generally, and in particular on the adequacy and suitability of the water transport expected from India, Burma, and Egypt, details of which were given to him. An advance on Bagdad was, however, at this time and for some months longer, excluded from the plans of the government of India and of the Cabinet.
Nixon lost no time in acting with vigour on his instructions to secure the control of the Basra vilayet, and his successive advances for that purpose were made with the previous approval of government. The Turks had established a strong position at Bahran, astride the Tigris, in front of Kurna, and were showing activity on the Karun river. Here a force under Major-General Gorringe repulsed them, and then, by a flank movement, threatened the force at Bahran, which Townshend was to attack. The difficulty of the latter operation was greatly increased by the Tigris being in flood and much of the surrounding marshes under water, from which there stood out a line of redoubts on low hills. The only possible attack was a frontal one, supported by artillery fire from guns at Kurna and from the naval flotilla, and it had to be made by infantry punting forward in small country boats (bellums), each of which carried only about ten men. After some weeks of preparation and training, at much of which Nixon was present, Townshend advanced on 31 May. The difficult operation, afterwards known as ‘Townshend's regatta’, was completely successful, and the pursuit ended with the occupation of Amara, some 90 miles up the river from Kurna, on 3 June, and the capture of its governor and many prisoners. Nixon's next movement was against the threatening force of Turks at Nazariyeh on the Euphrates, 68 miles west of Kurna, and this position Gorringe captured, with prisoners and guns, on 25 July.
Shortly after the occupation of Amara Townshend was prostrated by a sudden illness, which necessitated two months' leave to India. During this interval Nixon proposed to the government, as a means of consolidating the control of the Basra vilayet, a further advance to Kut el Amara, an important town on the Tigris, about 150 miles beyond Amara, and a little beyond the boundary of the vilayet. A few miles below Kut the Turks were entrenching with about 10,000 men in strong positions athwart the river. The government of India considered this advance a matter of strategic necessity, and suggested that a reinforcement of a brigade from Aden should be supplied. The Cabinet could not give the reinforcement, but eventually sanctioned the advance. It was skilfully carried out by Townshend. His division captured all the hostile positions by severe fighting, and entered Kut on 29 September. Pursuing the routed Turks, he arrived on 3 October at Azizieh, a village 60 miles up river, which now became the northernmost British outpost.
The conquest of the Basra vilayet was now complete. No further advance could be made without the approval of the Cabinet; but Nixon had submitted his plan, or appreciation of the situation, on 30 August, and on 3 October, a few days after the capture of Kut, he had telegraphed direct to the secretary of state, ‘I consider I am strong enough to open the road to Bagdad, and with this intention I propose to concentrate at Azizieh.’ Two days later he telegraphed that he saw nothing which would justify letting slip such an opportunity. Townshend at the front, however, had found it impossible to press on at once beyond Azizieh, even if permitted to do so, and he soon realized the danger of attempting the capture of Bagdad without large reinforcements. His division was weary and greatly reduced by casualties and sickness, mainly due to the torrid heat in which his recent battles had been fought. He proposed to consolidate his position at Kut, and considered it absolutely necessary, if Bagdad were to be occupied without great risk, that the further advance should be carried out by two divisions, or at least by one division closely supported by another. As Nixon took a more optimistic view, the question of an early attempt on Bagdad was for some time discussed between himself, the government of India, and the secretary of state. On 5 October, pending further consideration, he was ordered to stop the advance.
A new element, however, had come into the discussion. The Allied attack upon the Dardanelles had been brought to a standstill, and British prestige, especially amongst Eastern peoples, was held to demand some conspicuous off-set to the successes of the Turks. This consideration turned the views of the Cabinet and its military advisers in favour of an advance on Bagdad, provided always that, if captured, it could be held. The practicability of this depended: first, on large reinforcements of Nixon's fighting and auxiliary forces; and secondly, on an increase of his river transport propor-
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