Page:Discourse on the method of rightly conducting the reason, and seeking truth in the sciences - Descartes (trans. Veitch).djvu/20

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INTRODUCTION.

The determination of such truths or truth is, according to Descartes, to be reached by Analysis. The Philosophical Procedure of Descartes is thus, in the first instance, Analytic.

Analysis, in general, consists in the resolution of the complex into the simple and constituent.

The principal object of the Analysis of Descartes is to be found in our notions and judgments. The end of Descartes is to reach Principles or Reasons. In pursuance of this end, he proceeds always from the judgment of the truth of which he is uncertain, and seeks to find whether the other judgments, which the one in question involves, are true, and through these to determine the truth of the proposition from which he starts. Such is the nature of his general procedure.

The matter of our knowledge, viewed in the light of this Analysis, is not considered with reference to the purposes of classification ({{lang|la|non in quantum ad aliquod genus entis refertur), but with reference to its capability for consequence; to the relation of the determining and determined (in quantum unæ ex aliis cognosci possunt). The knowledge sought is thus, when reached, obtained through other knowledge, or by means of other truth.

The Analysis of Descartes thus manifestly supposes doubt as its essential preliminary; for, as the end of the Analysis is to manifest truth, it is plain, since we have recourse to it, that truth is concealed,—that we are in ignorance, need determining reasons; in a word, are in doubt.