History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 6/Chapter 12

by Hubert Howe Bancroft

 

CHAPTER XII.

DEPARTURE OF THE FRENCH.

1867.

Further Disaffection between Bazaine and the Court — Recall of European Soldiers — Bazaine's Conduct and Character — Exchange of Prisoners — Departure of Troops — Bazaine in Disgrace in France — Cost of Expedition — A New Council Upholds the Empire — Movements of Miramon — Maximilian at the Head of the Army — His March to Querétaro — Invested by the Republican Forces

The ministry expected Bazaine to make a few more efforts in their behalf against the Juarists, but a telegram from Paris, of the 10th of January, 1867, instructed him to hasten the departure of the troops. His measures in accordance therewith increased the bitterness of feeling between the marshal and the court till intercourse was completely broken off.^[1] Among the strongest reasons for this rupture was the strictness with which the commander-in-chief carried out the order for returning to their homes all European soldiers who so desired, even those who had enlisted under Maximilian, in accordance with the convention of Miramare; thus encouraging them to break their oath and to unfairly retain the bounty given them.^[2] Further, as many of the army effects could not profitably be taken to France, horses, saddles, and other cumbrous material were sold by auction at the different camps, going at insignificant prices often direct into the hands of the republicans, while a large quantity of projectiles and powder was destroyed, instead of being allowed to swell the resources of the imperial government.^[3] Bazaine has been widely abused for these and other acts in which he undoubtedly followed only instructions, although impelled occasionally perhaps to a certain excess by the hostility and misconstruction applied on every side; yet it must be admitted that sordid avarice was among the defects of character which tended to justify suspicion against him.^[4] A letter from General Diaz was not without its effect, accusing him of offering to surrender all the towns in French possession with armament, and even the persons of Maximilian and his leading supporters; but this rests on the misinterpreted utterances of the agent sent to confer with him about assuming the leadership of the new government sought by France. Negotiation with Ortega had been frustrated by the United States, as we have seen, and Diaz was too loyal to entertain the offer;^[5] yet he as well as several other leaders showed every consideration for Frenchmen, and readily exchanged the prisoners of this nationality.^[6] The arrangements of Bazaine being made, he marched out from Mexico on the 5th of February, the inhabitants being comparatively silent; for if one party regarded the departure as an humiliating necessity, another looked upon it as a desertion of their cause, and trembled for the consequences.^[7] At Puebla the feeling was even less friendly, influenced to a great extent by the proximity of the republicans, who followed closely though quietly upon the heels of the French, occupying the evacuated towns along the route.^[8] The national imperial army did not attempt to hold a single place between Puebla and Vera Cruz. Hearing of a disaster to the imperial arms, Bazaine considerately sent a message to Maximilian, offering to wait for him in case he should decide to join him. This was naturally declined; yet the marshal took pains to add to the strength of Vera Cruz, now left in charge of General Perez Gomez, so that it might serve as a refuge for the unfortunate prince.^[9] The embarkation of troops, 28,690 in all, had been going on regularly since February 14th, more than thirty vessels, including transports, mail-steamers, and ships of the squadron, having gathered in the harbor for the purpose.^[10] The last of the Belgians had left in January, and most of the Austrians followed, only a regiment of hussars and a battalion of infantry of the latter remaining with their prince.^[11]

Bazaine embarked the last of all, on March 12th, for Toulon, there to bear the brunt of popular ill-will, which had been slowly growing under the accumulating news of sterile victories and wasted millions, till capped by the humiliating reasons for the retreat, and the inglorious circumstances attending it. The government sought prudently to divert attention as much as possible from itself by fostering the feeling against the marshal. No salutes of honor were accorded to him, and he retired for a while under a cloud, silent as beseemed a subject to his sovereign; yet it escaped not attention that he was never called to answer for the missteps imputed to him.^[12]

Castelnau returned at the same time and obtained promotion. Dano remained after having in February

arranged that the custom-house at Vera Cruz should be restored to the Mexicans for a monthly payment of $50,000,^[13] a proposed pittance on behalf of the scattered Gallic treasures, whereof more than three hundred million francs had disappeared in expenses paid by the government of France, and other hundreds of millions had been paid by deluded subscribers to Mexican bonds, not to mention the millions of unrecognized claims and of losses to trade.^[14]

 

On reaching the capital in January 1867, Maximilian held another council to determine whether the empire should be sustained. Nearly two-score persons attended, including ministers, councillors, ecclesiastics, and army men. Bazaine, strange to say, had thought it best to respond in person, representing the futility of continuing with insufficient men and means the struggle against the republicans, whose armies occupied the greater part of the country, and whose cause was sustained by most of the people. But his objections were overruled. The minister of war spoke alluringly of 26,000 men at his command, and after a glib enumeration of provinces still declared to be under imperial control, he of the finance department gave the assurance that a revenue of eleven millions could be counted upon, a sum which might be doubled twice or three times by the recovery of a few other provinces. This glowing picture failed to produce any great enthusiasm, however. On taking the vote the empire was upheld, but by a not very decided expression of confidence.^[15]

Maximilian accepted. If deceived, as his sympathizers hastened to avow, he must have been blind indeed. The truth is, that pride and fancied honor bade him stay. He could less afford to recede now than after the conference at Orizaba. A proof of his miserable condition came at once in the desperate effort required to collect a forced loan of a million. Only a part of the sum was obtained, and a contribution of one per cent had to be imposed.^[16] On the other hand, came news that Miramon had triumphantly penetrated to the capital of Zacatecas, and had nearly succeeded in capturing Juarez.^[17]

Exultation was speedily checked, however. Miramon did not propose to advance farther in this direction with his present force. Satisfied with a forced contribution and the supposed diversion created among the republicans, he retired to join Castillo, who had made a movement toward San Luis Potosí.^[18] Unfortunately for him, Escobedo, commanding the republican army of the north, divined his intentions and intercepted him at San Jacinto on the 1st of February, attacking with a skill and determination that led to a complete rout. Escobedo stained his achievement with the wanton execution of a vast number of prisoners, notably a hundred French soldiers.^[19] Miramon arranged to join Castillo with a few followers and took refuge in Querétaro. Guanajuato had already fallen.^[20] Morelia followed in the crash,^[21] and now from Michoacan northward to the borders of San Luis Potosí the imperialists fell back to Querétaro, where the fortunes of the empire were to be decided.

In order to counteract the discouraging effect of Miramon's defeat and other disasters, Maximilian was persuaded to place himself at the head of the army, a step proper enough under the circumstances, although prompted by the ministry partly with a view of removing him to a distance, and drawing his attention from them and their assumed task of providing resources.^[22] The emperor accordingly set out on the 13th of February with 1,600 men and twelve cannon, the Austrians being left behind for political reasons,^[23] and to assist in holding the capital, which was deemed of vital importance.^[24] Minister Aguirre, Marquez, and the traitor Lopez were among the party. The campaign fund scraped together for the occasion with great trouble amounted to $50,000 — a munificent sum, truly, with which to sustain the impatient army waiting at Querétaro! And yet the ministers continued to hold up the golden prospects displayed at the late conference.

Lares remained, with his somewhat reconstructed cabinet,^[25] in charge of affairs, the defense of the city being intrusted to General Tavera, late minister of war, aided by O'Horan as prefect. To this end the troops in Cuernavaca, Toluca, and other outlying points were withdrawn, giving them a garrison of 5,000 men, which could be swelled by further impressment. Puebla had half that number, under the aged Noriega, and another force stood locked up at Vera Cruz and in Yucatan.

