea, the Army stripped the General Reserve of its resources. After the summer of 1950 its divisional units consisted of only the understrength 2d Armored Division, the partially organized 11th Airborne Division, and, closest to its wartime authorized strength, the 82d Airborne Division. The reserve had to be quickly rebuilt for other contingencies, particularly for Western Europe, where many national leaders feared a major challenge from the Soviet Union. In July defense officials began discussing the means for enlarging the Army, but many months passed before they decided upon a program. In the meantime, the Army expanded piecemeal. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson approved the activation of another infantry division on 14 July 1950, but it was not until October that the 4th Infantry Division, which had been serving as a training division at Fort Ord, moved to Fort Benning to be reorganized as a combat unit. The Army Staff expected the division to be trained by the late spring of 1951[11].
  • Because it would have taken too much time to organize new Regular Army divisions and Class B Organized Reserve Corps divisions (officers and enlisted cadre), the Army's leadership decided to recommend bringing some understrength National Guard divisions into federal service. On 10 August the president approved inducting four Guard infantry divisions. To accommodate them, the Army reactivated four World War II camps, and early in September the 28th (Pennsylvania), 40th (California), 43d (Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Vermont), and 45th (Oklahoma) Infantry Divisions entered active federal service. Army Field Forces and the Army Staff selected those units because of their geographic distribution, the status of their equipment, and their strength, which ranged from 8,000 to 9,500 officers and enlisted men each. The Army Staff immediately began working to bring the divisions up to their full table of organization and equipment strength[12].
  • Initially individual reservists recalled to active duty filled Regular and Guard divisions, but to maintain them and other divisions, as well as organize new units, the Army Staff relied on volunteers and draftees who were schooled in existing or reactivated training centers. To operate the centers, Army Field Forces activated five Regular Army divisions, the 8th Infantry at Fort Jackson, South Carolina; the 101st Airborne at Camp Breckinridge, Kentucky; the 5th Armored at Camp Chaffee, Arkansas; the 6th Armored at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; and the 7th Armored at Camp Roberts, California, between August and November 1950. The 6th Infantry Division was also reactivated to replace the 4th at Fort Ord[13].
  • The Chinese intervention in the fall of 1950 stimulated broader mobilization measures. After considerable debate, President Truman declared a national emergency, which required additional military forces to meet the Soviet threat in Europe as well as to fight the war in Korea. The mobilization plan called for eighteen combat divisions to be on active duty by June 1952. To obtain the additional divisions, the president approved the induction of the National Guard's 31st (Alabama and Mississippi) and 47th (Minnesota and North Dakota) Infantry Divisions into federal service in January 1951. These were reorganized under reduced tables that called for approximately 14,500 officers and enlisted men. For the eighteenth division, the Army reactivated the Regular Army's 1st Armored Division in March. This last unit improved the balance in the active force among infantry, armored, and airborne divisions, which stood at 2 armored, 2 airborne, and 14 infantry[14].
  • In the fall of 1951 the Joint Chiefs of Staff reevaluated the mobilization program and set a new goal of twenty-one active duty combat divisions by 31 December 1955. From the National Guard, the 37th (Ohio) and 44th (Illinois) Infantry Divisions were brought into federal service in early 1952, but the twenty-first division was not federalized or activated because of budgetary limitations. Thus the Korean War and the Cold War mobilization peaked at twenty divisions (See Chart 21 Below)[15]


  • Personnel policies for manning divisions during the Korean War differed from those used in World Wars I and II. Prior to 1951, when soldiers went overseas to fight, their tour was usually for the duration of the war. With far-flung commitments throughout Europe and Asia, Army leaders adopted a personnel rotation policy during the second year of the Korean War. They hoped such a system would avoid alienating the general public and maintain the morale of the soldiers themselves. To accommodate the additional personnel needed to implement the rotation, the training base was further expanded in the spring of 1951. The 5th Infantry Division was activated at Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, Pennsylvania, increasing the number of training divisions to ten, the maximum number during the Korean War. General Reserve divisions were also tasked to train recruits (See Table 22 Below)[16].


  • By April 1951 the Army was able to provide additional forces to improve the security of Japan, where no divisional reserve had existed since the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. The 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions moved to Japan, where they completed their training. Congress insisted, however, that the National Guard divisions have an opportunity to fight, and in the winter of 1951-52 the 40th and 45th Divisions replaced the 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions in Korea. The method of exchange revived a technique that had been developed during World War II. Ships that carried the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions to Korea brought the 1st Cavalry Division and 24th Infantry Division back to Japan. The units swapped all heavy equipment and supplies while the men carried only their personal arms and equipment with them. Thus the units experienced only a limited decline in combat efficiency. The two seasoned divisions returned to Japan to serve as a reserve. Until July 1953 the 2d, 3d, 7th, 25th, 40th, and 45th Infantry Divisions carried the fight in Korea. During the waning days of the conflict, immediately before the armistice on 25 July, the 24th Infantry Division returned to Korea as a rear area force to bolster the security of prisoner-of-war camps[17].
  • In 1952 Congress authorized what were in effect eight more divisions for the National Guard to replace the units in federal service. These organizations gave some areas of the country military forces where none had existed since units were federalized two years earlier for the Korean War. Under the new law the federal government could retain National Guard units (exclusive of personnel) for five years, but the states could organize replacements for the units in federal service. The new local units were to have the same designations as the units in federal service, with the additional identification NGUS (National Guard of the United States). Furthermore, the legislation required that when the Guard units in federal service were returned to the states, they were to be consolidated with their sister organizations. States began organizing NGUS units in 1952, and by the end of the Korean War on 23 July 1953, six out of the eight Guard divisions in federal service had local counterparts. Of the remaining two, the 37th Infantry Division (NGUS) received federal recognition on 15 January 1954, but the 44th never had an NGUS counterpart. The governor of Illinois, as an economy move, declined to organize it and requested the state's troop allotment be amended to delete the 44th Infantry Division. The division was removed from the force when it was released from federal service in December 1954[18].
