Page:NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 18; CZECHOSLOVAKIA; TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110013-9.pdf/9

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110013-9


FIGURE 1. Road in mountainous eastern Czechoslovakia. Illustrated are terrain constraints on offroad movement. (U/OU)


difficult to achieve along a wide front because of the numerous alternate routes and bridges throughout most of the country—excepting Slovakia.

Although the two major systems comprising the inland waterways are not interconnected, each system provides significant logistical support routes. Main Elbe-system routes connect the strategically important areas of Kolin, Prague, Melnik, Usti nad Labem, and Decin to the East German waterway system, thence to the East German-West German border. The Danube river provides Komarno and Bratislava access to the Czechoslovakia-Austria border moving west, and to Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the U.S.S.R. moving east as well as providing access to the lower Danubian river-maritime ports. The waterways lend themselves to Warsaw Pact logistical support of extended military operations as they are capable of moving large amounts of rations, POL (petroleum, oil, lubricants), ammunition, construction materials, and equipment. Most vulnerable are the lock-and-dam installations on the Elbe system, destruction of which would completely close through traffic by causing flooding and restrictive low water levels. Serious interdiction could also be accomplished by destroying the major ports on the Danube as well as those on the Elbe.

Military support by the Czechoslovak merchant fleet, based primarily at Polish ports, would be limited to logistic support of Warsaw Pact nations only.

Of the 10 oceangoing ships, at least 6 dry-cargo ships have a military lift and supply transport potential of 34,386 cargo deadweight tons for short-haul (48 hours steaming) nearseas operations. The four bulk-cargo ships would have only limited usefulness for logistic support; but, if accessible at the time of emergency, would also be assured for military support. Of the bulk-cargo ships, Praha, 32,240 d.w.t., has a heavy-lift capability with its 60-ton booms, and Vitkovice, 41,208 d.w.t., is equipped with a long hatch of 51 feet.

The lift capability could be augmented by an indeterminate number of smaller ships assigned to the inland waterway shipping companies.

No formal mobilization plan in regard to CSA and Slov-Air is known to exist. However, because of the status of the civil airlines as state-owned enterprises, civil aviation equipment and personnel could be absorbed into the military with little difficulty. Since most flight personnel are air force reservists, their conversion to the military during a national emergency could be quickly and easily performed. The 45 major transports would be of greatest value for their troop and cargo airlift potential. The light aircraft of Slov-Air could be used for a variety of military-oriented activities including reconnaissance, training, and medical evacuation.

The Czechoslovak military makes considerable use of the civil wire line facilities. Inasmuch as telecom facilities are owned by the government, integration or transfer of part or all of the networks from civil to military would be easy. In wartime, telecom facilities would come under complete control of the military.


C. Railroads (C)

The rail lines are owned and operated by the government and are administered through the Czechoslovak State Railways (CSD), an agency of the government under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Transportation. The CSD is the principal carrier of domestic long-haul freight and also carries a large amount of international traffic. Because of the thickly forested, rugged mountainous terrain, the pattern of the railroad system has remained basically unchanged since its development under the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Since that time emphasis has been placed primarily upon increased efficiency of the existing lines rather than on new line construction. The main developments have been improvement of east-west routes to provide for increased traffic with the U.S.S.R.


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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110013-9