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NORTH DAKOTA REPORTS.

151. When by statute the mayor is a part of the law making power, his concurrence in legislative action is essential to its validity. Dillon on Municipal Corps., § 309. Sexton v. Beach, 50 Mo. 488; Sexton v. St. Joseph, 60 Mo. 153; Irving v. DeVors, 60 Mo. 625. By force of statute a county tax deed—not void on its face—is prima facie evidence of title. But when any material irregularity is shown then the presumption of the statute is rebutted. Then step by step the claimant must prove everything essential to the validity of his title. Lacy v. Davis, 4 Mich. 157; Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 12; Thompson v. Ware, 43 la. 433; Butler v. Delano, 42 Ia. 350; Beddleman v. Brook, 28 Cal. 75; Johnson v. Elwood, 53 N.Y. 431; 2 Desty 961, 969.

Wallin, J. This is a statutory action to quiet an adverse title to real estate. The grounds of the action are not alleged in the complaint further than to state that plaintiff is the owner of lots 12 and 13 of block 9, in Keeney &.Dewitt’s addition to the City of Fargo, in Cass County; that defendant wrongfully claims an estate or title to the lots adversely to the plaintiff; that the action is brought to determine such adverse claim. The prayer of the complaint is, in effect, that defendant shall quitclaim his interest in the lots to the plaintiff, or set forth by answer the nature of his adverse claim, that it may be adjudged to be void, and that defendant be restrained from asserting any claim to the lots. Defendant answered the complaint, denying each and every allegation thereof, and further set out title to the lots in himself by virtue of two certain tax deeds annexed to and made a part of the answer. One of the deeds is based upon a tax sale of the lots for taxes claimed to have been assessed against them by the taxing officials of the City of Fargo, in the year 1884, such tax deed being executed by the city treasurer pursuant to a tax sale made by him in 1885. The answer further alleges that, subsequent, to such tax sale, defendant paid certain sums assessed against said lots by the city authorities as and for taxes. Referring to the other tax deed, the answer avers, in substance, that such deed was made and delivered to defendant by the county treasurer of