  • In addition to fighting the war in Korea in the early 1950s, the nation committed forces to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since 1947 only the 1st Infantry Division had been stationed in Europe, but with the establishment of NATO President Truman announced a substantial increase in forces there. Between May and November 1951 the 2d Armored Division and the 4th, 28th, and 43d Infantry Divisions joined the 1st Infantry Division in Germany. The commitment of these forces and similar actions by the NATO partners demonstrated a new reliance on collective security to deter aggression[19].

Organizational TrendsEdit

  • During the Korean War the Army modified some aspects of its divisional organizations, but the basic triangular structures adopted during World War II and revised in the immediate postwar period for infantry, armored, and airborne divisions remained intact. In 1952 a divisional ordnance battalion replaced the ordnance company, which increased self-sufficiency in each type of division. The trend in most organizations, however, was to save personnel and increase firepower. Chief of Staff Collins estimated that the changes in the infantry division enhanced its firepower by 68 percent compared to its World War II counterpart with only a 20 percent increase in personnel[20].
  • Firepower in the infantry regiment was increased through a series of changes. A 105-mm. recoilless rifle found a place within the regiment, as did the more powerful 3.5-inch "bazooka," a rocket fired from a shoulder position. In the first engagements of the Korean War, the 2.36-inch bazooka had proved inadequate against the Soviet T-34 tanks supplied to the North Koreans. To meet the Far East Command's requirement for an improved antitank weapon, 3.5-inch rocket launchers were rushed to the theater. On 20 July 1950 elements of the 24th Infantry Division used them to knock out several Russian-built tanks, and thereafter the weapon received wide use. Infantry used new models of the 81-mm. and 4.2-inch mortars, and the number of automatic rifles was increased in the regiment[21].
  • Improved aircraft technology provided all three types of divisions with new resources. The helicopter, boasting both vertical lift and hover capability, became a practical tactical and transport asset, playing a key role in supply and medical evacuation in Korea. Infantry and airborne divisions were authorized sixteen traditional fixed-wing aircraft and ten helicopters, while each armored division fielded eighteen aircraft and ten helicopters. The debate again surfaced as to whether all divisional aviation should be located in one unit since they usually used the same airfield. No separate aviation unit won approval, and technically the aircraft remained dispersed to the various units throughout the divisions. Divisions in combat, however, centralized their aircraft under divisional aviation officers who organized provisional aviation companies[22].
  • The Army made more significant changes in the armored division. Although large armored formations were considered unsuitable for the rugged terrain in Korea, the Army still faced a massive Soviet armored threat in Europe. In response, the armored division fielded the first new family of tanks since World War II. The M103 (T43) tank armed with a 120-mm. gun was authorized for the heavy tank battalion. Weighing about sixty tons, it was the largest and most powerful American combat vehicle adopted to date. The new medium tank, the M47, had an improved fire control system and a high-velocity 90-mm. gun, which enhanced its lethality, but it did not become available in any quantity until 1953. For the reconnaissance squadron the tables provided for the new M41 light tank, nicknamed the "Walker Bulldog" for General Walker, who had been killed in a jeep accident in Korea. In all, the armored division fielded 343 tanks[23].
  • The divisions deployed in Korea, Japan, and Germany usually adopted changes shortly after they were announced, in contrast to those in the United States. The latter, except for the 82d Airborne Division, served in a training capacity, mostly providing replacements for the overseas forces. As noted, training centers failed to meet the demand for replacements, but the political decision to limit mobilization precluded expanding the existing training centers or opening others, forcing the Army to use combat divisions to perform that function[24].
  • The Korean War brought about a major social change that touched all units throughout the Army. The Army had maintained all-black units since the Civil War, but military efficiency tests showed that blacks fought and performed better in integrated units than in segregated ones. Also, post-World War II social attitudes increased the demand for integration. In 1948 President Truman had directed desegregation of the armed forces, but the Army was slow, as were the other services, to respond. By May 1951, however, 61 percent of the line infantry companies in Korea had both white and black soldiers because little consideration was given to replacement by race. On 1 July of that year the Army authorized the new Far East commander, General Matthew B. Ridgway (Truman had relieved MacArthur the previous April) to integrate all units under his control, except for the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions. These units, which had recently arrived from the United States, were exempt from the order because they were National Guard organizations. The Army feared political repercussions from the states if their units were racially mixed. Nevertheless, despite the initial hesitation, the 40th and 45th were integrated shortly after they entered combat in Korea[25].
  • The Far East Command usually integrated units through normal administrative processes. For example, the 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry, and the 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, elements of the 2d and 3d Infantry Divisions that had been filled with black soldiers, were desegregated by simply reassigning them. The 25th Infantry Division had the 24th Infantry, the only all-black regiment in the Regular Army, and Ridgway approved inactivating the regiment to disassociate all divisional elements with segregation. The Army Staff transferred the 14th Infantry, less its personnel and equipment, from the United States to the Far East Command, and on 1 August 1951 the regiment replaced the 24th in the division. Most of the 24th's black soldiers were dispersed throughout the command, while white soldiers to fill the 14th were drawn from the 34th Infantry in Japan. Units in the other regional commands integrated soon thereafter[26]

Readjustment of Divisional ForcesEdit

  • Hostilities ended in Korea on 23 July 1953 when the United Nations and North Korea signed an armistice, but demobilization, like mobilization, did not follow a preplanned course. A threat still hung over Korea, and the defense of Western Europe remained of paramount concern. The size of the Army depended on the new president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, inaugurated in January 1953, who was committed to reducing military expenditures. Between 1 July 1953 and 1 July 1956, the Congress, at the president's request, cut the active Army from 1.5 to 1 million men, a reduction that required major adjustments in divisional forces[27].
  • By that time the annual load in the training centers had stabilized at a lower peacetime level, and the Army Staff had turned its attention to improving the General Reserve, particularly as a reenforcement force for Europe. In October 1953 the staff designated the 1st Armored Division and 44th Infantry Division as 30-day reinforcement units for NATO and named the 82d Airborne Division as the Western Hemisphere's contingency force. To bring these and other divisions in the General Reserve up to war levels, the 5th Infantry, 7th Armored, and 101st Airborne Divisions, which had been operating training centers, were inactivated and their personnel reassigned. The training center operated by the 10th Infantry Division was also closed, and a new mission was planned for the division[28].
