The advance from sensation through memory, experience, and art, to theoretical knowledge.
2.
Characteristics of 'wisdom' (philosophy).
3.
The successive recognition by earlier philosophers of the material, efficient, and final causes.
4.
Inadequacy of the treatment of these causes.
5.
The Pythagorean and Eleatic schools; the former recognizes vaguely the formal cause.
6.
The Platonic philosophy; it uses only the material and formal causes.
7.
The relation of the various systems to the four causes.
8.
Criticism of the pre-Platonic philosophers.
9.
Criticism of the doctrine of Ideas.
10.
The history of philosophy reveals no causes other than the four.
α.
1.
General considerations about the study of philosophy.
2.
There cannot be an infinite series, nor an infinite variety of kinds, of causes.
3.
Different methods are appropriate to different studies.
Β.
1.
Sketch of the main problems of philosophy.
2.
Fuller statement of the problems:—
(i)Can one science treat of all the four causes?
(ii) Are the primary axioms treated of by the science of substance, and if not, by what science?
(iii) Can one science treat of all substances?
(iv) Does the science of substance treat also of its attributes ?
(v) Are there any non-sensible substances, and if so, of how many kinds?
3.
(vi) Are the genera, or the constituent parts, of things their first principles ?
(vii) If the genera, is it the highest genera or the lowest ?
4.
(viii) Is there anything apart from individual things ?
(ix) Is each of the first principles one in kind, or in number ?
(x) Are the principles of perishable and of imperishable things the same?
(xi) Are being and unity substances or attributes ?
5.
(xii) Are the objects of mathematics substances ?
6.
(xiii) Do Ideas exist, as well as sensible things and the objects of mathematics?
(xiv) Do the first principles exist potentially or actually?
(xv) Are the first principles universal or individual?
Γ.
1.
Our object is the study of being as such.
2.
We must therefore study primary being (viz. substance), unity and plurality, and the derivative contraries, and the attributes of being and of substance.
3.
We must study also the primary axioms, and especially the law of contradiction.
4.
Fatal difficulties involved in the denial of this law.
5.
The connexion of such denial with Protagoras' doctrine of relativity; the doctrine refuted.
6.
Further refutation of Protagoras.
7.
The law of excluded middle defended.
8.
All judgements are not true, nor are all false; all things are not at rest, nor are all in motion.
Δ.
Philosophical Lexicon.
1.
'Beginning.'
2.
'Cause.'
3.
'Element.'
4.
'Nature.'
5.
'Necessary.'
6.
'One.' 'Many.'
7.
'Being.'
8.
'Substance.'
9.
'The same.' 'Other.' 'Different.' 'Like.' 'Unlike.'
10.
'Opposite.' 'Contrary.' 'Other in species.' 'The same in species.'
Distinction of 'theology], the science of being as such, from the other theoretical sciences, mathematics and physics.
2.
Four senses of 'being'. Of these (i) accidental being is the object of no science.
3.
The nature and origin of accident.
4.
(ii) Being as truth is not primary being.
Ζ.
1.
The study of being is primarily the study of substance.
2.
Various opinions on the question, what things are substances?
3.
Four things are commonly held to be substantial—the essence, the universal, the genus, the substratum. The last may be conceived as matter, form, or the concrete individual. Reasons why matter and the concrete individual cannot be primary substance. Form to be studied first in sensible things.
4.
What is essence and to what does it belong, i.e. what things can be defined? Primarily substance.
5.
Combinations of a subject with one of its proper attributes have no definition nor essence.
6.
Is a thing the same as its essence? Yes, if it is a substance.
7.
Analysis of generation, whether by nature, art, or spontaneity.
8.
Form is not generated, but put into matter; yet it did not previously exist apart—the agent in generation is form embodied in another individual of the same species.
9.
Why spontaneous generation sometimes takes place. The conditions of generation in the categories other than substance.
10.
When are definitions of the parts included in the definition of the whole? When the parts are parts of the form.
11.
Which parts are parts of the form, which of the concrete individual?
12.
Wherein consists the unity of an object of definition? In the appropriateness of the differentia to the genus.
13.
A universal cannot be either the substance or an element in the substance of anything (yet how else can a thing be defined?).
14.
Hence it is fatal to make Ideas substances and yet hold that they are composed of other Ideas.
15.
No individual can be defined, whether sensible or, like the Ideas, intelligible.
16.
The parts of sensible things are only potencies. Unity and being are not the substance of things.
17.
Substance is the cause or form which puts matter into a determinate state; it is that in a thing which is distinct from its material elements.
Η.
1.
The discussion of sensible substances continued. Their matter is itself substance.
2.
The main types of form or actuality. Definitions of matter, of form, and of the concrete individual distinguished.
3.
Form distinguished from the material elements; Antisthenes' attack on definition; definition analogous to number.
4.
Remote and proximate matter; the substratum of attributes not matter but the concrete individual.
5.
The relation of matter to its contrary states.
6.
What gives unity to a definition? The fact that the genus is simply the potency of the differentia, the differentia the actuality of the genus.
Θ.
1.
Being as potency and actuality. Potency in the strict sense, as potency of motion, active or passive.
2.
Non-rational potencies are single, rational potencies twofold.
3.
Potency defended against the attack of the Megaric school.
4.
Potency as possibility.
5.
How potency is acquired, and the conditions of its actualization.
6.
