grave danger of abuse, if bias or prejudice was made a ground upon which parties litigant might challenge the right of the members of the supreme court to sit. And apparently they determined that the members of the court ought not to be subjected to challenge by parties litigant on such grounds. But even if bias or prejudice constitutes a ground of disqualification, it seems clear that the appellant has failed to establish it.
Cyc. says: “The disqualifying prejudice of a judge does not necessarily comprehend every bias, partiality, or prejudice which he may entertain with reference to the case. And where, under the law, the bias or prejudice of a judge disqualifies him, it must be made to clearly appear not only that the bias or prejudice exists, but that it is of a character calculated to seriously impair his impartiality and sway his judgment.” 23 Cyc. 582, 583.
In considering the same subject, Ruling Case Law says: “The basis of the disqualification is that personal bias or prejudice renders the judge unable to exercise his functions impartially in the particular case. and therefore it must be shown that he is biased against, or entertains ill will or hostility toward, the defendant, of such character as might prevent him from giving the defendant a fair trial; and this must be shown as a matter of fact, and not as a matter of opinion of the defendant or any other person. The words bias and prejudice as used in the law of the subject under consideration refer to the mental attitude or disposition of the judge towards a party to the litigation, and not to any views that he may entertain regarding the subject-matter involved. Hence a judge is not disqualified from presiding at a criminal trial by the fact that he looks with abhorrence on the commission of crimes; or to try a contested election because he is an active politician, and one of the parties to the contest is a member of his political party, or because he had expressed his opinion on election day that a challenged voter had a right to vote; or to pass on an application to enjoin registrars from filing a registration list which omits the names of certain persons opposing a faction in which he is interested, and to compel them by mandamus to place such names on the list; or to try a case involving a violation of the liquor laws, because he is strongly opposed to the sale of liquor in any form, though if he has publicly pledged and committed himself to revoke the license of every person arraigned before him having license to sell liquor, and is personally hostile to the licensee, it would seem to be a good reason why he should not try cases involving the revocation of the license. It has also been held that