  • In December 1953 Eisenhower, who had hesitated to reduce forces in Korea because of the precarious armistice, announced that two of the seven U.S. Army divisions there were to return home, a step permitted by improved capabilities of the South Korean Army. United States Army Forces, Far East, selected the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions for return to the United States, and they departed Korea in the spring of 1954 with only a token personnel complement. Shortly thereafter the divisions were released from active federal service and reverted to state control. Concerned about the effects of demobilization because of events in Southeast Asia (the French were on the verge of withdrawing from that area), Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson suspended further reductions in the Far East Command on 7 April 1954[29].
  • Although the Army could retain National Guard designations for five years, Secretary Wilson decided to release the 28th, 31st, 37th, and 43d Infantry Divisions to state control in June 1954. This decision was primarily an administrative action and did not affect the actual number of combat or training divisions in active service. In Europe the 9th and 5th Infantry Divisions replaced the 28th and 43d Infantry Divisions, while the 8th and 10th Infantry Divisions in the United States replaced the 31st and 37th at Fort Carson and Fort Riley. The 69th Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne Division were reactivated to fill the gaps left by the 5th and 9th in the training base[30].
  • By the summer of 1954 the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea and the expansion of its army to twenty divisions permitted additional American reductions in Korea and allowed the Department of Defense to release all reserve units from active duty. In October the 25th Infantry Division with its personnel and equipment moved from Korea to Hawaii, where it became part of the Pacific area reserve. Shortly thereafter the 2d and 3d Infantry Divisions, reduced to near zero strength in Korea, replaced the National Guard 44th and 47th Infantry Divisions at Forts Lewis and Benning. The Guard divisions returned to state control, thus ending the involvement of the reserve divisions in the Korean War. When those divisions left federal service, only their designations reverted to the states since the guardsmen themselves had been released earlier. The states reorganized the units, except for the 44th, which Illinois did not want, by using the NGUS divisions as the nuclei, as planned[31].
  • After many revisions of the blueprints for a residual force in Korea, the Department of Defense instructed the services to plan for three divisions, one Army, one Marine, and one United Nations, plus combat support and combat service support units to remain there. In December 1954 Secretary Wilson decided that the Marine unit would return to the United States, leaving two Army divisions in Korea. As a result, the 24th Infantry Division, in the midst of moving to Japan, reversed its course and rejoined the 7th Infantry Division in Korea Coakley et al., "Demobilization," pp. 29-38.[32].
  • To improve the balance within Regular Army divisional forces after the Korean War, General Ridgway, who had become Army Chief of Staff in 1953, decided to revise the ratios among infantry, armored, and airborne units. In June 1954 the Fourth Army activated the 4th Armored Division, the first division to be equipped with the new M48 90-mm. tank. Ridgway planned to organize another armored division, raising the Regular Army total to four, but tank production lagged, preventing its formation until 1955. The 3d Armored Division was then converted from a training to a combat unit[33].
  • Although total Army strength declined and the reserves were released, the Army remained committed to an active force of twenty divisions. The Department of Defense, therefore, authorized the activation of the 23d and 71st Infantry Divisions. Those units, dubbed "Wilson Divisions" after Secretary of Defense Wilson, who approved their activation while cutting the strength of the Army, made use of existing regimental combat teams. The 23d Infantry Division, the former Americal Division of World War II fame, controlled units stationed in the Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and the southeastern United States from its headquarters at Fort Amador, Panama Canal Zone. The 71st, with its headquarters at Fort Richardson, Alaska, included units in Alaska and the northwestern United States. Because of their scattered divisional elements, the Army Staff labeled the divisions "static units," indicating that they were not capable of early deployment[34].
  • With further cuts on the horizon for the Regular Army, the Army Staff had to economize on manpower if it was to maintain twenty divisions. A review of all divisional tables of organization resulted in slightly smaller divisions. For example, without a change in structure, the infantry division dropped from 18,212 men of all ranks to 17,452. In addition, the tables provided for a reduced peacetime strength division, with some 2,700 fewer men for each division in the General Reserve. Before its divisions were sent into combat, they would, of course, need sufficient time and personnel to be brought to war strength as required for sustained operations. The lessons of Task Force Smith and the deployment of other units to Korea in the summer of 1950 thus appeared to be already lost. General Reserve divisions adopted the new tables in the summer of 1955. In addition, because of the Army's severe manpower shortages divisions in Europe were also reorganized under the reduced tables that same summer, and the tables were applied to the 25th Infantry Division, posted at Schofield Barracks, the following year[35].
  • Besides looking at the organizational tables for possible personnel cuts, the Army examined the individual replacement system. The system traditionally required the Army to maintain a large manpower overhead as a substantial percentage of its soldiers were always in transit. Lt. Gen. John E. Dahlquist, Chief of Army Field Forces, and Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, the Army Staff's Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (G-1), believed that a unit replacement system would be more economical, improve esprit de corps, and provide more efficient units. In response, the Army Staff developed the GYROSCOPE program, which paired a division in the United States with an overseas division. Personnel from the paired divisions were to exchange places every three years. In addition, the divisions in the United States were to conduct basic and advanced individual training, cutting the training base and providing each soldier with a home throughout most of his career. It also theoretically made it possible to replace an entire division if it were destroyed in a nuclear attack[36].

  • Beginning in 1955 fourteen divisions participated in the GYROSCOPE program (See Table 23 Below). To meet the changing needs of the Army, however, some deviation occurred during the duration of the program. For example, the 11th Airborne Division from Fort Campbell replaced the 5th Infantry Division in Germany in 1956, but the 5th's new station was Fort Ord, a former training center. Several benefits resulted: the European command received an airborne division, a unit it had wanted for some time; the U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC), successor to the Army Field Forces, gained a post, Fort Campbell, and equipment to test a new divisional structure for the airborne division; and the number of divisions remained unchanged[37].


