Page:Cambridge Modern History Volume 7.djvu/319

1787] Election by the people or by the legislature ? 287 decided in case a majority of the people should not concur in favour of any candidate. Charles Pinckney opposed election by the people. The people would be led by a few active, designing men ; and the most populous States, by combining, would be able to carry their point. The national legislature, on the other hand, being most directly interested in the laws made by it, would take the most care to choose a fit person to carry them out. Both points made by Pinckney were contested by Gouverneur Morris. Instead of a combination of the people of the populous States, there would be combinations in the legislature. As for the influence of a few designing men, that could prevail only in small districts. In the election of the governor of New York that sort of thing sometimes happened in particular localities, but the general voice of the State was never affected. He also answered the argument from lack of information by the people; the people would not be uninformed of those great characters who merited their esteem and confidence. Mason, on the other side, thought a government with a chief magis- trate to be elected by the people impracticable ; it was as unnatural as to refer a trial of colours to a blind man. The extent of the country rendered it impossible for the people to judge of the merits of the candidates; to which Williamson added, that while there were at the present time distinguished characters, known to everyone, it would not always be so. A vote was now taken, and only one State favoured the Morris motion. Hardly better fared a motion to the effect that the executive should be chosen by electors chosen by the State legislatures. It was then (July 17) voted unanimously that the executive be chosen by the national legislature. A change, on July 19, to election by electors appointed by the State legislatures, was in its turn set aside, and election by the national legislature was again agreed upon, on July 24. The mode of election bore directly upon the independence of the executive; and the vote last taken brought on motions, on the one hand, for re-eligibility, and, on the other, for extending the term of office beyond the seven years, which opened the whole subject again. If the chief magistrate must be elected by the national legislature, Wilson would give him a single, long term of office ; dependence of the executive must be prevented as far as possible. Gouverneur Morris again earnestly opposed election by the legislature. When the personal interest of members was opposed to the general interest, the legislature, otherwise trustworthy, could not be too much distrusted. In all public bodies there were two parties ; the executive would necessarily be more connected with one than with the other. There would be a personal interest, therefore, in one of the parties to oppose, in the other to support, it. Much had been said of the intrigues which would be practised by the executive to get into office ; nothing had been said of CH. VIII.