trunk on the dock, instead of loading it on the steamer, and there was no clause in the contract making the limited liability cover the case of negligence. The court cites: Michaels v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 30 N. Y. 564, 86 Am. Dec. 415; Read v. Spaulding, 30 N. Y. 630, 86 Am. Dec. 426; Maghee v. Camden & A. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 514, 6 Am. Rep. 124; Condict v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 54 N. Y. 500; Ravvson г'. Holland, 59 N. Y. 611. 17 Am. Rep. 394; London & L. F. Ins. Co. v. Rome, W. & O. R. Co., 144 N. Y. 200, 39 Northeastern 79, 43 Am. St. Rep. 752. BRIBERY. (CITY OFFICER— SCOPE OF AUTHORITY —VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE.) MISSOURI SUPREME COURT.
State v. Butler. 77 Southwestern Reporter 560, chronicles the successful appeal of the notorious Edward Butler from a conviction of an attempt to bribe a member of the Board of Health of St. Louis. The charter of St. Louis required all contracts to be let by the board of public improvements, and on this account an ordinance placing power in the Board of Health to contract for the removal of garbage, is held a nullity, and is also held not to affect the case because not signed by the mayor when Butler's attempt to bribe was made. It follows from this that the Board of Health had no power to let a contract for the removal of garbage, and Butler, in endeavoring to secure such a con tract by the offer of a bribe, is in the position of one attempting to bribe an officer to do something which he has no power to do. This, the Supreme Court declares, is not a violation of Rev. St. 1899, Sections 2084, 2089, providing in substance, that every per son who shall offer to give any money to any public officer of a city to influence his vote, etc., on any question "which may by law be brought before him in his official ca pacity," shall be guilty of an attempt to bribe. "How," says the court, "can an officer be influenced to act when there is no law re quiring him to do so and no power under the law authorizing him to act? It may be said that it was thought the power existed
and there should be a conviction of bribery or attempted bribery. So it may be said that a witness who swears falsely as to an immaterial matter . . . ought to be con victed of perjury because he thought it was material, but what court would for a moment hold that a defendant could be convicted for swearing falsely as to matters immaterial to the legitimate subject of inquiry? In re Yee Gee, 85 Federal Reporter 145; State v. Howard, 137 Mo. 288, 38 Southwestern Reporter 908; Collins v. State, 25 Tex. Supp. 204; Gunning v. People, 59 North eastern Reporter 494, 82 Am. St. Rep. 433; United States v. Boyer, 85 Federal Reporter 426; United States v. Gibson, 47 Federal Reporter 833; Commonwealth v. Reese, 29 Southwestern Reporter 352; Kitby v. State. 31 Atlantic Reporter 213; People v. Purley. 2 Cal. 564; Newman v. State, 23 Southeast ern Reporter 831; Ruffin v. State, 38 South western Reporter 169, are all cited in sup port of this doctrine, while a number of cases are distinguished or held inapplicable. Several minor decisions as 'to the construc tion of statutes and ordinances are made, among them that criminal statutes must be strictly construed, and that if there is a fair doubt concerning the existence of a charter power, it will be resolved against the city. This case has been productive of wide criticism of the court, in part based on the view that the Board of Health would neces sarily have to determine its power under the ordinance, and, therefore, pass on the ques tion of its validity, so that the matter was one which would come before the members in their official capacity. This is the holding in State v. Ellis, 33 N. J. Law 103, discussed in the opinion. Another and more emphatic criticism is directed toward the holding that the fact that the ordinance had not been signed by the mayor when Butler's attempt to bribe was made, deprived the Board of Health at that time of any official cogni zance of the awarding of the garbage con tract. Under this rule all that would be necessary to avoid criminal liability for brib
