RAILROADS. (CROSSING ACCIDENT.—INJURY RE SULTING IN SUICIDE.—COMPANY'S LIABILITY.) MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.
In Daniels v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 67 Northeastern Reporter 424, it appeared that plaintiff's testator received a blow on the head in a collision at a railroad crossing. His mind was clear for several weeks, but then he showed symptoms of insomnia and restlessness, had headaches, was melancholy, and at times delirious. An autopsy showed circumscribed meningitis, producing mental aberration. The accident occurred on August I2th, and on the 3d of the next October the testator committed suicide by strangling himself with a napkin. The question was whether his life was lost by the collision, so as to render the railroad company liable. In holding that the death was due to a new and intervening cause, so as to acquit the company from liability, the court cites a number of authorities including Dean v. American Ins. Co., 4 Allen 96, and Cooper v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 102 Mass. 227, 3 Am. Rep. 451, to the effect that if death is the result of voli tion by one who has a conscious purpose to end his life, arjd has intelligence to adapt means to ends, it is his own act, though he is so far insane as not to be morally responsi ble for his conduct. This doctrine is con trary to that declared in Breasted v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 8 N. Y. 299, 59 Am. Dec. 482; Life Insurance Company v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580, 21 L. Ed. 236; Man hattan Life Insurance Company v. Broughton, 109 U. S. 121, 3 Sup. Ct. 99, 27 L. Ed. 878. All of these cases were insurance cases. But in Scheffer v. Railroad Company, 105 U. S. 249, 26 Law Ed. 1070, the same question was involved as in the present suit, and the Supreme Court of the United States held that the representative of a person who was injured in a railroad accident and took his own life while insane, about eight months afterwards, could not recover against the railroad com pany. The court says that the subject brings it "near to the vexed theological problem as
to free will and pre-destination;" but with commendable caution it declines to "pursue these inquiries too far." SOLDIERS. (HOMICIDE IN LINE OK DUTY—MAR TIAL LAW.—WHAT CONSTITUTES.) SUPREME COURT OK PENNSYLVANIA.
In Commonwealth ex rel Wadsworth v. Shortall, 55 Atlantic Reporter 952, the relator petitioned for habeas corpus to secure discharge for an arrest for a homicide committed by him during the coal miners' strike of 1902, and while he was on duty as a member of the Penn sylvania militia. He was posted as a sentry in front of a private residence, with orders to halt all persons prowling around or ap proaching the house, and if the persons failed to respond to his challenge "to shoot, and shoot to kill." The country was much dis turbed, and dynamite outrages were threat ened. About 11.30 o'clock relator discovered a man approaching the house and called "Halt" several times. His challenge being disregarded, relator, in accordance with his orders, fired and killed the man. The court's first holding is that where the Governor is sues a general order calling out the militia to suppress violence and maintain, the public peace in a strike district, it is itself a declara tion of qualified martial law. The court says it is not unmindful of eminent authori ties who declare that martial law cannot exist in England or the United States in time of peace; but relies on the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Chase in Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U. S. 2, 127, 18 Law Ed. 281. The court also remarks that many other authorities hold that martial law exists wherever the military arm of government is called into service. Many authorities, English and American, are then reviewed to show that a soldier is bound to obey the orders of his superior officer where they do not clearly show their own illegality, and that he would be protected in doing so; and that, where a militiaman without malice, under an order of an officer and in performance of his sup posed duty, commits a homicide, he is ex