Maximilian reached Querétaro on the 19th, and was received with the enthusiasm to be expected from one of the stanchest of imperial cities, and withal of

Plan of Querétaro.

strong clerical proclivities.^[26] The vicissitudes of war had restricted him to this spot as the most northerly rendezvous and headquarters, although a better one might have been found. The place was picturesque, lying within a narrow valley, on the southern banks of the Rio Blanco, forming a quadrangle of houses about 8,000 feet in length by 4,000 in breadth, freely interspersed with conspicuous churches, chapels, convents, and a number of other fine edifices with gardens. It was not only the capital of the state bearing the same name, but one of the leading manufacturing places in the country, owing partly to its water power; and it sustained a population of nearly 40,000 souls. For strategic purposes, however, the situation was bad; for hills commanded it in every direction, and the river was fordable at more than one place.^[27]

A few days after their arrival a review of the troops was held, showing 9,000 men with 39 cannon, including about 600 Frenchmen.^[28] Miramon was placed at the head of the infantry, of which Castillo and Casanova received each a division, Mendez assuming command of the reserve brigade, in which Lopez served as colonel. Mejía became chief of the cavalry, Reyes of engineers, and Arellano of the artillery. To Marquez, chief of the general staff, was accorded the foremost place, greatly to the anger of Miramon.^[29] Although a large portion of the troops consisted of raw and not very devoted recruits, forcibly enrolled, yet as a whole they presented a fair average enough, even among the officers, though too numerous, and of whose ability Salm-Salm and other foreigners speak slightingly

The brave and dashing Miramon, handsome in face, with mustache and imperial, and with a career almost unequalled for brilliancy at so early an age, for he was only in the middle of the thirties, made a good impression; but his military science was indifferent. So they said was that of Marquez, a keen-eyed little fellow, with sinister, swarthy face and full beard, and known for his cruelty as the Alva of Mexico. The loyal Mejía was a tawny, unprepossessing Indian, with high cheek-bones and an enormous mouth, surmounted by scanty bristles. He was a god among the natives of the adjoining Sierra Gorda, who called him by the endearing name of Don Tomasito. Mendez was also classed as an Indian. He was plump and rather handsome, devoted to the emperor and beloved by his soldiers, yet not free from cruelty. Unimposing in stature but daring in character, these men formed with Maximilian the so-called five magic M's of the empire.^[30] The only soldier of acknowledged education was Severo Castillo, a thin, delicate man, almost deaf, cool in battle, and the best strategist among the Mexican generals. Good in his line was also the artillerist Arellano, a dark young man, agreeable and well educated. The most distinguished-looking of them all was Minister Aguirre, stanch and well-meaning, with a bent for religion. Their devotion to the emperor was not doubted, save in the case of Miramon, who stood suspected of ambitious plans.^[31] It was decided to demand from Mexico all the foreign troops, together with war material, ambulances, and money; but no response was made to the appeal. The ministry appeared intent on keeping everything for its own ends and safety.^[32] Maximilian found it necessary to rely on himself, and appointed as minister of finance and war the experienced Vidaurri, a lank man of Yankee-looking exterior, about sixty years of age, who had acquired fame as the liberal ruler of New Leon, which he for a time maintained almost independent. Forced loans were levied with comparatively little trouble, and the troops kept in good humor.

This feeling was greatly promoted by the conduct of Maximilian, who gave his personal attention to almost every detail, mingling freely with the soldiers and citizens, in plain uniform or national garb, often joining the crowd, accepting a light for his cigar, and living like a poor officer in two simple rooms. He enjoyed walking unattended in the alameda, and could be seen in the evenings at a game of skittles. His coolness under fire excited general admiration. His commanding stature, and the never-absent field-glass, rendered him apparent to the foe, and in making his tour of inspection he became a target for their shots.^[33]

 

