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Notes of Recent Cases. Г. С. Q. В. 474. Of the cases which hold that the company is responsible are cited Rose v. Des Moines Valley R. Co., 39 Iowa 246; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Butler, 57 Pa. 335: Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Hopkins, 41 Ala. 486; and Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. McGown, 65 Texas 640. The court distinguishes cer tain of its own decisions, vis: Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 468, and New World r. King, 16 How. 469, where, al though the parties were free passengers, it did not appear that there were any stipula tions concerning the risk, and the companies were also held guilty of gross negligence. The case of B. & O. S. W. R. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U. S. 498, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 385, 44 L. Ed. 560. is relied on as decisive of the point un der consideration. The Supreme Court holds that the judgments of the Circuit Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals, which per mitted a recovery, must be reversed. Jus tices Harían and McKenna dissent.

EXPERT TESTIMONY. (CONTRACT FOR CONDI TIONAL COMPENSATION —ILLEGALITY.) NEW YORK SUPREME COURT.

In Laffin v. Billington, 86 New York Sup plement 267, the plaintiff, a physician, sued for services rendered to defendant's client as an expert witness, in a suit for injuries against a street railway company. At the trial he testified that he was to get ten per cent, if he helped work up the case; that he told defendant that he would take up the ex pert end if he got ten per cent, of the settle ment or judgment, and that he wouldn't go ahead as an expert witness without defend ant's personal guaranty, as he had no faith in the honesty of his client. A writing was in troduced, signed by defendant's client, au thorizing defendant to pay plaintiff's fees out of the recovery, and followed by defendant's written agreement to pay plaintiff ten per cent, of his client's recovery. The court holds th?t this bargain was illegal and void. Wellington r. Kelly, 84 Xew York 533, is quoted to the effect that an agreement by a stranger to furnish evidence to substantiate a claim or defense for a comoensation de

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pending upon the success of his efforts, is jurious in its tendency, as furnishing an ducement for perjury and subornation witnesses. Lyon i: Hussy, 82 Hun. 15, N. Y. Supp. 281 is also cited.

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FIRE PROTECTION. (CITY PROPERTY— CONTRACT WITH WATERWORKS COMPANY.) CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT.

In Town of Ukiah City v. Ukiah Water & Improvement Co., 75 Pacific Reporter 773, it is held that a city which, under its power to conserve the general public good, con tracts with a waterworks company for gen eral fire protection, has no cause of action against the company for municipal property destroyed by fire, through the company's failure to supply a sufficiency of water. The case turns on the distinction between con tracts made by municipal corporations in what may, with perhaps questionable pro priety, be termed its private capacity, and those which it makes as a governmental agency of the State, for the benefit of the public at large. The contract in suit was held to belong to this latter class. The opinion of the court below is set out in full and adopted by the Supreme Court, which distinguishes the cases of Paducah Lumber Co. v. Paducah Water Supply Co., 89 Ky. 340. 12 Southwestern Reporter 554, 13 Southwestern Reporter 249, 7 L. R. A. 77. 25 Am. St. Rep. 536; Gorrell v. Water Supply Co., 124 N. C. 328, 32 Southeastern Reporter 720. 46 L. R. A. 513, 70 Am. St. Rep. 598; Planters' Oil Mill v. Monroe Water Works & Light Co., 52 La. Дпп. 1243, 27 Southern Reporter 684: Watson v. Inhabitants of Needham, 161 Mass. 404. 37 Northeastern Reporter 204, 24 L. R. A. 287. In the opinion of the trial court it is said, "It may be assumed here that it is within the power of a municipality, as a property owner, to enter into such a contract with a water cni"i>any for the protection of the property which it owns as a legal individual: but it cer tainly needs something more than evidence showing an accepted service for general fire purposes to establish such a contract, and