Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/93

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so'. And it is in this direction that the consequences are most difficult. For if those who have seen most of what truth is possible for us (and these are those who seek and love it most) — if these have such opinions and express these views about the truth, is it not natural that beginners in philosophy should lose heart? For to seek the truth would be to follow flying game.

But the reason for this opinion is that while these thinkers were inquiring into the truth of that which is, they thought 'that which is' was identical with the sensible world; in this, however, there is largely present the nature of the indeterminate — of that which exists in the peculiar sense which we have explained;[1] and, therefore, while they speak plausibly, they do not say what is true. For it befits us to put the matter so rather than as Epicharmus put it against Xenophanes.[2] And again, they held these views because they saw that all this world of nature is in movement, and that about that which changes no true statement can be made; at least, regarding that which everywhere in every respect is changing nothing could truly be affirmed. It was this belief that blossomed into the most extreme of the views above mentioned, that of the professed Heracliteans, such as was held by Cratylus, who finally did not think it right to say anything but only moved his finger, and criticized Heraclitus for saying that it is impossible to step twice into the same river; for he thought one could not do it even once.

But we shall say in answer to this argument also, that there is some real sense in their thinking that the changing, when it is changing, does not exist. Yet it is after all disputable; for that which is losing a quality has something[3] of that which is being lost, and of that which is coming to be, something must already be. And in general if a thing is perishing, there will be present something that exists; and if a thing is coming to be, there must be something from which it comes to be and something by which it is generated, and this process cannot be[4] ad infinitum. But leaving these arguments, let us insist

  1. Cf. 1009a 32.
  2. Epicharmus may have said that Xenophanes' views were 'neither true nor plausible', or that they were 'true but not plausible'.
  3. 1010a 18 read ἔχει τι τοὖ.
  4. 1010a 22 read μὴ εἶναι εἰς.