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WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. JACKSON

Opinion of the Court

he disregards Ex parte Young’s express teaching against enjoining the “machinery” of courts. 209 U. S., at 163.

Justice Sotomayor seems to admit at least part of the problem. She concedes that older “wooden” authorities like Ex parte Young appear to prohibit suits against state-court clerks. Post, at 7. Still, she insists, we should disregard those cases in favor of more “modern” case law. Ibid. In places, The Chief Justice’s opinion seems to pursue much the same line of argument. See post, at 4. But even overlooking all the other problems attending our colleagues’ “clerks-only” theory, the authorities they cite do not begin to do the work attributed to them.

Most prominently, our colleagues point to Pulliam. But that case had nothing to do with state-court clerks, injunctions against them, or the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Instead, the Court faced only the question whether the suit before it could proceed against a judge consistent with the distinct doctrine of judicial immunity. 466 U. S., at 541–543. As well, the plaintiff sought an injunction only to prevent the judge from enforcing a rule of her own creation. Id., at 526. No one asked the Court to prevent the judge from processing the case consistent with state statutory law, let alone undo Ex parte Young’s teaching that federal courts lack such power under traditional equitable principles. Tellingly, our colleagues do not read Pulliam to authorize claims against state-court judges in this case. And given that, it is a mystery how they might invoke the case as authority for claims against (only) state-court clerks, officials Pulliam never discussed.

If anything, the remainder of our colleagues’ cases are even further afield. Mitchum v. Foster did not involve state-court clerks, but a judge, prosecutor, and sheriff. See 315 F. Supp. 1387, 1388 (ND Fla. 1970) (per curiam). When it came to these individuals, the Court held only that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar suit against them. 407 U. S. 225, 242–243 (1972). Once more, the Court did not purport