Notes of Recent Cases. cry would be to accomplish the undue in fluencing of the official before the law under which he was to act had taken effect. Thus, if a corporation desired to influence the ac tion of Secretary Cortelyou in his new posi tion as secretary of commerce, all that would have been necessary to make such proceeding lawful would be to have ap proached him before the President signed the act creating the department of com merce. The obvious absurdity of such a re sult is one of the great weaknesses of the court's opinion. CARRIERS. (CARRIERS— FRKE TRANSPORTATION— BREACH OF CONTRACT—WIFE'S PASSAUF. MONEY — RECOVERY BY HUSBAND— INCONVENIENCE — DAMAGES.) NEW YORK SUPREME COURT.
In Miller v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 85 New York Supplement 883, it ap peared that plaintiff had made a special con tract with the company to transport him and his wife in a certain express train to the city of New York from Cumberland, Mary land. On reaching Philadelphia the com pany refused to continue the trip and told plaintiff he would have to wait over three or four hours for another distinct train. In stead, he took passage over another railroad and sued for a breach of the contract of car riage and for damages for inconvenience, an noyance and delay. The court first holds that plaintiff could recover money paid for his wife's fare from Philadelphia onward, though she was not a party to the action, and her claim was not assigned to him. This is on account of his obligation to support his wife and pay her expenses, including travel ing expenses, especially when she is with him. As to the right to recover for mere in convenience and annoyance, the court holds that it does not exist in the absence of proof of actual physical or mental injury. Miller v. King, 2i App. Div. 192, 47 New York Supplement 534, and Hamilton v. Third Avenue Railroad Co., 53 N. Y. 25, are dis tinguished.
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CASH REGISTER. (MEMORANDA AS INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE.) NEW YORK SUPREME COURT.
In Cullinan v. Moncrief, 85 New YorkSupplement 745, the State excise commis sioner sought to recover the penalty of a bond given by defendants, who were drug gists, to obtain a certificate to traffic in li quors. The evidence was that a special agent of the excise department had pur chased from one of the defendants a halfpint of brandy without a physician's pre scription, and paid him 75 cents therefor, which, with the price of another article pur chased at the same time, amounted to 96 cents. To rebut this evidence defendants offered a slip from their cash register show ing that on that date no sale for 96 cents had been made. The defendant from whom the brandy was said to have been purchased, testified that he had a cash system by which he could tell whether he was in the store or not. His partner explained the working of the cash register. The court holds that the slip was inadmissible, there being a total failure of the evidence to establish the cor rectness of the items thereon, and says it is also of the opinion that the slip should not have been received in evidence in any event, as it was not an account book, but a mem orandum made by the party in his own in terest, which was not offered in aid of the witness' recollection. CONTEMPT. (WHAT CONSTITUTES— DENUNCIATION OF COURT—TERMINATION OF CAUSE— LEGISLA TIVE LIMITATION OF AUTHORITY—FREEDOM OF Sl'EKCll.)
MISSOURI SUPREME COURT.
In State v. Shepherd, 76 Southwestern 79, the defendant was informed against for con tempt of the Supreme Court itself in print ing an article commenting on the termina tion of a personal injury case begun against the Missouri Pacific Railroad and brought by appeal before that court. After referring to the charges of bribery in the Legislature and reflecting on the good faith of the gov ernor and attorney-general, the article pro ceeded: "And now, as the capsheaf of all
