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The Offensive and Disaster

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less successful beginning.^[1] The representatives of the soldiers had made it quite plain that the army was not ready to make a blow, and that even if they could be forced or persuaded to attempt one, they were absolutely unable to sustain a reverse without disaster. But the generals knew their way. They began an energetic campaign of "careful nursing" on the front, and carried away the Government by promises of a splendid beginning. This "nursing" consisted in collecting on a narrow section of the front, which was very thinly held by the enemy, specially chosen divisions; but even the soldiers of these divisions were little inclined for an offensive, and the High Command collected at the same point the British armoured cars, Checho-Slovak contingents, a good many British and French aviators, and all the shock battalions, the Kornilovists, "battalions of death," and the other troops which soon after the disaster played the chief part in the counter-revolutionary movements. But that was not all. Whole regiments were made up of officers only. This heterogenous

↑ "The Times History of the War," Part 170, "The Russian Offensive and Retreat," says (p. 12): "Faithful to the call of their obligations as Allies, seeking manfully to justify the Revolution, unheeding the clamour of Bolshevik agitation and German agents whom they were powerless to bridle or subdue, the Provisional Government gladly adopted M. Kerenski's views as to the possibility of a general offensive. A conference at headquarters between Ministers and the Supreme Commander -in-Chief, General Brusilov, who had been transferred from the South-Western front to succeed General Alexeiev, did not yield so much promise. It was ascertained that a simultaneous offensive on all the fronts would necessitate indefinite delay. The Northern front had suffered such ravages from the proximity of Petrograd and its demoralising influences that scarcely any hope could be entertained of its reviving before the season had matured too much for effective operations. The Western or Central front, recently commanded by General Gurko, was better off, as the Bolshevik strongholds, Petrograd and Kronstadt, were farther away. But it was badly infected, and nothing could be done much before the end of July. The South-Western front looked more promising. With careful nursing it might be counted upon to deliver a blow some time in June." (The italics are mine.)

[1] "The Times History of the War," Part 170, "The Russian Offensive and Retreat," says (p. 12): "Faithful to the call of their obligations as Allies, seeking manfully to justify the Revolution, unheeding the clamour of Bolshevik agitation and German agents whom they were powerless to bridle or subdue, the Provisional Government gladly adopted M. Kerenski's views as to the possibility of a general offensive. A conference at headquarters between Ministers and the Supreme Commander -in-Chief, General Brusilov, who had been transferred from the South-Western front to succeed General Alexeiev, did not yield so much promise. It was ascertained that a simultaneous offensive on all the fronts would necessitate indefinite delay. The Northern front had suffered such ravages from the proximity of Petrograd and its demoralising influences that scarcely any hope could be entertained of its reviving before the season had matured too much for effective operations. The Western or Central front, recently commanded by General Gurko, was better off, as the Bolshevik strongholds, Petrograd and Kronstadt, were farther away. But it was badly infected, and nothing could be done much before the end of July. The South-Western front looked more promising. With careful nursing it might be counted upon to deliver a blow some time in June." (The italics are mine.)

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