Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/125

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are called complete; for things are complete in virtue of having attained their end. Therefore, since the end is something ultimate, we transfer the word to bad things and say a thing has been completely spoilt, and completely destroyed; when it in no wise falls short of destruction and badness, but is at its last point. This is why death is by a figure of speech called the end, because both are last things. The ultimate purpose is also an end. — Things, then, that are called complete in virtue of their own nature are so called in all these senses, some because they lack nothing in respect of goodness and cannot be excelled and no part proper to them can be found outside, others in general because they cannot be exceeded in their several classes and no part proper to them is outside; the others are so called in virtue of these first two kinds, because they either make or have something of the sort or are adapted to it or in some way or other are referred to the things that are called complete in the primary sense.


Chapter 17

'Limit' means the last point of each thing, i.e. the first point beyond which it is not possible to find any part, and the first point within which every part is; it is applied to the form, whatever it may be, of a spatial magnitude or of a thing that has magnitude, and to the end of each thing (and of this nature is that towards which the movement and the action are — not that from which they are, though sometimes it is both, that from which and that to which the movement is — and the final cause), and to the substance of each thing, and the essence of each; for this is the limit of knowledge; and if of knowledge, of the thing also. Evidently, therefore, 'limit' has as many senses as 'beginning', and yet more; for the beginning is a limit, but not every limit is a beginning.
Chapter 18

'That in virtue of which' has several meanings, (1) the form or substance of each thing, e.g. that in virtue of which a man is good is the good itself,[1] (2) the proximate subject in which

  1. 1022a 15 read καθὸ ἀγαθός, αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν