Tsardom, did the Burgfrieden in Germany begin to waver. All attempts to break down Germany by external force have led and are bound to lead to a strengthening of Germany's internal unity. The same would be true of England, America, or any other nation. Had the Russian democracy had a fresh and well-equipped army at their disposal, they would none the less first have tried the political method of destroying German unity. As it was, they had no other alternative.
But there was yet another element which determined the peace move of the Russian democracy. I refer to their desire to frustrate the threatened German offensive. While the first two motives of Russia's peace policy—the necessity to counteract the growing dissolution of the army and the hope of undermining the political unity of Germany—have been perverted and misrepresented, this third element has been completely ignored in Allied countries. To grasp the full reality of this motive, it is necessary to remember the state of affairs in Russia immediately after the Revolution. No sooner were the first few days of the Revolution over than Russia was seized by the fear that the Germans were preparing an offensive. Persistent rumours stated that Petrograd was in immediate danger, that the Germans were about to land troops on the Riga front, and so forth. Who disseminated such rumours, and with what purpose, it is not necessary to consider here. Maybe there was some foundation for them, and some of their authors were acting in good faith. But there is no doubt that to a great extent these rumours emanated from the new War Office, which was stupid enough to imagine that anxiety was a salutary state of mind for the Russian people at that time. Such tactics were a very crude mistake, but that is not the question here. The important thing is that immediately after the Revolution the Russian army and democracy were faced with the question of a possible German offensive. That the Russian army was at that time absolutely unable to
