Page:Michael Farbman - Russia & the Struggle for Peace (1918).djvu/156

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The Struggle for Peace

But as a matter of fact there probably never was a better synthesis of true idealism and genuine statesmanship than in the conduct of the Russian democracy in its struggle for peace. The element of idealism was strong indeed. It was the great dream of bringing peace to the tortured world. It was the ideal of reviving the Proletarian International. It was the desire to see the war over; to be able to start the great task of social reconstruction in building the new Russia.

Undoubtedly these great and high ideals determined the first peace move of the democracy. But these ideals were not the only, not even the main, motives of the policy of the democracy in their struggle for peace. The main motives which impelled them were the actual realities of Russia. They worked for peace, not because they wanted peace, but because Russia needed peace. The bitter legacy they inherited from the old régime made the continuation of the war all but impossible. The disorganisation of Russia's economic system and the disintegration of the army made the prolongation of the war a sheer impossibility. At all events, the army, as the Revolution found it was unable to carry on the war. The greatest concern for the Russian democracy was the army. It was in an altogether unstable and insecure condition. It was in imminent danger of collapse ; the disruptive forces tended to be greater than the forces holding it together. Something had to be done to inspire it with new confidence. I have already mentioned above that the whole foundations of the army had to be reformed to restore it to a condition of fighting fitness. But the democratisation of the army meant more than the mere democratisation of its disciplinary system; it involved no less the democratisation of the aims for which the army was to fight. The first task confronting the Russian democracy was to give the army the confidence that it was fighting a purely defensive war. Had the democracy not instinctively understood the dangerous condition of the army, had they not solemnly repudiated all aims of conquest and