equity contributed upon the purchase price through the Montana or Benson county properties is left unsettled and undetermined. What the evidence may have disclosed in this regard assuredly we cannot ascertain nor determine, in the absence of its settlement and certification. Unless manifest injustice in equity should result thereby, it was proper for the trial court to give effect and recognition to the stipulation of the parties providing for retention of payments by the vendor. Pfeiffer v. Norman, 22 N. D. 168, 173, 133 N. W. 97, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 891. Upon the record, in its present shape, we are unable to state or to hold that the trial court erred in its conclusions with regard to retention of the payments made. We are further of the opinion that the trial court did not err in granting to the plaintiff one-half of the 1921 crop. The computations above stated and the inferences to be drawn from, and the presumptions attaching to, the findings are sufficient to justify such conclusion. The contract further expressly provides for retention of legal title to crops in the plaintiff. We are further of the opinion that the trial court did not err in not granting a six months' period of redemption as provided in cases of a statutory foreclosure. Chap. 151, Laws 1917; Raad v. Grant, 43 N. D. 546, 169 N. W. 588, 592.
However, we are of the opinion that the defendant should be accorded, upon equitable principles, a further time beyond that allowed by the trial court within which to make good the defaults found. The plaintiff did not proceed by the statutory method of cancellation. Through such method the defendant would have been entitled to a six months' period of redemption. The plaintiff sought, by an equitable action, to secure speedy relief and more appropriate action. As it has happened through the course of litigation, the time within which plaintiff secured possession of the land under the decree was delayed beyond the statutory time that would have occurred in a statutory cancellation. The plaintiff has sought the aid of equity, and the plaintiff must, and this court should, as far as the present record will permit, accord to the defendant equity. It is manifest, in a period of deflation of land prices such as the parties assert to exist, that loss by one or both of the parties cannot be escaped as far as present money values are concerned. Upon such basis the defendant will suffer loss, if he makes good the defaults; and, if he does not, he will suffer loss equally or more. Upon such basis the plaintiff will suffer loss if such defaults are not made good. Accordingly the plaintiff is not in a posi-
