tor a stay of proceedings pending an appeal; (3) an appeal from an order denying a change of venue. The libel is this:
“Langer Wants Control.
“It became clear early in the referendum campaign that two factions were seeking control of the I. V. A. One was headed by Attorney General Langer and the other by President Everson. Langer visited heads of Minneapolis and St. Paul corporations that are financing the I. V. A. early this year and demanded that he be made custodian of the slush funds that were expected in North Dakota. His record was against him, and these gentlemen turned him down, though politely. Because of this Langer is sore, it was said yesterday, and is attempting to build up a machine of his own.”
The false innuendo is to this effect: That the purpose and meaning of the libel was to affirm that Langer sought the slush fund to bribe voters at the general election and to corrupt the press, and that it was so understood by those who read the libel. Now that innuendo is clearly false, and yet it is the basis of the action. The libel does not admit of any such understanding. It in no manner indicates that Langer sought the fund for other than legitimate campaign purposes. And without that false innuendo, the complaint would not have been sustained, as it was, by three judges of our court. In two more recent cases the judges have held that even on a demurrer they will not longer hold as true that which they know to be false. All that has a direct bearing on the way in which. Judge Allen used his discretion on the motion for a change of venue and a stay.
‘Pending an appeal from the order denying a'change of venue, the court and counsel made preparations to rush the case to trial, and even put it on the peremptory call of the trial calendar. Hence counsel took fright and rushed to this court with a motion for a stay, and he was told that the motion might well be intrusted to the discretion of Judge Allen. Then Judge Allen heard the motion and allowed a stay on five conditions: (1) That within 10 days defendants give a bond in the sum of $2,000 to pay any judgment plaintiff may recover pursuant to the order ot Judge Cole made as a condition of granting leave to answer. (2) That within 10 days defendants give a bond in the sum of $5,000 to pay any judgment plaintiff may recover. (3) That within 10 days defendants prepare and present to the court for settlement a statement of the case. (4) That within 1o days after settlement defendants complete
