Page:Discourse on the method of rightly conducting the reason, and seeking truth in the sciences - Descartes (trans. Veitch).djvu/21

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INTRODUCTION.
xix

On the hypothesis that knowledge by Method is possible, it is plain that there must be some knowledge, or truth, which is superior to doubt, and capable of affording other knowledge, or truth whose certainty is dependent on the higher knowledge, that is, on principles.

In accordance with the nature of his instru- ment, the whole Philosophy of Descartes is but an attempt to find the Principles or Principle which, as absolutely ultimate in the order of Analysis, and, therefore, absolutely primary in the order of the reverse process, that is, of Syn- thesis, affords the conditions and possibility of Philosophy, or of Methodical Knowledge. In other words, Descartes seeks that truth, which, itself contained in no higher, contains, or at least affords the condition of our reaching, all other truths.

Now the ultimate principles or principle must, as ultimate, be self-evidencing, that is, stand in need of no proof, or higher knowledge as its guarantee; and the degree of its evidence must be such as to determine in the knower absolute and indestructible assurance. The first truth must, therefore, be approached through the High- est Certainty.

Again, as the absolutely certain is wholly superior to doubt; as of such doubt in truth is impossible, Descartes makes Doubt the means of manifesting the Ultimate Truth, by constituting it the regulative principle of his Analysis.

Descartes thus not only commences with a