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430 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. Ever since sleeping cars have been in general use, the courts with almost uninter- rupted regularity have decided that inasmuch as the sleeping car companies are neither innkeepers nor common carriers, they are not under the extreme liability attaching to those occupations. P. P. C. Co. v. Smith, 73 111. 360 ; Blum v. S. P. P. C. Co., i Flippin, 500; Lewis V. iV. Y. P. C. Co., 143 Mass. 267. The Georgia court discusses the rela- tionship of the company to the passenger on its own merits, and, notwithstanding the necessity which the sleeping car has become, the defenceless condition of the passenger, and the consequent resemblance to that state of facts which developed the heavy responsibility of the innkeeper, reaches the same conclusion as the cases cited. The single case opposed to the current of authority is P. P. C. Co. v. Lowe, 28 Neb. 239, holding the company an innkeeper. Conflict of Laws — Foreign Judgments — Conclusiveness. —j^^/c/. Judg- ments rendered in France, by whose laws judgments of the United States courts are reviewable on their merits, are not conclusive when sued upon in the United States, but are onXy prima facie evidence of the justice of the plaintiff's claim. (Fuller, C. J., Harlan, Brewer, and Jackson, JJ., dissenting.) Hilton v. Guyot, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 139. The case presents a fundamental question, and one likely to occur very often. The decision, therefore, is of more than ordinary importance. On strict common law principles it can hardly be supported. It has long been settled that our courts will respect and enforce private lights acquired under foreign laws, and it is difficult to see why a right acquired under a foreign judgment does not come within this category. The fact that France does not recognize United States judgments as conclusive would seem to be a political argument, rather than a legal ground, for refusing to recognize the judgments of France. It presents a question of the comity of nations. The court falls into the error of supposing that comity means reciprocal courtesy. If comity is a part of the common law, as we believe it to be, the courts have no discretion to apply it in one way to one country and in another way to another country. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Fuller seems entirely sound. The decision follows the rule adopted in most of the Continental countries, and which was formerly the rule in England; Roach v. Garvan, i Ves. Sr. 157 ; but has since been disapproved by the English courts, which now hold that foreign judgments are impeach- able only on the ground of fraud or lack of jurisdiction. Noiiviou v. Freeman, i 5 A pp. Cases, I, 9; Gocidardv. Gray, L. R. 6 Q. B. 139-148. Some of our State courts are in accord with the modern English doctrine, and treat foreign judgments as conclusive. Dunstan v. Higgins, 138 N. Y. 70 (1893); Raskin v. Goddard, 55 Me. 389; Baker v. Palmer, 83 111. 568. Conflict of Laws — Foreign Judgment — Service of Process.— A defend- ant who is duly served with process while temporarily in Sweden, and who appears by attorney, is amenable to the jurisdiction of its courts, and a judgment against him will be enforced in the courts of England. Carrick v. Hancock, 12 The Times Law Rep. 59. A foreign judgment in personam obtained without service of process on the defend- ant is internationally invalid, but if the defendant appears, though under protest, any judgment will be enforced by the courts of his domicil if the court of original judgment had jurisdiction. Voinet v. Barrett, 58 L. J. Q. B. 39; Boissiere 6^ Co. v. Brockner <Sr» Co., 6 The Times Law Rep. 85. The court holds also that the duty of allegiance is correlative with the protection given by a state to every one within its territory, and that a valid service of process may be made upon a defendant as soon as he enters the country, irrespective of the time he intends to remain. Conflict of Laws — General Commercial Law — Right of States to Change. — Defendant in Wisconsin put his name on the back of a note payable in Massachusetts. According to decisions in Wisconsin, this made him an indorser; according to United States decisions, he was a joint maker. A statute in Massachu- setts made notice to such person necessary to his liability. Held, that the United States court would not follow the decisions of the State court in matters of general commercial law, and that defendant was a joint maker ; but that the court would apply the statute of Massachusetts, under which defendant was not liable. Phipps v. Hard- ing, 70 Fed. Rep. 468. ' The first point is the settled doctrine in the Federal courts. It was argued from this and from certain language in S^vift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. i, 18, and Watson v. Tarpley, 18 How. 517, 521, that State statutes should also be disregarded. The dicta referred to do give ground for the contention, but the court refuses to follow them and limit the legislative power of the States. The decision on the second point cannot be objected to in effect, but it seems perhaps to be somewhat inconsistent with the first.