repel a great offensive was too obvious. Thus the manifesto to the peoples of the world, and "above all, to the German proletariat," was a tactical move. I do not mean merely to say that it turned out to be a tactical move; I want to emphasise that it was purposely intended as such. I base my statement on conversations with the members of the Executive Committee of the Soviet who drafted this manifesto. In relating the circumstances which led to the elaboration of this step, they emphasised that they were influenced by anxiety and expectation that Hindenburg was preparing a crushing blow against Russia. My view is based on these conversations, but I can support it with a very important document which confirms it absolutely. On the 14th of March, the very day when the Soviet addressed its manifesto to the world, the Izvestia published a leading article about the war which explains all the motives that impelled the leaders of the democracy. The article concludes: "Evidently Hindenburg intends to attempt an attack against Russia so as to weaken, by means of victories, the effect of the Russian Revolution, and to check the advance of revolution in Germany and Austria. … And the danger from this side is not yet over. The German offensive must be arrested by a double blow on the front and in the rear. … On the front it must be repelled by military efforts; into the rear of Germany we must direct our appeal for an immediate conclusion of the war."
Thus the manifesto to the peoples of the world was, so to say, a peace offensive, or even a "peace-trap. " It was intended to break up and disorganise the military and social unity of Germany and of Austria. And it achieved considerable results. It would have been decisive if the Russian bourgeoisie and the short-sighted diplomacy of the Allies had not hastened to the assistance of German militarism.
There is a widespread belief in the Allied countries that the Russian Revolution was saved by the Allies, who, by their offensive on the West, paralysed
