tion to complain if equity affords an opportunity to make good the defaults found. The plaintiff, in equity, has sought the cancellation of the contract. The trial court, through its findings, in equity has awarded a strict foreclosure. The remedy of a strict foreclosure is a harsh remedy. Ordinarily equity will not avail thereof, if other methods of foreclosure can be utilized with justice to the parties. From the findings it appears that the defendant tried, in good faith, to till the lands involved in a good and husbandlike manner; that he made some improvements on the land; that even after this action was started he farmed the lands, harvested and threshed grain thereon; that in the fall of 1921, and after the rendition of the judgment herein, he did plowing and sowed rye upon the lands, evidently contemplating a continuance of the contract and the ability to meet the defaults. These actions of the defendant did not serve to injure plaintiff's interests or his property rights. Although the trial court, after the rendition of the judgment, accorded to the defendant two extensions of time within which to meet the defaults, nevertheless we are of the opinion that justice and equity, under the circumstances, require that defendant be accorded every opportunity to meet the defaults found, consistent with plaintiff's rights.
In the findings it appears that a credit of $9,035 for the Benson county and Montana lands was given by the plaintiff upon the purchase price of the land involved herein. It is true that the trial court found that the properties at their present market values, considering defendant's investment therein, are insufficient to compensate the plaintiff for his losses sustained. However, the trial court does not determine their present market value or the present value of defendant's equities therein. Although upon the record we are unable to hold that it was error to decree to the plaintiff the retention of the credit given by the defendant for the Benson county and Montana lands, nevertheless it does not appear affirmatively that full justice is done by retaining such credit and decreeing a strict foreclosure within a comparatively limited time. In such circumstances equity should do full justice, and not by halves. If, now, a foreclosure through sale of the premises should be ordered, it might simply serve purposes of either jeopardizing or destroying the rights and interests of both parties; those of the defendant by imposing an insurmountable burden of costs and the payment of the full obligation; those of the plaitniff by denying the present enforcement of existing defaults and by greatly lessening the value of his lien. A strict fore-
