APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110013-9
Black, and Adriatic Seas. The government depends heavily on foreign-flag ships to carry the country's foreign trade; in 1972 Czechoslovak ships carried less than 10% of the 4.5 million tons of foreign seaborne trade.
Except for the merchant marine, for which there are no expansion plans, improvement and expansion of the transportation and telecom facilities are in various stages of planning or implementation. As to the railroads, main emphasis is being placed on improvement of the existing lines rather than on construction of new ones; major projects underway include the reconstruction and enlargement of rail junctions in several key centers and electrification of several lines between Prague and several main cities. The highway modernization program aims to eliminate serious bottlenecks, improve existing roads, and establish an expressway system of cross-country routes. A main objective is to have 80% of the national roadnet paved by 1975; long-range plans call for expressways from Prague to the borders of all adjacent countries by 1990. Inland-waterway transport improvements underway or planned include reconstruction of locks and dams, port modernization, new container terminals, and fleet improvement and expansion. Additional pipelines are under construction or planned for the near future. There are no known plans for expansion of the merchant fleet. Some improvement of military airfields is underway, particular emphasis being on construction and improvement of defense installations. Telecom projects seek to eliminate any obsolete intercity systems and establish an automated long-distance telephone service.
B. Strategic mobility (S)
Czechoslovakia's transportation systems would play a strategic role in the event that Warsaw Pact Forces were committed against Western Europe and the NATO central front forces. However, the rail, highway, and inland waterway systems do have shortcomings and vulnerable points. Although adequate for current economic needs, the well-developed rail system would be severely taxed to sustain large-scale military movements. Major military operations in and through the country would be seriously hampered by a lack of alternative east-west routes, too few north-south routes, and the difference in gages between Czechoslovak and Soviet railroads.
The most important rail route is the 593-mile double-track electrified line from the U.S.S.R. border at Cierna nad Tisou to the East German border at Dolni Zleb. It provides the only east-west rail route through Czechoslovakia into East Germany for Soviet military movements. Major interdiction points along the route are the larger classification yards at Cierna nad Tisou, Kosice, Ceska Trebova, Prague, and Usti nad Labem. Also vulnerable are the various large steel and concrete bridges crossing the Poprad, Vah, Morava, Elbe, and Vltava rivers. Special clearances on this line permit the use of U.S.S.R. rolling stock after Soviet-gage tracks are exchanged for standard-gage at the border. Should the need arise, Soviets could move more than 68,000 short tons of military supplies over this line in a 24-hour time period without disruption of civilian traffic.
A strategic north-south route runs along the Morava-Oder corridor from Ostrava, at the Polish border, to Bratislava, at the Hungarian border. This 164-mile double-track partly electrified line connects two of the country's major industrial areas and carries the greater share of international traffic from Poland to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. Capacity of this route is over 79,000 short tons per 24 hours. Major interdiction points on the route are: the classification yards at Ostrava, Prerov, and Bratislava; the 670-foot concrete-arch bridge over the Vydrica River at Bratislava; and the 380-foot steel-plate-girder bridge over the Becva River at Prerov.
Another strategically important route is the 55-mile broad-gage line from the U.S.S.R. through Vel'ke Kapusany to Haniska. This line, with a daily capacity of 15,000 short tons, provides the Soviets with a second high-capacity rail route into Czechoslovakia and provides an alternate route for bypassing the highly congested Chop (U.S.S.R.)-Cierna nad Tisou transloading complex. However, because of its lack of bypasses, the route is extremely vulnerable to military action.
The highway network would provide a viable transport alternative for strategic movement during the initial phase of any major military operation. Practically all of the major routes are paced, and bypasses have been constructed around many urban areas. However, prolonged movement by tracked vehicles and heavy trucks would seriously damage most road surfaces. The road pattern throughout the western and central parts of the country provides considerable flexibility for motorized forces, but movement in Slovakia, the eastern part of the country, would be curtailed by the lack of north-south routes and the generally mountainous terrain. Offroad dispersal in that area would be difficult or virtually impossible (Figure 1). Effective interdiction would be
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110013-9