  • As the divisions rotated, the U.S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army closely monitored their activities and readiness to determine the effect of the moves on the units. They found that divisional combat efficiency declined for a number of weeks before and after rotation, and Lt. Gen. Bruce C. Clarke, Seventh Army commander, recommended limiting GYROSCOPE to units smaller than divisions. In 1958 the last divisional exchange took place when the 3d Infantry Division from Fort Benning replaced the 10th Infantry Division. Thereafter the program involved only smaller-size units. On I September 1959 the Army terminated GYROSCOPE, following the recommendations of General Clyde D. Eddleman, Commander, U.S. Army, Europe, who believed that other replacement systems worked better with less disruption. GYROSCOPE helped to sustain morale, but the scheme did not save money or improve combat readiness[38].
  • With divisions in the GYROSCOPE program conducting individual training, the Department of the Army reduced the number of training centers. By 1 July 1955 only seven major training centers remained, of which five were operated by divisions. The continued use of divisional names for the centers, however, was being questioned. Lt. Gen. Walter L. Weibir, the G-1, wanted to change the centers' names to reflect their missions more accurately. For some time the divisional designations had confused the general public, government officials, and the trainees. In the spring of 1956 the Army thus inactivated the 6th and 69th Infantry Divisions and 5th and 6th Armored Divisions and reassigned the 101st Airborne Division as a test unit. Branch replacement centers replaced the training divisions. For example, the organization at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, became the U.S. Army Training Center, Field Artillery[39].
  • The savings that resulted from the revised tables of organization, modifications in the replacement system, and a reduction in the training base did not equal the required cuts in Army strength. The Army was therefore unable to maintain twenty Regular Army divisions. Further reductions required the commanders of United States Army, Caribbean, and Sixth Army to inactivate the 23d and 71st Infantry Divisions in 1956. Some of their elements, however, continued to serve in the active force[40].

Improving the ReservesEdit

  • The structure of the reserve components came under close scrutiny during the Korean War. By then military leaders had decided the large undermanned force of fifty-two divisions developed after World War II was unrealistic. On 24 October 1950 the chief of staff directed a committee to reevaluate the reserve structure and develop plans to meet both limited and major mobilizations. Six months later, before the decision to mobilize 20 divisions due to the Korean War, the committee reported that the Army needed 18 divisions on active duty-12 Regular Army and 6 National Guard-and 33 reserve divisions to back them up. The latter divisions fell into two categories for mobilization, an early ready force of 9 divisions from the National Guard and a late ready force of 24 divisions with 12 from the Guard and 12 from the Organized Reserve Corps. The units in the National Guard were to be maintained at 100 percent officer and 50 percent enlisted strength, while those in the Organized Reserve Corps were to have 100 percent of their officers but only an enlisted cadre. The committee decided that the remaining thirteen Organized Reserve Corps divisions were unnecessary and recommended their immediate inactivation[41].
  • During the summer and fall of 1951 the six army commanders in the United States, staff agencies, and the Section V Committee, created after World War I for the reserve components to have a voice in their affairs, evaluated the plan. The army commanders urged that all divisions in the Organized Reserve Corps be infantry divisions because they believed that the reserves could not adequately support armored and airborne training. They thought thirteen, rather than twelve, reserve divisions should be maintained to provide a better geographic distribution of the units. The Section V Committee opposed the reduction of the Organized Reserve Corps from twenty-five to thirteen divisions because it feared unfavorable publicity, particularly with the nation at war. On 20 December the Vice Chief of Staff, General John E. Hull, delayed reduction in the number of Reserve Corps divisions until 31 December 1952 but directed the reorganization and redesignation of airborne and armored divisions as infantry as soon as practicable. In March 1952 the 80th, 84th, 100th, and 108th Airborne Divisions were reorganized and redesignated as infantry divisions, and the 63d, 70th, and 75th Infantry Divisions replaced the 13th, 21st, and 22d Armored Divisions. The Army made no other divisional changes in the reserve troop basis at that time[42].
  • Along with the reorganization of the Organized Reserve Corps divisions, the Army published new regulations formalizing a "Ready Reserve" concept. Under the new rules the Ready Reserve comprised Early and Late Ready Forces, categories which replaced the old Class A, B, and C units. The Early Ready Force was to have 110 percent officer and 100 percent enlisted strength, while the Late Ready Force, which included all Organized Reserve Corps divisions, was to have 100 percent officer and 5 percent enlisted strength. In July 1952 Congress passed new legislation that redesignated the Organized Reserve Corps as the Army Reserve and gave legal status to the concept of the Ready Reserve[43].
  • Before the dust had settled on the reforms, the Army realized that it had failed to improve unit manning or meet reasonable mobilization requirements. In the fall of 1952 Army leaders thus proposed that the personnel from the thirteen inactivated Army Reserve divisions be assigned to strengthen the remaining twelve divisions. A new reserve troop basis resulted, this time calling for 37 divisions, 27 in the National Guard and 10 in the Army Reserve. To keep the unneeded fifteen Army Reserve divisions active, they were to be reorganized as training divisions to staff training centers upon mobilization or man maneuver area commands for training troops. The continental army commanders implemented the new Army Reserve troop basis in 1955 piecemeal. They reorganized, without approved tables of organization, the 70th, 76th, 78th, 80th, 84th, 85th, 89th, 91st, 95th, 98th, 100th, and 108th Infantry Divisions as cadre for replacement training centers and organized the 75th "Maneuver Area Commands" using the resources of the 75th Infantry Division. Two years later the 75th Infantry Division was inactivated along with 87th Infantry Division. Assets of the 87th were used to organize a maneuver area command; thus one unneeded division remained in the troop basis[44].
  • To prepare for challenges in Western Europe, the new troop basis authorized the conversion of four National Guard infantry divisions to armored divisions. New York, California, Georgia, and Florida agreed to convert the 27th, 40th, and 48th Infantry Divisions. For the fourth armored division, the Army planned to use the slot temporarily occupied by the 44th Infantry Division, which Illinois no longer wanted. Eventually Tennessee and North Carolina, which shared the 30th Infantry Division, each agreed to maintain a division; Tennessee organized the 30th Armored Division, while North Carolina organized the 30th Infantry Division[45].
