too between him who has a garment and the garment which he has there is a having. This sort of having, then, evidently we cannot have; for the process will go on to infinity, if we can have the having of what we have. — (2) 'Having' or 'habit' means a disposition according to which that which is disposed is either well or ill disposed, either in itself or with reference to something else, e.g. health is a 'habit'; for it is such a disposition. — (3) We speak of a 'habit' if there is a portion of such a disposition; therefore the excellence of the parts is a 'habit'.
Chapter 21
'Affection' means (1) a quality in respect of which a thing can be altered, e.g. white and black, sweet and bitter, heaviness and lightness, and all others of the kind. — (2) The already actualized alterations. — (3) Especially, injurious alterations and movements, and, above all, painful injuries. — (4) Experiences pleasant or painful[1] when on a large scale are called affections.
Chapter 22
We speak of 'privation' (1) if something has not one of the attributes which a thing might naturally have, even if this thing itself would not naturally have it, e.g. a plant is said to be 'deprived' of eyes. — (2) If, though either the thing itself or its genus would naturally have an attribute, it has it not, e.g. a blind man and a mole are in different senses 'deprived' of sight; the latter in contrast with its genus,[2] the former in contrast with his own normal nature. — (3) If, though it would naturally have the attribute, and when it would naturally have it, it has it not; for blindness is a privation, but one is not 'blind' at any and every age, but only if one has not sight at the age at which one would naturally have it. Similarly a thing suffers privation when it has not an attribute in those circumstances, or[3] in that respect and in that relation and in that sense, in
