Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 9.djvu/457

RECENT CASES. 429 it would seem to turn on whether the amount received was derived from the enforce- ment of a legal right, or was a pure gift. Proceeding on the latter assumption, as the court did, the decision is sound, but the former case might easily arise, as, for instance, by the temporary illness of a school teacher. Admiralty— Subject Matter of Salvage — Gas Float m a River. — A float, fifty feet long, with ends shaped like the bow of a vessel, but without mast or rudder, was moored in a river as a beacon. It contained a gas cylinder, the light being fixed on a structure fifty feet high, the gas supplying it continuously for six weeks. No one was stationed upon the float, which went adrift, and was secured by the plain- tiff, who assisted the Trinity yacht in getting it off. Held, the float was not subject matter of salvage. Gas Float Whitton, No. 2, 12 The Times Law Rep. 109. The opinion emphasizes the point that jurisdiction as to salvage is limited to claims for services to a ship, her equipment, cargo, etc. And the term "ship " is to be used only in the ordinary meaning among those conversant with shipping business. A more liberal construction seems to have been placed upon the word in The Mac, L. R. 7 Pro. Div. 127, where a hopper barge was held subject of salvage. Certain passages in the opinions in the latter case might well justify the position taken by the respondents in the present appeal. In America the cases conflict upon both points. A Raft of Spars, Abb. Adm. Rep. 485; Fifty Thousand Feet of Timber, 2 Lowell, 64, and Byivater v. A Raft of Piles, 42 Fed. Rep. 917, hold the articles named subject to salvage, though of course not to be defined as " ships." Tome v. Four Cribs, Taney's Dec. 533, and the English case of Palmer v. Roicse, 3 H. & N. 505, are apparently co7itra, though perhaps affectcid by custom or statute. Cope v. Valette Co., 119 U. S. 625, held, that the District Court had no jurisdiction over the salvage of a floating dry dock, and the court seems to incline to the strict definition of the principal case, though noticing (p. 630), without comment, the conflict of authority in regard to timber. But perhaps, as is said in 42 Fed. Rep. 917, the cases vary so widely in their circumstances that all of the decisions may be reconcilable, though not without infringing upon the strict rule laid down in the principal case. Agency — Vice-Principal Becomes Fellow Servant whf:n. — Plaintiff's in- testate was killed while engaged in a work in which the foreman of the shop was assi.stin,:? him. It was no part of the business of the foreman to assist the deceased. Held, the foreman was a fellow servant of the deceased, not a vice-principal, by virtue of their being engaged upon the same work. Hartford v. A'b. Pac. R. R., 64 N. W. Rej). 1033 (Wis.). The decisions on this point are numerous and there is some conflict in the results reached, but since Railroad Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, the doctrine of the principal case has been pretty well established. Hatina v. Granger^ 28 Atl. Rep. 659 (R. I.), is a recent well considered decision in accord. Carriers — Liability of a Railway Company for a Tort of its Servant. — Plaintiff's intestate was shot by the depot agent of the defendant railway for abusive language. Deceased had called to receive his baggage, and, having been given receipts for it, was stepping out of the door when he was hit by the bullet. Held, a finding by the jury that the agent was acting within his employment so as to render the railway company liable will not be disturbed. Daniel v. Petersburgh Ry. Co., 23 S. E. Rep. 327 (N. C). The case is a close one. The trial court might have been justified in ordering a con- trary finding, on the ground that the agent was acting from a sole motive, and that his employment as regarded the decedent had ceased. As to such action by the trial judge, it is interesting to compare the case with McGilvray v. West End St. Ry., 164 Mass. 122, deciding that a street railway company is not liable for an assault by a con- ductor on a person who had just alighted from the car outside the car-house. If the decision of the majority of the court is not open to exception in the principal case, the language of the concurring judge is, as he seems to put the liability on the ground of common carrier, regardless of whether or not the agent was acting at the time in tlie course of his employment. Does a railway company owe the duty of insurer to a man on its premises in decedent's position .? Surely not. The contract of carriage was at an end. Carriers — Sleeping Car Companies — Liability for Money Lost by Pas- senger. — The plaintiff sues the Pullman Company for a sum of money lost at night while he was a passenger on one of its cars. Held, the company's duty is to maintain such a watch "as may be reasonably necessary to secure the safety" of such of the l^assenger's goods as are properly in his possession as a traveller. If the loss occurs while the passenger is asleep, the burden is on the company to prove such case. A'aUs V. P. P. C. Co., 23 S. E. Rep. 186 (Ga.).