  • In 1955 Congress again legislated measures to improve the reserves. Among the amendments to the 1952 law was a provision that allowed young men eighteen and a half years old to enlist in the Army Reserve for eight years. Not less than three and not more than six months of that obligation was to be spent on active duty for basic training. The law also provided that reservists who did not perform satisfactorily after basic training might be ordered, without their consent, to active duty not to exceed forty-five days. Although the Army Reserve hoped these provisions would help to meet manning problems, the measure failed. Most young men were uninterested in military service, and for the few who were the active Army lacked the resources to provide basic training and the National Guard proved more attractive than the Army Reserve[46].
  • At the beginning of 1957 the Army thus had 56 combat divisions and 12 training divisions. Of these, the Regular Army fielded 18 combat divisions, many not fully manned; the National Guard 27; and the Army Reserve 11. Of the 56 divisions, 3 were airborne, 10 were armored, and the remainder were infantry.
  • Between 1950 and 1957 Army divisions fought a war in Korea and deterred the Soviet challenge in Western Europe. At the height of the Korean War the active Army had eight divisions in the Far East, five in Germany, and a seven division General Reserve in the United States. Divisions retained their World War II structure with modifications while gaining additional firepower. As the United States assumed leadership of the Western democracies, a ready force, backed by fully manned and equipped reserves, took on added significance. Nevertheless, the Regular Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve divisions all suffered from a lack of personnel. After the Korean War budgetary constraints exacerbated the manning conditions, while the general reliance of the Eisenhower administration on nuclear deterrence put the fiscal emphasis on weapons systems rather than on the combat divisions.
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Endnotes for Chapter IXEdit

  1. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, January 1, 1950 to December 1950 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 532.
  2. Ltr, TAG to CinC, Far East, 12 Jun 50, sub: Activation, Inactivation, Redesignation, and Reorganization of Certain Units in the Far East Command, AGAO-I 322 (10 Apr 50) G-1-M, AG Reference files, DAMH-HSO; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 86-87, 90-94; Stubbs and Connor, Armor-Cavalry, p. 77.
  3. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 80-88
  4. Ltr, TAG to CinC, Far East, 26 Jul 50, sub: Reorganization of Certain Units in the Far East Command, AGAO-I 322 (21 Jul 50) G-I M, AG Reference files, DAMH-HSO; Elva Stillwaugh, "Personnel Policies in the Korean Conflict," ch. 1, pp. 32-40, Ms, DAMNHSR.
  5. Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, United States Army in the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 385-89; Charles G. Cleaver, "History of the Korean War," vol. 3, pt. 2, Personnel Problems, pp. 7-12, Ms, DAMHHSR; David Curtis Skaggs, "The KATUSA Experiment: The Integration of Korean Nationals into the U.S. Army, 1950-1965," Military Affairs 38 (Apr 1974): 53-58
  6. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 92-96, 168-71.
  7. Appleman, South to the Naktong, pp. 389-90; T.R. Fehrenback, This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan Company, 1963), p. 202; Ltr, Henry P. Carrington to Edgar M. Howell, 18 Nov 50, 63d Field Artillery Battalion file, DAMH-HSO; Military History Section, "A Brief History of the 34th Infantry Regiment" (United States Army Forces, Far East, Nov 1954), 34th Infantry file, DAMN-HSO.
  8. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 131-34; Max W. Dolcater, 3d Infantry Division in Korea (Tokyo: Toppan Printing Co., 1953), pp. 57-65; Ltr, TAG to CGs, Third and Second Armies, 25 Aug 50, sub: Organization and Reorganization of Certain Units, AGAO-I 322 (17 Aug 50) G-1-M, Ltr, TAG to CinC, Far East, 6 Oct 50, sub: Changes of Certain Units in the Far East Command, AGAO-I 322 (4 Sep 50), G-1-M, and Ltr TAG to CG, Third Army, 19 Mar 51, sub: Change in Status of Certain Units, AGAO-I 322 (2 Mar 51) G-1-M, all 3d Inf Div file, DAMN-HSO.
  9. Stillwaugh, "Personnel Policies," ch. 6, pp. l-4.
  10. Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow, November 1950 July 1951, United States Army in the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), pp. 237, 247, 503; Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, United States Army in the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 472.
  11. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 117-20; Stillwaugh, "Personnel Policies," ch. 1, pp. 9-12; Ltr, TAG to CGs, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Armies, 16 Oct 50, sub: Change in Status of Certain Units, AGAO-I 322 (29 Aug 50), G-1-M, 4th Inf Div file, DAMH-HSO.
  12. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 122-25, 294; National Guard Bureau, "Induction and Release of Army National Guard Units," pp. 21-24, National Guard Induction, Korean War, Reference Paper files, DAMH-HSO; OCAFF Diary, "Action in Support of FECOM 3 July 1950- 30 September 1950," Ms, DAMH-HSR; Ltr, TAG to CGs, First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Armies, 6 Sep 50, sub: Reorganization of Certain Units Called to Active Duty from Civilian Components, AGAO-1 322 Gen Res (23 Aug 50) G-1-M, AG Reference files. DAMH-HSO.
  13. Crossland and Currie, Twice a Citizen, pp. 96-97; Ltr, TAG to CG, Third Army, 10 Aug 50, sub: Activation of the 8th Infantry Division (Training), AGAO-I 322 (7 Aug 50) G-1-M, 8th Inf Div file, GO 51, Fort Jackson, South Carolina, 1950, Ltr, TAG to CG, Second Army, 10 Aug 50, sub: Activation of the 101st Airborne Division (Training), AGAO-I 322 (7 Aug 50) G-1-M, 101st Abn Div file, Ltr, TAG to CG, Fourth Army, 21 Aug 50, sub: Activation of the 5th Armored Division, 21 Aug 50, AGAO-I 322 Training Div (15 Aug 50) G-1-M, 5th Armd Div file, Ltr, TAG to CG, Fifth Army, 21 Aug 50, sub: Activation of the 6th Armored Division. AGAO-I 322 Training Div (15 Aug 50) G-1-M, 6th Armd Div file, Ltr, TAG to CG, Sixth Army, 10 Nov 50, sub: Activation of the 7th Armored Division, AGAO-1 322 (11 Oct 50) G-1-M, 7th Armd Div file, Ltr, TAG to CGs, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Armies, 16 Oct 50, sub: Change in Status of Certain Units, AGAO-I 322 (29 Aug 50), 4th Inf Div file, and Divisional Historical Data Cards, all DAMH-HSO.
