sciences are superior to the other sciences, and this to the other theoretical sciences. One might indeed raise the question whether first philosophy is universal, or deals with one genus, i.e. some one kind of being; for not even the mathematical sciences are all alike in this respect, — geometry and astronomy deal with a certain particular kind of thing, while universal mathematics applies alike to all. We answer that if there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider being qua being — both what it is and the attributes which, belong to it qua being.[1]
Chapter 2
But since the unqualified term 'being' has several meanings, of which one was seen[2] to be the accidental, and another the true ('non-being' being the false), while besides these there are the figures of predication, e.g. the 'what', quality, quantity, place, time, and any similar meanings which 'being' may have; and again besides all these there is that which 'is' potentially or actually: — since 'being' has many meanings, we must first say regarding the accidental, that there can be no scientific treatment of it. This is confirmed by the fact that no science — practical, productive, or theoretical — troubles itself about it. For on the one hand he who produces a house does not produce all the attributes that come into being along with the house; for these are innumerable; the house that is made may be pleasant for some people, hurtful to some, and useful to others, and different — to put it shortly — from all things that are[3]; and the science of building does not aim at producing any of these attributes. And in the same way the geometer does not consider the attributes which
