general, he quitted his regiment finally without having attained to the command of it.
Meantime Nixon had served on the staff in the Chitral relief force (1895), and in the Tochi field force (1897–1898). In both cases mentions in dispatches followed, and for the former service he was promoted to brevet lieutenant-colonel in January 1896, having attained the rank of major in the previous September. Having served on the staff as assistant quartermaster-general with the rank of colonel for more than two and a half years from March 1899, he was sent to South Africa towards the end of 1901 and served there till the end of the war, commanding a cavalry column in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony. He received four clasps with the medal, was mentioned in dispatches, and was awarded the C.B. (1902).
On returning to India Nixon resumed his appointment as assistant quartermaster-general for intelligence (November 1902), became second-class district commander (May 1903), inspector-general of cavalry (August 1906), a divisional commander (May 1908), and in October 1912 received the important appointment of general-officer-commanding the Southern army of India, from which he was transferred to the command of the Northern army in February 1915. He had meantime been promoted to major-general (March 1904), lieutenant-general (February 1909), and general (May 1914), and had been created K.C.B. in 1911. In India he had long borne the reputation of an energetic and capable staff officer and commander; but it was the part that he played in the Mesopotamian expedition during the European War which brought his name prominently before the public.
The basis of the Indian preparations for war as organized under Earl Kitchener [q.v.] was that India would make the utmost effort on the frontier and would be reinforced by men and supplies from England. The reverse of this happened on the outbreak of war in 1914. Within a few weeks large and fully equipped forces had been sent from India to France, Egypt, and East Africa, besides reinforcements to Aden and other British outposts. A great demand had thus already been made upon the Indian military establishments when, on the entry of Turkey into the War (29 October 1914), it was decided that, as a precautionary and defensive measure, Basra and its neighbourhood should be occupied by a force from India—the 6th (Poona) division, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Barrett. A naval force of some small vessels co-operated. Basra was occupied on 22 November, and Kurna, 47 miles up the Tigris, at its junction with the Euphrates, on 9 December. The Turks, preparing for offensive action, were in some force at Bahran on the Tigris, at Nazariyeh on the Euphrates, and at Ahwaz on the Karun river. Meantime Barrett's division was being reinforced from India by instalments of a new division, the 12th, and Sir John Nixon was appointed to the command of the whole force, taking it up on 9 April 1915. At this juncture Sir Arthur Barrett resigned the command of his division through ill-health, and was succeeded by Major-General (Sir) Charles Vere Ferrers Townshend from India; whilst Major-General (Sir) George Frederick Gorringe took command of the 12th division, incomplete and without artillery except such as he could borrow from Townshend's division. A few days after Nixon's arrival and before that of Townshend, the Turks, advancing from Nazariyeh, attacked an entrenched camp at Shaiba, west of Basra, and were dispersed after severe engagements.
The control of all operations in Mesopotamia had been reserved to the British government acting through the secretary of state for India, the government of India, and the commander-in-chief in India, General Sir Beauchamp Duff [q.v.]. On 24 April 1915 the secretary of state, telegraphing to the viceroy, stated that no advance beyond the present theatre of operations would be sanctioned at the moment, but that measures for the protection of the oil-pipe line from Persian Arabistan on the east, and an advance to Amara on the Tigris, would be approved if supported by the government of India. The telegram concluded, ‘In Mesopotamia a safe game must be played.’
Nixon, before leaving India, had received his instructions from the commander-in-chief, and these were not known to the secretary of state till 2 May. He was to retain control of the Basra vilayet, of all outlets to the sea, and of such portions of neighbouring territories as might affect his operations, and as far as possible to endeavour to secure the oilfields and pipe line on the east, and after acquainting himself on the spot with the existing situation, to submit, first, a plan for the effective occupation of the Basra vilayet, and secondly, a plan for a subsequent advance on Bagdad. He was also to report on his military requirements
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