Actuality distinguished from potency; a special type of potency described; actuality distinguished from movement.
7.
When one thing may be called the potency or matter of another; how things are described by names derived from their matter or their accidents.
8.
Actuality prior to potency in definition, time, and substantiality; nothing eternal or necessary is a mere potency.
9.
Good actuality better than potency, and bad actuality worse; therefore no separate evil principle in the universe. Geometrical truths found by actualization of potencies.
10.
Being as truth, with regard to both simple and composite objects.
Ι.
1.
Four kinds of unit; the essence of a unit is to be a measure of quantity or of quality; various types of measure.
2.
Unity not a substance but a universal predicate; its denotation the same as that of being.
3.
Unity and plurality; identity; likeness; otherness; difference.
4.
Contrariety is complete difference; how related to privation and contradiction.
5.
The opposition of the equal to the great and the small.
6.
The opposition of the one to the many.
7.
Intermediates are homogeneous with each other and with the extremes, stand between contraries, and are compounded out of these contraries.
8.
Otherness in species is otherness of the genus and is contrariety; its nature further described.
9.
What contrarieties constitute otherness in species.
10.
The perishable and the imperishable differ in kind.
Κ.
1.
Recapitulation of Β. 2, 3.
2.
Recapitulation of„ Β. 4–6.
3.
Recapitulation of„ Γ. 1, 2.
4.
Recapitulation of„ Γ. 3.
5.
Recapitulation of„ Γ. 4.
6.
Recapitulation of„ Γ. 5–8.
7.
Recapitulation of„ Ε. 1.
8.
Recapitulation of„ Ε. 2–4.
Extracts from Physics:
9.
II. 5, 6, on luck.
III. 1–3, on potency, actuality, and movement.
10.
IV. 4, 5, 7, on the infinite; there b no actual infinite, and especially no infinite body.
11.
V. 1, on change and movement.
12.
V. 2, 3, on the three kinds of movement.
Definitions of 'together in place', 'apart', 'touch', 'between', 'contrary in place', 'successive', 'contiguous', 'continuous'.
Λ.
1.
Substance the primary subject of inquiry. Three kinds of substance—perishable sensible, eternal sensible, and unmovable (non-sensible).
2.
Change implies not only form and privation but matter.
3.
Neither matter nor form comes into being. Whatever comes into being comes from a substance of the same kind. If form ever exists apart from the concrete individual, it is in the case of natural objects.
4.
Different things have elements numerically different but the same in kind; they all have form, privation, and matter. They also have a proximate and an ultimate moving cause.
5.
Again actuality and potency are principles common to all things, though they apply differently in different cases. The principles of all things are only analogous, not identical.
6.
Since movement must be eternal, there must be an eternal mover, and one whose essence is actuality (actuality being prior to potency). To account for the uniform change in the universe,
there must be one principle which acts always alike, and one whose action varies.
7.
The eternal mover originates motion by being the primary object of desire (as it is of thought); being thoroughly actual, it cannot change or move; it is a living being, perfect, separate from sensible things, and without parts.
8
Besides the first mover there must be as many unmoved movers as there are simple motions involved in the motions of the planets. The number is probably either 49 or 55, As there is but one prime mover, there must be but one heaven.
9.
The divine thought must be concerned with the most divine object, which is itself. Thought and the object of thought are never different when the object is immaterial.
10.
Μ.
1.
We pass to immaterial substance. Two kinds of immaterial substances have been believed in, mathematical objects and Ideas, We shall discuss first the former, then the latter, then the view that numbers and Ideas are the substance of sensible things.
2.
(i) Mathematical objects cannot exist as distinct substances either in or apart from sensible things.
3.
They can be separated only in thought. Mathematics is not entirely divorced from consideration of the beautiful, as is sometimes
alleged.
4.
(ii) Arguments which led to the belief in Ideas. Some prove too little, others too much.
5.
Even if there were Ideas, they would not explain the changes in the sensible world.
6.
(iii) Various ways in which numbers may be conceived as the substance of things.
7.
(a) If all units are addible, this gives only mathematical, not ideal number. (b) If all units are inaddible, this gives neither matheatical nor ideal number, (c) If only the units in the same number are addible, this leads to equal difficulties; units must have no difference of kind.
8.
The views of Platonists who disagree with Plato, and those of the Pythagoreans, lead to equal difficulties. Further objections to ideal numbers: (a) How are the units derived from the indefinite dyad? (b) Is the series of numbers infinite or finite; and if finite, what is its limit? (c) What sort of principle is the one?
9.
Discussion of the principles of geometrical objects. Criticism of the generation of numbers from unity and plurality, and of spatial
magnitudes from similar principles. The criticism of ideal numbers summed up. The upholders of Ideas make them at once universal and individual.
10.
Are the first principles of substances individual or universal?
Ν.
1.
The principles cannot be contraries. The Platonists in making them contraries treated one of the contraries as matter. Various forms of this theory. The nature of unity and plurality expounded.
2.
Eternal substances cannot be compounded out of elements. The object of the Platonists is to explain the presence of plurality in the world, but in this they do not succeed. What justifies the belief in the separate existence of numbers?
3.
Difficulties in the various theories of number. The Pythagoreans ascribe generation to numbers, which are eternal.
4.
The relation between the first principles and the good.
5.
How is number supposed to be derived from its elements? How is it the cause of substances?
6.
The causal agency ascribed to numbers is purely fanciful.
