A discourse upon the origin and foundation of the inequality among mankind/Preface
PREFACE.
The most useful and least improved of all human Studies is, in my Opinion, that of Man, (2) and I dare say, that the Inscription on the Temple of Delphos did alone contain a more important and difficult Precept than all the huge Volumes of the Moralists. I therefore consider the Subject of this Discourse, as one of the most interesting Questions Philosophy can propose, and, unhappily for us, one of the most knotty Philosophers can labour to solve: For how is it possible to know the Source of the Inequality among Men, without knowing Men themselves? And how shall Man be able to see himself, such as Nature formed him, in spite of all the Alterations which a long Succession of Years and Events must have produced in his original Constitution, and to distinguish what is of his own Essence, from what the Circumstances he has been in, and the Progresses he has made, have added to, or changed in, his primitive Condition. The human Soul, like the Statue of Glaucus which Time, the Sea and Storms had so much disfigured that it resembled a wild Beast more than a God, the human Soul, I say, altered in the Bosom of Society by the perpetual Succession of a thousand Causes, by the Accession of numberless Discoveries and Errors, by the Changes that have happened in the Constitution of surrounding Bodies, by the perpetual jarring of its own Passions, has in a manner lost so much of its original Appearance as to be scarce distinguishable; and we no longer perceive in it, instead of a Being always acting from certain and invariable Principles, instead of that heavenly and majestic Simplicity which its Author had impressed upon it, but the shocking Contrast of Passion that thinks it reasons, and a delirious Understanding.
But what is still more cruel, as every Improvement made by the human Species serves only to remove it still further from its primitive Condition, the more we accumulate new Informations, the more we deprive ourselves of the Means of acquiring the most important of all; and it is, in a manner, by the mere dint of studying Man that we have lost the Power of knowing him.
We need not be very clear-sighted to perceive, that it is in these successive Alterations of the human Frame we must look out for the first Origin of those Differences that distinguish Men, who, it is universally allowed, are naturally as equal among themselves, as were the Animals of every Species, before various Physical Causes had introduced those Varieties we now observe among some of them. In fact, it is not possible to conceive, how these first changes, whatever Causes may have produced them, could have altered, all at once and in the same manner, all the Individuals of the Species. It seems obvious, that while some improved or impaired their Condition, or acquired divers good or bad Qualities not inherent in their Nature, the rest continued a longer time in their primitive Posture; and such was among Men the first Source of Inequality, which it is much easier thus to point out in general, than to trace back with Precision to its true Causes.
Let not then my Readers imagine, that I dare flatter myself with having seen what I think is so difficult to discover. I have opened some Arguments; I have risked some Conjectures; but not so much from any Hopes of being able to solve the Question, as with a View of throwing upon it some light, and giving a true State of it. Others may with great Facility penetrate further in the same Road, but none will find it an easy Matter to get to the end of it. For it is no such easy task to distinguish between what is natural, and what is artificial in the actual Constitution of Man, and to make one's self well acquainted with a State which, if ever it did, does not now, and in all probability never will exist, and of which, notwithstanding, it is absolutely necessary to have just Notions to judge properly of our present State. Nay, a Man must be more a Philosopher than most people think to take upon him to determine exactly, what Precautions are requisite to make solid Observations upon this Subject; and, in my Opinion, a good Solution of the following Problem would not be unworthy of the Aristotles and Plinies of our Age: What Experiments are requisite to know Man as constituted by Nature, and which are the best Methods of making these Experiments in the bosom of Society? For my own Part, I am so far from pretending to solve this Problem, that I think I have sufficiently reflected on the Subject of it to dare answer beforehand, that the wisest Philosophers would not be too wise to direct such Experiments, nor the most powerful Sovereigns too powerful to make them; a Concurrence of Circumstances which there is hardly any Reason to expect, or at least that it should be attended with that Perseverance, or rather that Succession of Knowledge, Penetration, and Good-will requisite on both Sides to insure Success.
These Researches, so difficult to make and which hitherto have been so little thought of, are however the only Means left us to remove a thousand Difficulties, which prevent our seeing the true Foundations of Human Society. It is this Ignorance of the Nature of Man, that so much perplexes and obscures the genuine Definition of natural Right: for the Idea of Right, as Monsieur Burlamaqui says, and still more that of natural Right, are Ideas evidently relative to the Nature of Man. It is therefore from this very Nature of Man, continues that great Philosopher, from his Constitution and his State, that we are to deduce the Principles of this Study.
It is impossible to observe, without both Surprize and Scandal, the little Agreement there is to be found on this important Article between the different Authors that have treated of it. Among the gravest Writers, you will scarce find two of the same Opinion. Not to speak of the ancient Philosophers, who, one would imagine, had laid themselves out to contradict each other in regard to the most fundamental Principles, the Roman Jurisconsults make Man and all other Animals, without Distinction, subject to the same natural Law, because they consider under this Name, rather that Law which Nature imposes upon herself than that which she prescribes to others; or, more probably, on Account of the particular Acceptation of the Word, Law, among these Jurisconsults, who, on this Occasion, seem to have understood nothing more by it, than the general Relations, established by Nature between all animated Beings for the sake of their common Preservation. The Moderns, by not admitting any thing to rank under the word Law but a Rule prescribed to a moral Being, that is to say, a Being intelligent, free, and considered with a View to his Relations to other Beings, must of course confine to the only Animal endowed with Reason, that is, to Man, the Competency of the natural Law; but then, by defining this Law, every one of them his own Way, they establish it on such Metaphysical Principles, that so far from being able to find out these Principles of themselves, there are very few Persons among us capable of so much as understanding them. Thus, therefore, all the Definitions of these learned Men, Definitions in every thing else so constantly at Variance, agree only in this, that it is impossible to understand the Law of Nature, and consequently to obey it, without being a very subtile Reasoner and a very profound Metaphysician. This is no more nor less than saying, that Men must have employed for the Establishment of Society a Fund of Knowledge, which it is a very difficult Matter, nay absolutely impossible for most Persons to develop, even in the bosom of Society.
