They were unquestionably able, honest, and efficient officers. The fact that they were alert and active in seeking the perpetrator of these atrocious crimes is evidence that each was conscientious in the discharge of his duty. It is unbelievable that men and officials of this character could be guilty of the matters charged against them by Layer. Certainly they did not thus stultify themselves.
It is also to be remembered that, at the time Layer made his affidavits herein, he was an inmate of the penitentiary, and under the judgment and sentence of’the court would remain so for the term of his natural life. He knew that, so long as life should continue, he would be prohibited from free association with the world outside; that he had forfeited for the remainder of his lifetime the society of his family, of his friends, and relations. He knew that the sun of his personal liberty had forever set; his future held for him no hope, no ray of light. In these circumstances the binding force and sanctity of an oath might mean little to him. He in fact would be suffering no additional penalty should he make a false affidavit. In these circumstances, he would be quite free and fearless in swearing to the statements contained in his affidavits. In view of the facts stated in the affidavits by the officials above mentioned, his statements and his and corroborating affidavits are entitled to no credit. It is true, as contended by the defendant in his brief, that under the constitution, one charged with crime is entitled to a trial by the jury, that he is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and that the state must prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is likewise true that the defendant is the only person who can waive such rights. It is the law, however, in this state that the defendant has the right to waive, and the state to receive such waiver on the defendant’s plea of guilty, and that upon such plea he may lawfully be convicted and imprisoned. It is likewise true that such waiver of such privilege must be a voluntary one, and free from all duress, fear, intimidation, and coercion; that is, he must not be induced or compelled to make his plea of guilty by reason of threats, or in any way forced to do so. In other words, his plea must be free and voluntary.
The appellant has cited a long list of authority which sustains this principle. Among others is Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318, 44 Am. Rep. 29; Little v. Commonwealth, 142 Ky. 92, 133 S. W. 1149, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 257, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 241; State v. Calhoun, 50 Kan. 523, 32 Pac. 38, 18 L. R. A. 838, 34 Am. St. Rep. 141. There is no doubt of the correctness of the legal principle stated in the above authorities, and other
