change of a representative body, the rates of confidence in
the people, and diffidence in the state governments, as electors, are still farther increased. It will be also seen from
such a computation, that it is infinitely easier for the representatives of the states, than for those of the people, to
betray their constituents to a consolidating principle; and
that the responsibility of the senate to the states, though
the chord by which the union itself is intended to be secured,
is too feeble to inflict any considerable degree of stricture
upon human conduct.
A still stronger view of this subject exists. The popular and the federal, are the principles of the general government. The federal principle is not allowed the intellectual or moral means for self preservation, of frequent election, or of recalling its deputies, or of an entire change of them at one period. By weakening the means of confederation to defend itself, this chief principle in the structure of the general government, is particularly exposed to the frauds of its natural enemy, consolidation; because its means of defence are merely moral, and ought of course to have been at least equal to the moral means of its co-principle, supported by the physical force of the people.
As the responsibility of their agents, is the only means whereby the federal parties to the government can enforce their will, or defend their rights, there is no danger in making it effectual. An intellectual control over federal deputies, may be safely entrusted to state governments, unarmed and influenced by the people, as the best mode of counteracting designs to destroy the union; designs, which these governments will most effectually detect and defeat.
We may take stronger ground yet. Hitherto we have chiefly exhibited the states and the people in a kind of contrast, in order to make our reasoning understood; but by forbearing the distinction, the argument becomes more forcible. The general government is the creature of the people