  14. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 298-300; Truman, Papers of the President, 1950, pp. 746-47; "Induction and Release of Army National Guard Units," pp. 39-41; Ltr, TAG to CGs, Third and Fourth Armies, 26 Apr 51, sub: Reorganization of Certain General Reserve Units, AGAO-I 322 Gen Res (2 Apr 51) G-1-M, AG Reference files, Ltr, TAG to CGs, Third and Fourth Armies, 1 Mar 51, sub: Activation of the 1st Armored Division, AGAO-I 322 (24 Feb 51) G-1-M, 1st Armd Div file, DAMH-HSO.
  15. Stillwaugh, "Personnel Policies," ch. 1, pp. 51-60; "Induction and Release of Army National Guard Units," pp. 48-58.
  16. Stillwaugh, "Personnel Policies," ch. 3, p. 1; Ltr, TAG to CG, Second Army, 21 Feb 51, sub: Activation of the 5th Infantry Division (Training), AGAO-1 322 (2 Feb 51) G -1-M, 5th Inf Div file, and Historical Data Card 5th Inf Div, DAMH-HSO; Robert W. Coakley, Karl E. Cocke, Daniel P. Griffin, "Demobilization Following the Korean War," OCMH Study 29, pp. 71-73, Ms, DAMH-HSR.
  17. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, pp. 202-04. Prior to the redeployment of 24th Infantry Division to Korea in summer of 1953, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division and 24th Infantry Division had served there as security forces on a rotation basis since October 1952.
  18. DA Bull 15, 1952; Annual Report of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, 1953, pp. 2-3, 1954, p. 15; see notes based on NG-AROTO (National Guard Bureau-Organization and Training Branch) 325.4. letters, 1952-54, author's files; "Illinois Declines Allotment to Reorganize 44th Division," Army Times, 9 Jan 54; "Protests Rip Illinois Guard; Generals Urge Boyle's Removal," Army Times, 16 Jan 54; Ltr, NGB to AG, Illinois, 17 Feb 54, sub: Withdrawal of Federal Recognition, National Guard Units, NG-AROTO 325.4-111, 44th Inf Div file, DAMH-HSO.
  19. Truman, Papers of the President, 1950, p. 626; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1969), pp. 437-40; Historical Data Cards for the 4th, 28th, and 43d Inf Divs and the 2d Armd Div, DAMN-HSO.
  20. TOE 7, Infantry Division, 15 May 1952; TOE 17, Armored Division, 29 Dec 1952; TOE 57, Airborne Division, I Jan 1952; Lloyd Norman, "The New Look Strategy," Combat Forces Journal 4 (Feb 1954): 15-20.
  21. TOE 7-11, Infantry Regiment, 15 May 1952; "Tools for the Fighting Man: Small Arms," Armed Forces Talk (18 Jan 1952) pp. 1-15; Walter H. Ramsey, "The Big Bazooka: Russian Tanks Were No Match for Our 3.5-Inch Weapon," Ordnance 35 (May-Jun 1951): 638-40.
  22. TOE 7, Infantry Division, 15 May 1952; TOE 17, Armored Division, 29 Dec 1952; TOE 57, Airborne Division, 1 Jan 1952; James C. Smith, "Centralized Operations," Army Aviation Digest 1 (Mar 1955): 19-25; Joseph Bonanno, "The Helicopter in Combat," Ordnance 37 (MarApr 1954): 868-72; Donald F. Harrison, "A History of Army Aviation," ch. V, pp. 11-20, 25-27, Ms, DAMN-HSR.
  23. TOE 17, Armored Division, 29 Dec 1952; Stubbs and Connor, Armor-Cavalry, pp. 7778; "The T43 Heavy Tank," Armor 63 (May Jun 1954): 32-33; "Army's New M48 Medium Tank Ready for Distribution to Armor Troops," Armor 61 (May-Jun 1952): 30-31.
  24. Ltr, TAG to CinC, U.S. Army, Europe, 6 Feb 53, sub: Change in Status of Certain Units, AGAO-I (M) (28 Jan 53) G-1, and Ltr, TAG to CG, U.S. Army Forces, Far East (Main), 9 Feb 53, sub: Change in Status of Certain Units, AGAO-I (M) 322 (4 Feb 53) G-1, both AG Reference files, DAMH-HSO; OCAFF, "Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 1953," ch. 9, pp. 1-18.
  25. DA Bull 23, 1948; Morris J. MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, pp. 428-59 passim.
  26. MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, pp. 442-45; Bernard C. Nalty and Morris J. MacGregor, Blacks in the Military: Essential Documents (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1981), pp. 309-11; Ltr, TAG to CGs, Third and Fifth Armies, 9 Aug 51, sub: Change in Status of Certain General Reserve Units, AGAO-I 322 (26 Jul 51) G-1-M, 14th Inf file, DAMH-HSO; "FE Racial Integration Means New Names for 2 Regiments," Army Times, 4 Aug 52.
  27. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 121-25; Coakley et al., "Demobilization," pp. 8-9.
  28. 28 Coakley et al., "Demobilization," pp. 69-72, 85-87.
  29. Eisenhower, Papers of the Presidents, 1953, pp. 860-61; Coakley et al., "Demobilization," pp. 28-29; "Induction and Release of Army National Guard Units," pp. 21-24. In 1952 General Mark W. Clark reorganized the Far East Command as a unified command with U.S. Army Forces, Far East, as the Army's element.
