No. I.—Introduction, 7
Necessity of a new constitution, 7
Obstacles to be encountered, 7
Inducements to moderation in controversy, 8
General propositions to be discussed, 9
II, III, IV, V.—Concerning dangers from foreign force and fluence, 10
Inquiry into the importance of union, 10
Characteristics of our country and people, 11
History of the confederation, 12
How and by whom the new constitution was framed, 12
Propriety of candid deliberation as to its provisions, 13
Public safety an important object of government, 14
Union will diminish the causes of war, 15
Union will secure the election of capable men to office, 15
Union will lead to a readier settlement of differences with other nations, 16
Union will strengthen the nation so as not to invite hostility, 17
Dangers arising from conflicting interests of nations considered, 18
Comparison of the facilities for defence by a union, and by separate sovereignties, 19
Results of union illustrated by the history of Great Britain, 21
Danger of dissensions between separate confederacies or states, 22
Impossibility of lasting alliances between states whilst distinct, 23
VI, VII.—Concerning dangers from war between the states, 24
Frequent contests would arise between the states, if separate, 24
Illustrations from history of other nations, 24, 25
The idea that the genius of republics and the influence of commerce will secure peace, chimerical, 26
Proofs from history, 27
Danger of territorial disputes, 29
Danger of competitions of commerce, 31
Danger of collisions arising from the apportionment of the public debt of the union, 31
Conflicts of laws, 32
Alliances between states, and with foreign nations, 33
VIII.—The effects of internal war in producing standing armies and other institutions unfriendly to liberty, 33
Nature of the contests which would arise between states, 34
Such contests would result in standing armies and military establishments, 34
Consequent danger from military usurpation, 36
Union the only security against such dangers, 37
IX, X.—The utility of the union as a safeguard against domestic faction and insurrection, 38
Distractions which agitated the republics of Greece and Italy, 38
Enlargement of the republic a safeguard against such distractions, 39
Views of Montesquieu, 39, 40
Perfect equality of states not essential in a confederacy, 41
Dangers of factions in popular governments, 42
The remedies or preventives discussed, 43
Impracticability of removing the causes of faction, 44
A pure democracy admits of no cure for faction, 45
Checks and safeguards in a republic, 46
Superiority of a large over a small republic, 47
XI.—The utility of the union with respect to commerce and a navy, 48
Jealousy in Europe of our commercial tendencies, 48
Union will increase our power to obtain commercial privileges from other nations, 49
Union will enable us to maintain a navy, 50
Weakness and insignificance will result from disunion, 50, 51
Effect of a navy on our fisheries, 51
Union will increase the aggregate commerce of the states, 52
Union will give us the ascendant in the affairs of this continent, 53
XII.—The utility of the union with respect to revenue, 54
Prosperity of commerce a source of national wealth, 54
Commerce increases the means of revenue, 54
Revenue from direct taxation impracticable, 55
Impost duties must be relied on for revenue, 55
Union will facilitate the collection of such duties, 55, 56
Difficulty of separate States collecting such duties, 56
Necessity of revenue to a nation, 57
XIII.—The same subject continued, with a view to economy, 58
Union favorable to economy in public expenditure, 58
Probable confederations in case of disruption of the union, 59
Increased cost of separate governments, 60
XIV.—An objection drawn from the extent of country answered, 60
Practicability of extending the limits of a republic, 60
Distinction between a republic and a democracy in this respect, 61
Extent of the union compared with that of European states, 62
Jurisdiction of the general government limited, 62
Facilities of intercourse will increase, 63
Border states will need protection from the union, 63
Disunion more dangerous than union, 64
XV, XVI.—Concerning the defects of the present confederation, in relation to the principle of legislation for the states in their collective capacities, 65
Insufficiency of the confederation to preserve the union, 65
Disastrous results of its defects, 66
Increase of power in the national government necessary, 67
National legislation must act on individuals instead of states, 67
A league or alliance of states will be inefficient, 68
What is implied in a government, 69
Necessity of a controlling head to the confederation, 70
In a league of states, the only remedy for disobedience is force, 72
Difficulties involved in this remedy, 72
A military despotism would result, 73
Impracticability of sustaining the union by such means, 73
Superior facility with which a national government would execute its laws, 74
Or repress commotions, 75
XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX.—The subject continued, and illustrated by examples, to show the tendency of federal governments, rather to anarchy among the members, than tyranny in the head, 76
Danger of encroachment on states rights and powers, considered, 76
The danger of national weakness more to be feared, 76
Pervading influence of the local governments, 77
Illustration from the history of the feudal system, 78
Illustration from the history of the Grecian republics, 79
Illustration from the history of the Achæan league, 81
Illustration from the history of the Germanic body, 84
Illustration from the history of Poland, 87
Illustration from the history of the Swiss cantons, 87
Illustration from the history of the United Netherlands, 89
XXI, XXII.—Further defects of the present constitution, 92
Want of sanction to the laws, 92
Want of a mutual guaranty of the state governments, 93
Regulating state contributions to the treasury by quotas, 94
The proper remedy for this defect, 95
The want of a power to regulate commerce, 96
Difficulties arising from separate state regulations, 97
The raising of troops by quotas, 98
The right of equal suffrage among the states, an evil, 98
Requiring a vote of two-thirds of the states is not a remedy, 99
This principle gives scope to foreign corruption, 100
Instances from history of officers of republics corrupted by foreign powers, 101
The want of a judiciary power a crowning defect, 102
Necessity of a supreme tribunal, 102
Present organization of congress unsuitable for an executive head, 103
Propriety of the constitution being ratified by the people rather than by the states, 103
XXIII.—The necessity of a government, at least equally energetic with the one proposed, 104
Necessity of union for the common defence, 104
Power to raise armies and fleets necessary, 104
Powers of the present confederation insufficient, 105
A weak government unsafe, 106
The powers must be co-extensive, with the objects of government, 107
XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII.—The subject continued, with an answer to an objection concerning standing armies, 108
The constitution vests the power of raising armies in the legislative and not the executive branch, 108
Standing armies not prohibited by the state constitutions, 109
Nor by the articles of confederation, 109
Dangers of invasion from foreign countries or savage neighbors, 110
Necessity of national troops to protect commerce, 111
Difficulty of separate states protecting the frontiers, 112
Armies of separate states more dangerous to liberty than those of the nation, 113
Objections to restrictions on the power of the government as to armies, 113
Militia cannot be relied upon alone for national defence, 114
Armies sometimes necessary in time of peace, 115
Danger of making the government too feeble by restrictions, 116
Vesting the power to raise armies in the legislature is a sufficient safeguard, 117
Effect of the limitation of appropriations to two years in the new constitution, 118
Liberty cannot be subverted, nor large armies raised, without time, 119
Dangers from armies less in a united than a disunited state, 120
The idea that the laws of the union cannot be executed without force unfounded, 121
The national government will be as well administered as state governments, 121
It will be strengthened by extending into internal affairs, 122
And by operating on individuals rather than states, 123
The force occasionally necessary to execute the laws, an argument for union, 124
The same necessity for force might exist in case of several confederacies, 125
Union the best safeguard against the representatives of the people usurping power, 125