PREFACE.
The subject of "Aircraft in Warfare," with which Mr. Lanchester deals, is, and for some time will be, highly controversial. In each of its three aspects, the scientific, the military, and the material or manufacturing, it is still in the stage of experiment and speculation. The results obtained cannot always be made available for the information of the general public, and those which are available have usually been set forth in terms so technical, either in a scientific or a military sense, as to be somewhat difficult for the general reader to understand. Very little trustworthy information, therefore, has been disseminated, and the uninstructed public, hungry for information on a novel and alluring subject, of which the national importance is evident, has fallen an easy prey to the imposter. Any plausible rogue, gifted with sufficient assurance, and aided by a ready pen or supple tongue, has been able to pose as an "aeronautical expert," and to find some kind of following. To those who, as a matter of duty, or in search of information, have perused the aeronautical discussions carried on in the Press, or the reports of such discussions elsewhere, the very word "expert" calls up a strange procession of inventors, politicians, motor-trade touts, journalists, trick-fliers, novelists and financial agents, most of them, axe in hand, on the way to the national grindstone; a few, innocent, following on the same track, on a vague quest for supernatural powers of flight.
As a matter of fact, there are no experts in military aeronautics. There are experts in the various branches: in flying, in scientific research, in the design and construction of aeroplanes and engines, in military organisation and tactics. But, as yet, there is little opportunity for the expert in one branch to gain definite knowledge of the others, except by hard personal experience; in every direction there is progress, in every section of work opinion is fluid, and the views of the workers are not yet sufficiently crystallised to permit of definite instruction to others. Yet there are some students who, by reason of their receptive minds, and their wide and varied experience, have mastered so many of the fundamental problems that they are well qualified to review the general position, and to put forward a reasoned statement of their views. And of those so qualified, none has a wider view than Mr. Lanchester.
Of all the fields in which work for the advancement of military aeronautics has been undertaken, in this country, that of scientific research has, up to the present, produced the results that will probably be the most enduring. It is only by the solution of fundamental problems of science that improvement in the power of flight can be won. Solutions may be obtained, and some few have been, by chance, or by intuition; but to gain the full value of the result, it is necessary that the scientific solution should also be found, as a basis for further deductions. In this work of stating and solving the problems of aeronautics, Mr. Lanchester was one of the pioneers; he was bold enough to publish the result of his investigations at a time when flying had only just been proved possible; and he has reason now to be well satisfied with the quality of his early work. In this new book he has discussed matters of wide interest and, at the present moment, of vital importance, and has considered in many bearings the relations between aeronautic science and military art. In this effort many difficulties have had to be faced, not the least of which is the lack of definite knowledge of the methods which have been employed and of the results which have been achieved by aircraft in the present war. And, further, there has been the necessity of exercising extreme discretion in the use of information which is within his knowledge. In the first respect I have some advantage over Mr. Lanchester; in the second he, in writing the book, and I in introducing it, suffer under the same disability.
During the past three years Mr. Lanchester and I have had several tussles in private on the questions debated in this book. Each can put up a pretty good defence on his own ground. Mr. Lanchester is well protected by his profound knowledge of physical science and his practical acquaintance with several branches of engineering. I am strongly entrenched behind a barricade of military prejudice, with some dim recollections of early scientific training as reserves for counter-attack. In my incursions into Mr. Lanchester's territory, I have now and then received a buffet which has made me more wary. And occasionally, I think, Mr. Lanchester has found himself hung up in my wire entanglements. I should like nothing better than to fight out, in public and with due formality, these points—not a few—on which he and I disagree; but at the present moment this is impossible, nor is it advisable that I should do much towards indicating those on which we are in agreement.
There are two theories, however, evolved by Mr. Lanchester to which I may safely draw attention. The first he has called the N-square law, and it is, to my mind, a most valuable contribution to the art of war. It is the scientific statement of a truth which, although but dimly perceived, has been skilfully used by many great captains, both Naval and Military, but it is now for the first time stated in figures and logically proved. We can never be governed by the rules of exact science; there are too many conflicting factors, too many fortuitous circumstances; but there are certain rules, whether based on experience or calculation, which no commander may lightly transgress. Concentration of force is one of these rules, and a statement of the inevitable disadvantages of dispersion is valuable. The examples chosen from sea and land warfare illustrate the working of the law with admirable precision.
In the other case, Mr. Lanchester's calculations are less satisfactory. In considering the proportion of aircraft which is suitable for the requirements of an army in the field, the aircraft are compared with cavalry, and the aeroplane with a single trooper. This is no sound basis for calculation. To begin with, a single aeroplane absorbs, on the average, the services of some twelve officers and men, and its cost, which is not an immaterial factor, would provide more than a score of horses. But even the most accurate display of comparative figures will bring us no nearer to a correct result. The aeronautical arm is a new force in war, performing new functions, extending its activities every day and, at present, recognising but few limitations to its possible development. There is, as yet, no rule-of-thumb method of arriving at a definite and correct allotment of aircraft to an army of given strength. The only safe line on which to proceed is to consider, first, what are the services which the aircraft are to be required to perform? Second, how much of our available resources are we justified in devoting to these services? The answer to the first question shows a list which increases with each successive month of war. The mere propounding of the second will inevitably raise a controversy of which the only possible settlement will be a compromise. The final decision, however, ought to be based on relative value, not on relative numbers.
On the merits of these and other questions raised by Mr. Lanchester, the reader must be the judge. I hope that there may be many readers, and that they will give consideration to their judgments, for, whether they agree or not with the author, they will find here much that is worthy of study and reflection.
- ↑ Lieutenant General Sir David Henderson, KCB, KCVO, DSO (1862–1921) was the senior leader of British military aviation during the First World War, (Wikisource contributor note)