The Green Bag MARRIAGE. (BREACH OF PROMISE.— DAMAGES.— EXCESSIVE VKRDICT.) UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON.
In McCarty v. Heryford, 125 Federal Reporter 46, a verdict of $22,500 for breach of marriage promise, against a man shown to own property worth $70,000, incumbered by a mortgage for $20,000, was held so excessive as to indicate passion or prejudice on the part of the jury, the offer of marriage having been renewed in good faith after the commencement of the action, and the matters of aggravation relied on by the plaintiff not having been sustained by a preponderance of the evidence. The court reviews a number of verdicts in this class of cases and says the verdict in the case at bar is unusual. In Campbell v. Arbuckle, 4 New York Supplement 30, a verdict for $45,ooo was sustained, but that verdict amounted to only four and one-half per cent., for one year of the defendant's estate. In another case a verdict for $25,000 was allowed to stand, that sum being one-sixth of the defend ant's fortune. In other cases verdicts for $16,000 and $12,500, where the defendants were worth $50,000 and $75,000 were ap proved, the recovery in each instance being increased by matters of aggravation. In the present instance the court says that if the verdict is allowed to stand, in view of the incumbrance already on defendant's prop erty, it will wipe out his entire estate at forced sale; and that if a jury may thus divest a man of his property, its power ought to be exercised with great caution. MONOPOLIES. (ANTI-TRUST LAW.—INTERSTATE COMMERCE.) UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON.
In Ellis v. Inman, Poulsen & Co., 124 Federal Reporter 956, a combination be tween all local lumber manufacturers in a city to raise and maintain the price to l.ical customers, and to refuse to sell to those who purchased any part of their sup ply from outside mills, were held not to
violate the Sherman anti-trust law, as in restraint of interstate commerce, while the discrimination against local dealers purchas ing elsewhere affects interstate commerce only directly and incidentally.
MURDER. (REVERSAL OF CONVICTION. PLEA OF GUILTY OF MANSLAUGHTER.—POWER то АССЕГГ.) UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA.
In United States v. Linnier, 125 Federal Reporter 83, an interesting question of prac tice in homicide cases is presented. The de fendant was indicted for murder, was convict ed, and then filed a motion for new trial which was sustained. He thereupon offered to file a plea of guilty of manslaughter and allow sentence to be pronounced thereon. The United States attorney objected to the re ceiving of such a plea, and the question was as to the power of the court in the premises. The evidence had shown the defendant guilty of manslaughter only. A number of cases are cited to show that a reviewing court, on determining that the evidence shows defend ant guilty of a lesser crime than that for which he was convicted, may enter judgment for that crime on the verdict already rend ered. State v. Schele, 52 Iowa 608, 3 North western Reporter 632; State v. Keasling, 74 Iowa 528, 38 Northwestern Reporter 397; Commonwealth v. Squire, i Mete. (Mass.) 258, are cited as instances in which the lower court had pronounced sentence for a lighter offense than that found by the verdict to have been committed. The court then says that it can therefore be said that instead of set ting aside the verdict over the objection of either or both of the parties, the court, on the verdict as it stood, because of the state of the evidence, could have pronounced a judgment for manslaughter; and having such power, it is more than certain that the court could and should receive the plea of the lesser offense and pronounce judgment there on. In concluding, the power of the United States attorney is reviewed, and his objection held not to be insurmountable.
