authorities to like effect cited by the defendant. The rule there stated is the well-settled and general rule. It does not, however, apply to the case at bar. In those cases it was either admitted or established by competent proof that the plea of guilty was entered while the accused was under duress, or that it was procured by intimidation or coercion; in other words, it was not a voluntary one. Here, however, that condition does not exist. The proof entirely fails to show that the defendant was under duress, or that, he was intimidated, coerced, threatened, or abused and maltreated, and thus induced to enter his plea of guilty. On the contrary the proof is quite conclusive that his plea was a voluntary one. If it could be established by competent proof that the defendant had by any means been coerced into entering his plea, or if any means were used to put him in fear, or if by fraud he was deceived, or if for any legal cause his plea was not free and voluntary when entered, all the proceedings thereafter occurring including his conviction and sentence would be a nullity. There is, however, no such proof.
While it is proper and lawful in this state for the trial court to receive a voluntary plea of guilty from one charged with crime, nevertheless the writer, speaking for himself only, is of the opinion that the ends of justice would be better subserved, where one is accused of a felony and offers to plead guilty, by rejection of such plea by the court, thus placing the accused upon his trial to the court and jury, providing for him, if necessary, an attorney who will protect and secure for him every right and privilege guaranteed him by the constitution and provided for by the law of the land. This would afford an opportunity to determine if a confession was voluntary in cases where a confession, in part, is relied on by the state to establish the guilt of the accused, and would as well afford the accused an opportunity to show that he did not make the confession, or, if he did, that it was procured by fraud, duress, coercion, etc. It would also afford him an opportunity of cross-examination of those who procured the confession from him, and as well an opportunity to assert every lawful right in aid of his defense.
But, as above stated, defendant waived all these and other privileges by law secured to him, and this, as the record shows, freely and voluntarily. Hence the order and judgment from which this appeal has been taken should be affirmed, and they are affirmed.
Robinson, Christianson, Birdzell, and Bronson, JJ., concur.
