CONTENTS.
xiii
| 5. | The counter-proposition is equally contradictory, whether accepted without, or with, a restriction, | 261 |
| 6. | The counter-proposition is the foundation of "sensualism"—character of sensualism, | 261 |
| 7. | The anti-sensual psychology merely restricts the counter-proposition—leaves the contradiction uncorrected, | 263 |
| 8. | The root of the mischief. History of distinction between sense and intellect, | 264 |
| 9. | Aim and procedure of Greek metaphysics, | 264 |
| 10. | A rule for the historian of philosophy, | 266 |
| 11. | This rule observed in these Institutes, | 266 |
| 12. | Return to history of distinction between sense and intellect, | 267 |
| 13. | Illustration of early Greek doctrine, | 269 |
| 14. | The old philosophers were right in their problem—in their way of working it, and in fixing sense as the faculty of nonsense, | 270 |
| 15. | A reason why the truth of this doctrine is not obvious, | 271 |
| 16. | Difficulty and difference of opinion as to intellectual element, | 272 |
| 17. | Ambiguities of the old philosophers, | 273 |
| 18. | Three misconceptions arising out of these ambiguities, | 273 |
| 19. | Comment on first misconception, | 275 |
| 20. | Comment on second misconception, | 276 |
| 21. | Comment on third misconception, | 277 |
| 22. | Key to the Greek philosophy, | 279 |
| 23. | Return to counter-proposition. It is founded on a confusion of the distinction between sense and intellect, | 281 |
| 24. | The Lockian and the Kantian psychology in limiting the counter-proposition effect no subversion of sensualism, | 282 |
| 25. | Kant's doctrine impotent against sensualism, | 283 |
| 26. | The statement in par. 4, and the charge in par. 7, are borne out by the foregoing remarks, | 286 |
| 27. | Kant sometimes nearly right. He errs through a neglect of necessary truth, | 287 |
| 28. | The true compromise between Sense and Intellect, | 288 |
| PROPOSITION XI. | ||
| Presentation and Representation, | 290 | |
| Demonstration, | 290 | |
| Observations and Explanations, | 291 | |
| 1. | Why this proposition is introduced, | 291 |
| 2. | Distinction between knowing and thinking, | 292 |
| 3. | This proposition the foundation of a true philosophy of experience, | 293 |
| 4. | Representation—its two insuperable restrictions, | 293 |
| 5. | First restriction by way of addition. Second by way of subtraction, | 294 |
| 6. | The latter restriction unrecognised by philosophers. Eleventh Counter-proposition, | 295 |
| 7. | Its invalidity shown, | 296 |
| 8. | The minimum cogitable equates with the minimum scibile, | 296 |
| 9. | Dr Reid's mistake in his assault on representationism, | 297 |
| 10. | The truth and the error of representationism, | 299
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