But from the very nature of the case, it is manifest that the right of competition fur nishes no justification for an act done by the use of means which in their nature are in violation of the principle upon which it rests. The weapons used by the trader who relies upon this right for justification must be those furnished by the laws of trade, or at least must not be inconsistent with their free oper ation. ... In the case before us the mem bers of the association were to be held to the policy of refusing to trade with the plaintiff by the imposition of heavy fines, or, in other words, they were coerced by actual or threatened injury to their property. . . . This method of procedure is arbitrary and artificial, and is based in no respect on the grounds upon which competition in business is permitted, but, on the contrary, it creates a motive for business action inconsistent with that freedom of choice out of which springs the benefit of competition to the public, and has no natural or logical relation to the grounds upon which the right to compete is based." A large number of cases are cited and dis tinguished. DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT. (STIPULATIONS AVOIDING LIABILITY TOWARD FREE PASSEN GERS.)
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.
In the case of Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Adams, 24 Supreme Court Reporter 408, is discussed the liability of a railroad company for the wrongful death of a passenger who was riding upon a pass, the conditions of which stipulated that the company would not be liable under any circumstances, whether of negligence of agents or otherwise, or for any injury to the person or loss or damage to the property of the passenger using the same. The death occurred in Idaho, and the statutes of that State provide that when death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs or representatives may maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death, or if such person is employed by another who is responsible for his conduct, then also against the employer.
The Circuit Court charged the jury that they were not to consider what was the duty of the railroad toward the person who was killed, but the duty which the road owed to his heirs, and the duty which the latter had the right to exact from the railroad in this case is the same duty which the railroad cornpay owed to the public in general. The Su preme Court holds that it is error to main tain that although it should appear that the railroad company failed in no way in its duty toward the deceased, it couid yet be held responsible, under the Idaho statute above mentioned, to his heirs for the damages they suffered by reason of his death. Yrongful act and neglect alike imply the omission of some duty, and that duty must be the duty owing to the decedent. It cannot be that if the death was caused by an unintentional act it can be considered wrongful or negligent at the suit of the heirs of the decedent. They claim under him, and can recover only in case he could have recovered had he been only injured. Upon the question of the liability of the road to a person riding upon a free pass, the court says that "the question to be considered is, whether the company is liable in damages to a person injured through the ordinary negligence of its employés who at the time is riding upon a pass given as a gratuity and upon the condition, known and accepted by him, that the road shall not be responsible for such injuries. This question has received the consideration of many courts, and has been answered in different and opposing ways. The Supreme Court men tions the cases of Rogers v. Kennebec S. B. Co., 86 Me. 261, 29 Atl. 1069: Quimby v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 150 Mass. 365, 23 N. E. 285; Griswold v. New York & N. E. R. Co., 53 Conn. 371, 4 Atl. 261; Kinney v. Central R. Co., 34 N. J. Law 513; and others which hold that the company under these circumstances is not responsible. The fol lowing English cases are also referred to as holding to the same effect: McCalley v. Furness R. Co., L. R. 8 Q. B. 57; Hall v. North eastern R. Co., L. R. ID Q. B. 437; Duff v. Great Northern R. Co., Ir. L. R. 4 C. L. 178; and Alexander z1. Toronto & N. R. Co., 33
