bond, and alleging that the same was without consideration. At the close of the trial both parties moved for directed verdicts. The trial court thereupon dismissed the jury, and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants.
The sole question presented on this appeal is whether the trial court was correct in ordering judgment in favor of the defendants. A determination of that question involves a consideration of, and is controlled by, a construction of the instrument in suit. Our statute provides:
“Every contract by which the amount of damages to be paid or other compensation to be made for a breach of an obligation is determined in anticipation thereof is to that extent void.” § 5925, C. L. 1913.
“Parties to a contract may agree therein upon the amount which shall be presumed to be the amount of damages sustained by a breach thereof, when from the nature of the case it would be impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the actual damages.”’ § 5926, C. L. 1913.
Questions similar to the one here presented have frequently been before the courts, and have given them much trouble. No good purpose would be subserved by analyzing the different adjudicated cases, for as has been well said:
“No definite rule to determine the question is furnished by them, each being determined more in direct reference to its own facts than to any general rule.” Streeper v. Williams, 48 Pa. 450.
In the earlier cases the courts gave more weight to the language of the clause designating the sum to be paid. The modern authorities attach greater importance to the meaning and intention of the parties. Sutherland on Damages (4th ed.) § 293, p. 907. No form of words has been regarded as controlling.
“But the fundamental rule, so often announced, is that the construction of these stipulations depends, in each case, upon the intent of the parties as evidenced by the entire agreement construed in the light of the circumstances under which it was made.” Kemp v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 69 N. Y. 45.
Thus, in Streeper v. Williams, supra, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the word ‘“‘forfeit,” in a certain instrument there in suit, was outweighed by the applicable rules of interpretation and meant “to pay.” Our statute provides:
“All contracts, whether public or private, are to be interpreted by the