  30. Ltr, TAG to CinC, U.S. Army, Europe, and CG, First Army, 7 Apr 54, sub: Change in Status of Certain Divisions, AGAO-I (M) 322 (2 Apr 54) G-1, 9th Inf Div file, Ltr, TAG to CGs, Third and Fifth Armies, 27 Apr 54, sub: Change in Status of Certain Divisions, AGAO-I (M) 322 (22 Apr 54) G-1, 8th Inf Div file, Ltr, TAG to CG, Fifth Army, 27 Apr 54, sub: Reorganization of the 10th Infantry Division, AGAO-1 (M) 322 (22 Apr 54) G-1, 10th Inf Div file, Ltr, TAG to CG, First Army, 23 Apr 54, sub: Activation of the 69th Infantry Division (Training), AGAO-I (M) 322 (22 Apr 54) G-1, 69th Inf Div file, and Historical Data Cards for the 5th, 8th, 9th, 28th, 31st, 43d, and 69th Inf Divs and the 101st Abn Div, all DAMN-HSO.
  31. Semiannal Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1954, pp. 56-57; Coakley et al., "Demobilization," pp. 39-43; Ltr, TAG to CG, Sixth Army, 27 Sep 54, sub: Reorganization of the 2d Infantry Division, AGAO-I (M) 322 (16 Sep 54) G-1, 2d Inf Div file, and Ltr, TAG to CG, Third Army, 27 Oct 54, sub: Reorganization of the 3d Infantry Division, AGAO-I (M) 322 (19 Oct 54) G-1, 3d Inf Div file, both DAMH-HSO; "Schofield Ready to Welcome 25th Division," Army Times, 18 Sep 54; "Induction and Release of Army National Guard Units," pp. 48-58; Report of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, 1955, pp. 14-15.
  32. Coakley et al., "Demobilization," pp. 29-38.
  33. Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 1954, OCAFF, ch. 14, pp. 1-4; Ltr, TAG to CG, Fourth Army, 28 May 54, sub: Activation of the 4th Armored Division, AGAO-I (M) 322 (26 May 54) G-1, 4th Armd Div file, and Ltr, TAG to CGs, Second Army and Continental Army Command (CONARC), 9 Mar 55, sub: Change in Status of 3d Armored Division, AGAO-1 (M) 322 3d Armd Div (8 Mar 55) G-1, 3d Armd Div file, both DAMN-HSO; "4th Armored Reactivated at Ft. Hood," Army Times, 26 Jun 54; "4th Armd Build-Up Underway," Army Times. 3 Jul 54; William R. Rock, 3d Armored Division (Spearhead), A History of the 3d Armored Division (Darmstadt, Germany: Stars and Stripes, 1957), pp. 45-46.
  34. Ltr, TAG to CGs, U.S. Army, Caribbean, and Third Army, 2 Dec 54, sub: Organization of the 23d Infantry Division, AGAO-I (M) 322 (17 Nov 54) G-, 23d Inf Div file, and Ltr, CGs, U.S. Army, Alaska, and Sixth Army, 27 Oct 54, sub: Organization of the 71st Infantry Division, AGAO-I (M) 322 71st Inf Div (12 Oct 54) G-1, 71st Inf Div file, both DAMH-HSO; Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army, 1 Jul-Dec 54, p. 20; "Scattered from Here to Yon, Two ' Wilson Divisions' Formed," Army Times, 20 Nov 54.
  35. Coakley et al., "Demobilization," pp. 88-89; TOE 7R, Infantry Division, 1955; TOE 17R, Armored Division, 1955; TOE 57, Airborne Division, 1955; Ltr, TAG to CGs, CONARC, and Second and Fourth Armies, 23 May 55, sub: Reorganization of 1 st, 3d, and 4th Armored Divisions, AGAO-I (M) 322 (18 May 55) G-1, Ltr, TAG to CGs, CONARC, and Third, Fifth, and Sixth Armies, 23 May 55, sub: Reorganization of Certain Infantry Divisions, AGAO-I (M) 322 (19 May 55) G-1, Ltr, TAG to CGs, CONARC, and Third Army, 1 Aug 55, sub: Reorganization of the IIth Airborne Division, AGAO-I (M) 322 (20 Jul 55) G-1, Ltr, TAG to CGs, CONARC and Third Army, 26 May 1955, sub: Reorganization of 82d Airborne Division, AGAO-I (M) 322 (24 May 55) G-1, Ltr, TAG to CinC, U.S. Army, Europe, 9 Sep 55, sub: Confirmation of Reorganization of Certain Units, AGAO-O (M) 322 (16 Aug 55) G-1, and Ltr, TAG to CG, U.S. Army, Pacific, 5 Mar 56, sub: Change in Status of Certain Units, AGAO-O322 (27 Feb 56) DCSPER (Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel), all AG Reference files, DAMHHSO; Historical Data Cards for divisions, DAMH-HSO.
  36. Memo for Record, sub: Unit Rotation Plan, 23 Feb 54, and Ltr, John E. Dahlquist to Matthew B. Ridgway, 7 Apr 54, Records of the Army Staff, G-1, 210.21 Feb-Mar 54, RG 319, NARA; "World-wide Unit Rotation," Army Combat Forces Journal 5 (Nov 1954): 37; Robert N. Young, "Operation GYROSCOPE, Rotation Plus Stability," Army Information Digest 10 (Mar 1955): 2-6; Historical Division, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), Operation GYROSCOPE in the US Army Europe, 1957, pp. 1-2 (Secret, material used unclassified), DAMN-HSR.
  37. Historical Section, USAREUR, Operation GYROSCOPE in the US Army Europe, pp. 2640; SS, G-1 for CofS, sub: Training Center Designations, Tab A, 15 Dec 55, G-1 S 323.3, Division General file, DAMH-HSO.
  38. Historical Section, USAREUR, "The Replacement and Augmentation System in Europe (1945-1963)," pp. 47-48, Ms, DAMH-HSR.
