Opinion of the Court
to pass judgment on any sovereign immunity defense, let alone suggest any disagreement with Ex parte Young. To the contrary, the Court went out of its way to emphasize that its decision should not be taken as passing on the question whether “principles of equity, comity, and federalism” might bar the suit. 407 U. S., at 243. Meanwhile, Shelley v. Kraemer did not even involve a pre-enforcement challenge against any state-official defendant. 334 U. S. 1 (1948). There, the petitioners simply sought to raise the Constitution as a defense against other private parties seeking to enforce a restrictive covenant, id., at 14, much as the petitioners here would be able to raise the Constitution as a defense in any S. B. 8 enforcement action brought by others against them. Simply put, nothing in any of our colleagues’ cases supports their novel suggestion that we should allow a pre-enforcement action for injunctive relief against state-court clerks, all while simultaneously holding the judges they serve immune.
B
Perhaps recognizing the problems with their court-and-clerk theory, the petitioners briefly advance an alternative. They say they seek to enjoin the Texas attorney general from enforcing S. B. 8. Such an injunction, the petitioners submit, would also automatically bind any private party who might try to bring an S. B. 8 suit against them. Reply Brief for Petitioners 21. But the petitioners barely develop this back-up theory in their briefing, and it too suffers from some obvious problems.
Start with perhaps the most straightforward. While Ex parte Young authorizes federal courts to enjoin certain state officials from enforcing state laws, the petitioners do not direct this Court to any enforcement authority the attorney general possesses in connection with S. B. 8 that a federal court might enjoin him from exercising. Maybe the closest the petitioners come is when they point to a state
