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288 Various modes of election proposed. [1737 the intrigues to get him out. Men would covet his place, and cabal with the legislature, until the end was gained. As for the danger of monarchy, they might have something worse, if the executive should not be properly chosen. To get rid of dependence of the executive on the legislature, the expedient of making him ineligible a second time had been devised. In other words, we should have the benefit of experience, and were then to deprive ourselves of the use of it. The chief magistrate at the end of a long term would not cease to be a man ; he would wish to continue in office. The road by the Constitution would be cut off; so he would make a road with the sword. It was a difficult thing rightly to balance the executive. Make him too weak, the legislature would usurp his authority ; make him too strong, he would usurp legislative powers. He preferred a short period, with re-eligibility, but a different mode of election from that which had been provided for. Various expedients were now brought forward ; by Wilson, in favour of electors to be taken by lot from the national legislature; by Ellsworth, for appointment by the national legislature, with re -eligibility by the choice of electors appointed by the State legislatures; and by Gerry, for appointment by the governors of the States with the advice of their Councils, or, if there were no Council, by electors chosen by the State legislatures. Ellsworth made a formal motion in favour of his proposal. The subject was discussed by Madison. There were objections to all modes. Election must be by some authority under the national or State constitutions, or by some special authority derived from the people, or by the people themselves. Election by the judiciary was out of the question ; the only other national authority was the legislature. But there were in his judgment insuperable objections to such election. Apart from the effect upon the independence of the chief magistrate such election would agitate and divide the legislature so as to interfere with public interests. In the next place, the candidate would intrigue with the legislature; he would owe his election to the predominant faction, and then would be apt to be subservient to that faction. Further, the ministers of foreign powers would use the opportunity to mix their intrigues in the election. Germany and Poland were witnesses to the danger. He then considered the three branches of the State governments, and found objections to election by any of them. The State legislatures had betrayed a propensity to pernicious measures ; one object of the national government was to control that propensity ; and one object of giving the national executive a negative on legislation was to control the national legislature so far as it might be infected with a like propensity. Refer the appointment of the executive to the State legislatures, and that purpose might be defeated. Appointment by the State executives was liable to the objection that they could and would be courted and intrigued with by the candidates, by their partisans, and