  39. Coakley et al., "Demobilization," pp. 72-80; U.S. Congress, Senate, Eleventh Report of the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate under the Authority of S.Res. 18, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., Apr 1951; SS, G-1 for CofS, sub: Training Center Designations, 15 Dec 55, SS, DCSPER for CofS, same subject, 27 Jan 56, DCSPER S 323, and DOD News Release No. 152-56, sub: Army to Stop Using Division Designations to Identify Training Divisions, 23 Feb 56, all Division General file, DAMN-HSO; also see unit files of the 101st Abn, 6th and 9th Inf, and 5th and 6th Armd Divs, DAMH-HSO.
  40. Lit, TAG to CG, U.S. Army, Caribbean, I Mar 56, sub: Change in Status of Certain Units, AGAO-O (M) 322 (10 Feb 56) DCSPER, 23d Inf Div file, and Ltr, TAG to CGs. CONARC and Sixth Army, 6 Sep 56, same subject, AGAO-O 322 (9 Aug 56) DCSPER, 71st Inf Div file, DAMH-HSO.
  41. Memo, G-1 for G-3, 24 Oct 50, sub: Development of Army's Position in a Complete Review of Civilian Components Structure, G-1 326 (24 Oct 50), and SS, G-3 for Cots, 5 Apr 51, sub: Development of Army Position in a Complete Review of Civilian Components Structure, G-3 326 (24 Oct 50), both Army Reserve file, DAMH-HSO.
  42. SS, G-3 for CofS, 18 Dec 51, sub: Implementation of the Approved Outline Plan, Army Reserve Forces, 326 (5 Dec 51), Army Reserve Forces Conference, Department of the Army, Army Field Forces, Continental Armies, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 5-9 Nov 1951, Memo for Record, OCofS, 20 Dec 51, sub: Implementation of the Army Reserve Force Reserve Divisional Reorganization, GS 326 (19 Nov 51), and DA Army Reserve Forces Program Summary, 1 Mar 52, all Army Reserve Reference files, Ltr, TAG to CG, Second Army, 18 Apr 52, sub: Change in Status of Certain Army Reserve Divisions, AGAO-I 322 Army Res (6 Mar 52) G-3-M, Ltr, TAG to CG, Third Army, 23 Feb 52, same subject, AGAO-I 322 Army Res (28 Jan 52), Ltr, TAG to CG, Fourth Army, 21 Feb 52, same subject, AGAO-I 322 Army Res (30 Jan 52) G-3-M, Ltr, TAG to CG, Fifth Army, 13 Feb 52, same subject, AGAO-I 326 (25 Jan 52) G -3-M, Ltr, TAG to CG, Sixth Army, 22 Feb 52, same subject, AGAO-I 322 Army Res (29 Jan 52), all AG Reference files, and Historical Data Cards, Army Reserve divisions, all DAMH-HSO. The Section Five Committee, established in 1920, was the vehicle for reserve officers to provide input about reserve affairs.
  43. AR 140-305, 1 Feb 1952; DA Bull 7, 1952.
  44. Karl Cocke, "The Reserve Components," OCMH Study 130, pp. V-38-49, VI-1-45 passim, Ms, DAMN-RAD; "General Staff Study Leading to the Preparation of Reserve Components Mobilization Preparedness Objectives Plan I," 1 Jul 53, DAMH-HSR; Ltr, TAG to CG, First Army, 15 Mar 55, sub: Designation and Organization of Certain Divisions of the Army Reserve, AGAO-I (M) 322 (21 Feb 55) Army Res, Lit, TAG to CG, Second Army, 19 May 55, same subject, AGAO-I (M) 322 Army Res (21 Mar 55) Army Res, Lit, TAG to CG, Third Army, 15 Feb 55, sub: Designation and Organization of 108th Infantry Division (Replacement Training), AGAO-I (M) 322 (9 Feb 55) Army Res, Ltr, TAG to Fourth Army, 25 Jan 55, sub: Designation and Organization of the 95th Infantry Division, AGAO-I (M) 322 95th Inf Div (18 Jan 55) Army Res, and Ltr, TAG to CG, Fifth Army, 23 May 55, sub: Designation and Organization of Certain Divisions of the Army Reserve, AGAO-I (M) 322 Army Res (11 May 55) Army Res, all AG Reference file, DAMN-HSO; GO 152, Sixth Army, 1955; Ltr, TAG to CG, Fourth Army, 11 Mar 55, sub: Change in Status of Certain Army Reserve Units, AGAO-I (M) 322 Army Res (17 Feb 55) Res, and Ltr, TAG to CGs, CONARC, and Third and Fourth Armies, 10 Jan 57, sub: Change in Status of Certain Units of the Army Reserve, both AG Reference files, DAMH-HSO.
  45. Ltr, NGB to AG, California, 15 Jun 54, sub: Organization, Conversion, Reorganization, and Redesignation of National Guard Units (40th Division), NG-AROTO 325.4-Calif (4 Jun 54), 40th Inf Div file, Ltr, NGB to CofS, Div of Military and Naval Affairs, New York, 15 Dec 54, sub: Organization, Reorganization, Conversion, and Redesignation, National Guard Units of the 27th Infantry Division to be the 27th Armored Division, NG-AROTO 325.4-NY (13 Dec 54). 27th Inf Bde file, Ltr, NGB to AG, Georgia, 17 Oct 55, sub: Allotment, Conversion. Redesignation, Organization, Reorganization and Withdrawal of Federal Recognition, Army National Guard Units, NG-AROTO 325.4 (30 Sep 55) GA, GA NG file, Ltr, NG13 to AG. Florida, 17 Oct 55, sub: Allotment, Conversion, Redesignation, Organization, Reorganization and Withdrawal of Federal Recognition, Army National Guard Units, NG-AROTO 325.4-Fla, FL NG file, Ltr, NGB to AG, Tennessee, 20 Oct 54, sub: National Guard Troop Allotment (Tennessee), 20 Oct 54, NG-AROTO 325.4-Tenn, TN NG file, and GO 33, North Carolina National Guard, 18 Oct 54, NC state file, DAMH-HSO; Report of the Chief: National Gt«rrd Bureau, 1955, p. 15, and 1956, p. 21.
  46. DA Bull 12, 1955; Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, pp. 120-27.

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).