As Men, therefore, are so little acquainted with Nature, and agree so ill about the Meaning of the word Law, it can scarce be expected they should ever fix unanimously upon a good Definition of natural Law. Accordingly, all those we meet with in Books, besides wanting Uniformity, are derived from many Lights which Men do not naturally enjoy, and from Advantages they can have no Notion of, as long as they remain in a State of Nature. The Writers of these Books set out by examining, what Rules it would be proper, for their common Interest, Men should agree to among themselves; and then, without further Ceremony, they proceed to give the Name of natural Law to a Collection of these Rules, without any other Proof of such a Collection's deserving that Name, than the Advantage they find would result from an universal Compliance with it. This is, no doubt, a very easy Method of striking out Definitions, and of explaining the Nature of Things by an almost arbitrary Fitness.
But as long as we remain unacquainted with the Constitution of Man, considered as just issuing from the Hands of Nature, it will be in vain for us to attempt to determine what Law he received, or what Law suits him best. All we can plainly distinguish in regard to that Law, is that not only, for it to be Law, the Will of him whom it obliges must submit to it with Knowlege of such Obligation, but likewise that, for it to be natural, it must speak immediately by the Voice of Nature.
Laying aside therefore all the scientific Treatises, which teach us merely to consider Men such as they have made themselves, and confining myself to the first and most simple Operations of the human Soul, I think I can distinguish in it two Principles prior to Reason, one of which interests us deeply in our own Preservation and Welfare, and the other inspires us with a natural Aversion to see any other Being, but especially any Being like ourselves, suffer or perish. It is from the Concurrence and the Combination our Mind is capable of forming between these two Principles, without there being the least Necessity for adding to them that of Sociability, that, in my Opinion, flow all the Rules of natural Right; Rules, which Reason is afterwards obliged to re-establish upon other Foundations, when by a gradual Exertion of its own Powers it has at last stifled the Authority of Nature.
By proceeding in this Manner, we free ourselves from the Necessity of making a Man a Philosopher, in order to make a Man of him; his Obligations are not dictated to him merely by the slow Voice of Wisdom; and as long as he does not resist the interior Impulses of Compassion, he never will do any harm to another Man, nor even to any other sensible Being, except in those lawful Cases where his own Preservation happens to come in question, and it is of course his Duty to give himself the Preference. By this Means too we may put an end to the ancient Disputes concerning the Participation of other Animals in the Law of Nature; for it is plain that, as they want both Reason and Free-will, they cannot be acquainted with that Law; however, as they partake in some measure of our Nature in virtue of that Sensibility with which they are endued, we may well imagine they ought likewise to partake of the Benefit of the natural Law, and that Man owes them some particular Kinds of Duty. In fact, it seems that, if I am obliged not to injure any Being like myself, it is not so much because he is a reasonable Being, as because he is a sensible Being; and this last Quality, by being common to Men and Beasts, ought to exempt the second from any unnecessary Injuries the first might be able to do them.
This same Study of original Man, of his real Wants, and of the fundamental Principles of his Duties, is likewise the only good Method we can take, to surmount an infinite Number of Difficulties concerning the Origin of moral Inequality, the true Foundations of political Bodies, the reciprocal Rights of their Members, and a thousand other similar Questions, that are as important as they are ill understood.
To consider human Society with a calm and disinterested Eye, it seems at first sight to shew us nothing but the Violence of the Powerful and the Oppression of the Weak; the Mind is shocked at the Cruelty of the one, and equally grieved at the Blindness of the other; and as nothing is less stable in human Life than those exterior Relations, which Chance produces oftener than Wisdom, and which are called Weakness or Power, Poverty or Riches, human Establishments appear at the first Glance like so many Castles built upon Quick-sands; it is only by taking a nearer Survey of them, and by removing the Dust and the Sand that surround and disguise the Edifice, we can perceive the unshakeable Basis upon which it stands, and learn to respect its Foundations. Now, without applying ourselves seriously to the Study of Man, his natural Faculties and their successive Developments, it is impossible we should ever be able to make these Distinctions, and to separate, in the actual Constitution of Things, the Operations of the Divine Will from the pretended Improvements of Human Art. The political and moral Reflections, to which the important Question I examine gives room, are therefore useful in all Shapes; and the hypothetical History of Governments is, in regard to Man, an instructive Lesson in every respect. By considering what we should have become, had we been left to ourselves, we ought to learn to bless him, whose gracious Hand, correcting our Institutions, and giving them an unshakeable Foundation, has thereby prevented the Disorders which they otherwise must have produced, and made our Happiness flow from Means, which, in all Appearance, would without his Intervention have completed our Misery.
Quem te Deus esse Jussit,
et Humanâ quâ parte locatus es in re,
Disce.