Page:Michael Farbman - Russia & the Struggle for Peace (1918).djvu/193

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The Offensive and Disaster
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revolutionary Russia would have caused considerable agitation among the German workers, who would have interpreted it as an attempt to destroy the Revolution. But the longer the indefinite situation at the front continued, the more impatient grew the warlike party in Germany. They would have welcomed nothing more gladly than any kind of provocation from Russia's side. They could then crush Russia without any fear of opposition from the democratic elements in Germany.

While the Russian democracy was engaged in internal strife and disagreement, the Coalition Government began to organise its mad offensive. Towards the end of May all the bourgeois Press was discussing the offensive as a foregone conclusion. In fact, the offensive was on the lips of everyone. At that time the Soviet leaders demanded an explanation from Kerenski about the war situation and the rumours of an offensive. Kerenski made an important speech in which he explained that the work of diplomacy was very difficult; that Russia was beginning to carry less weight with her Allies, and that in diplomatic negotiations she must have this strongest argument of a tried and proven military efficiency and warlike power.[1] In the second place, he said, the question of offensive or no offensive was in the hands of the High Command. "It is a matter of strategy, of the technique of war, and of the special circumstances on the front." In vain the Left warned him that the offensive was above all a political question on which the whole position of the democracy, and, in fact, of Russia, before the world, depended. Least of all should it have been entrusted to the High Command, which was permeated with imperialistic

  1. Kerenski's Under-Secretary, Colonel Yakubovich, stated at the conference of the delegates from the front that France and England had approached the Provisional Government with a declaration beseeching them to undertake the offensive. If not, they declared that the inactivity on the Russian front would force them, in the final reckoning, to follow the path of separate peace with Germany. This declaration by Yakubovich was published in all the Russian papers and in the official Gazette.