Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 48).pdf/55

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TUTTLE v. TUTTLE COURT
31

a judge is not disqualified from sitting in a proceeding to punish a contempt consisting of imputation of his motives and attacks upon his integrity, or to try one who has published a newspaper libel against him. Personal knowledge of a judge, of former proceedings before him, is not a disqualification, nor does any disqualification result from the fact that he is convinced of the guilt of an accused, or that he has been an admirer and friend of one accused, and regards him as scrupulously honest. The fact that a judge conducted the preliminary examination which resulted in the prosecution of accused does not, in the absence of any showing as to any personal bias or prejudice, disqualify him from presiding at the trial.” 15 R. C. L. pp. 530, 531. The United States Supreme Court has held that it is no valid objection to a judge trying a cause that before his appointment he was attorney in other matter for some of the parties. But that “in such a state of facts, the judge must be permitted to decide for himself whether it was improper for him to sit in trial of the suit.” Carr v. Fife, 156 U. S. 494, 39 L. ed. 508, 15 Sup. ct. Rep 427.

The petition filed by the appellant challenging Justice Robinson's right to sit in this case was not verified. There was, and is, no contention that Justice Robinson had even the remotest interest in the lawsuit, or that he was related to or even acquainted with the parties. The mere fact that a judge entertains, or even has expressed, an opinion upon some question of law, does not disqualify him on the ground of bias or prejudice. If it did, then a trial judge ought not to sit on the hearing of a motion for a new trial based upon errors of law committed during the course of the trial, and the members of this court ought not to sit in the consideration of petitions for rehearings or upon rearguments of causes. “There is no rule or principle,” said the supreme court of Vermont (Martyn v. Curtis, 68 Ut. 397, 35 Atl. 334) “that disqualifies the judge of a court from sitting in different causes in which the same legal rules and questions of fact, or either of them, are presented for consideration. In many instances, causes involving the same questions are tried by the same judges.”

Under the facts presented in this case the remaining members of the court would not be justified in saying that Mr. Justice Robinson should not sit and participate in the hearing and determination of the case. At most a situation is presented in which he must be permitted to determine for himself whether it is proper for him to sit. Carr v. Fife, 156 U. S. 494. 498, 39 L. ed. 508, 510, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427. See also State ex rel.