reviving the spirit and increasing the fighting strength of the army, which was entrusted to Kerenski, and the task of preparing the way to peace and negotiating with the Allies, which was given to Tereshchenko. The army was to be strengthened, not to continue the war, but to have, if necessary, a strong military argument against Germany. For equilibrium and a harmonious elaboration of the country's policy, it was necessary for these two elements to supplement each other. Kerenski set himself to his task with his accustomed energy and with a real revolutionary inspiration. He really enlarged the revolutionary outlook of the soldiers; it was a very promising beginning. But the more Kerenski inspired the army with new vigour and force, the more his success served to whet the imperialistic appetites of the bourgeoisie. The Cadets and their supporters on the Right began to speak, not only about the sacred interests of Russia, about war till victory, and so forth, but even about their hopes of arresting the Revolution. The High Command drew its own conclusions from the efforts to revive the army and from Kerenski's success. The Commander-in-Chief, Alexeiev, made speeches to the soldiers scorning the idea of the democratic peace programme and proclaiming that Russia needed "victory, not peace." The attitude of the High Command began to make the democracy very uneasy, and Kerenski had to dismiss Alexeiev. But that did not stem the tide of imperialism in the High Command, and Kerenski attempted to mitigate matters still further. General Gurko was dismissed from his command and degraded. But these were only half measures, and the counter-revolutionary aspirations of the High Command continued to grow.
Meanwhile Tereshchenko, who was under the direct obligation to hasten the negotiations with the Allies and to bring them to a satisfactory conclusion, began instead to make every possible effort to "reassure " the Allies that Russia would "fulfil her duties" towards them. The democracy disapproved of the line which
