sympathies, and altogether out of touch with the ideals and the expressed policy of the democracy. In vain the Left warned the Government that an offensive should not be made into a political weapon for diplomatic purposes. The offensive was decided on by the Government to impress the Allies.
The Russian military position at that time gave not the slightest justification even for an offensive on a limited scale. It is true that the suspension of hostilities for many months had helped Russia to accumulate a fairly large amount of munitions. But as far as food supply and clothing were concerned, the army was absolutely inadequately provisioned. And the really dangerous thing was the morale of the armies. Had Germany begun an offensive it would probably have inspired the Russian army with vigour and patriotism. But an offensive at a time when the old treaties with the Allies for imperialistic aims had not even been revised, an offensive carried out with an army which was vigorously protesting against this evil, was sheer madness.
But there were great temptations for the Russian generals. In the first place, there was the notion that the Austro-German armies on the Russian front were likewise infected and demoralised by the Revolution and subsequent fraternisation. Secondly, reconnaissances had shown that parts of the Austrian front were very thinly held, and that an easy success could be obtained by a well-organised surprise movement. There was an idea that a success on one part of the front might inspire the whole Russian army and people with a new patriotism and warlike fervour. And even a defeat was thought to have its saving features. It would again inspire the army and the people to repel the invaders.[1]
On the long fighting line from the Baltic to the Black Sea a small part was chosen which promised a more or
- ↑ After the July offensive, the Allied Press actually used to call every reverse on the front, even the fall of Riga, a "blessing in disguise."