In the first council held on the 22d of February, it had been apparently agreed to set forth and fight the approaching republicans in detail, before they should by combining prove too strong. This admirable resolution, which might have given victory to imperial arms, and achieved the conciliation project of Maximilian, was not acted upon, evidently by advice of the all-influential Marquez. His reasons are not given. In case of defeat, Querétaro would still have served as a refuge.^[34] And so the precious moments were allowed to glide by, the imperialists passively waiting till the Juarist forces had come up and invested the place with lines and batteries, shutting them up in their mouse-trap, as the emperor not inaptly began to term it. Now, when the dispiriting effect of a siege began to be felt, Marquez recommended that they should evacuate the city, beat a retreat to Mexico, and there with all available forces deliver battle to the united republican armies and settle the question at one cast. This advice was not acted upon, partly owing to the demoralizing influence of a retreat and the danger of assault from the growing masses of pursuers, who already numbered 25,000 before Querétaro alone, including nearly a third of cavalry, not to mention the large forces which Diaz and other leaders could bring against the rear.^[35]

On March 5th the republican forces appeared before Querétaro, and began to occupy positions, at first along the south and west line, extending later east and north, as additional troops arrived, and protected by the batteries established on the surrounding hills. They embraced the army of the north under Treviño, to whom Escobedo had relinquished the immediate command, the army of the west under Corona, and the army of the centre under Régules and Riva Palacio,^[36] the latter being among later arrivals.

With the usual mixture of veterans and hastily drilled and impressed recruits, and a sprinkling of foreigners, notably Americans, these forces presented as fair an average as those of the imperialists, whom they exceeded in number by nearly two to one, already at the outset.^[37] The northern army was the best in organization, and the troops from Sinaloa excelled in good arms, while those from Michoacan appeared the most neglected of all, although infused with the indomitable spirit of their energetic leader, Régules.^[38]

 

 

1. In a letter to Bazaine of Jan. 25th, Lares alluded to the promise made to protect the districts occupied by French soldiers, and pointing out that this had not been fulfilled with respect to Tezcuco and other near-lying towns, he sneeringly inquired what course would be pursued if the capital were attacked while still held by the French. He also demanded when the French would depart, and the surrender of the citadel and war stores take place, as well as satisfaction be given for the suppression of La Patria journal, which had abused the marshal because he interfered in behalf of a suspected Juarist named Garay. Bazaine curtly replied that he would hold no further intercourse with the ministry. He wrote to Maximilian complaining of their insinuating language and evil policy, explaining that arrangements were made with Marquez for the surrender of the fortifications, etc., and that he would depart during the first half of Feb. Maximilian returned the letter, and de clared that no further intercourse would take place until satisfaction was given for the reflections cast on his ministers. Détroyat adds to Kératry's extracts the comments of Murphy on the rupture. L'Intervention, 304-8.
2. Going even so far as to place those who refused in the category of deserters. The object was partly disgust with Maximilian, partly a measure to promote his abdication, although the same telegram forbade any further urging in this respect; but also a desire to save further sacrifices of French blood. This 'emporta sur toute autre considération, says D'Héricault, Max., 85; by leaving them, he adds, the life of Maximilian could readily have been saved, for a few thousand foreign soldiers could penetrate anywhere in Mexico. Maximilian at first refused to let them go, but yielded by telegram of Jan. 14th. Id., 94. Their bounty had been $25, besides other expenditure for the pressed treasury Salm-Salm intimates that 'not less than six thousand men' deserted nevertheless to join Maximilian. My Diary, i. 18-19; but this is an exaggeration. A result of the measure was that Escobedo caused to be shot more than 100 Frenchmen captured early in Feb. at the defeat of Miramon, on the ground that they could no longer claim the protection of the tricolor. Several French officers appeared with a bitter protest in Le Courrier, at Mexico, reflecting on the steps which had led to such slaughter of their comrades, now termed bandits by the Juarists. Basch is naturally severe upon Bazaine. Erinnerungen, i. 143-8.
3. Because it could not pay the trifle demanded for the stores. It must be admitted, however, that the projectiles were as a rule useless for the Mexican artillery, and that the empire had plenty of ammunition, as intimated in a letter by Maximilian to Gen. D'Hurbal, who organized this artillery. Domenech, Hist. Mex., iii. 415-16. Kératry publishes a report from the artillery department showing that the Mexicans had received from France 3,228, 226 cartridges and 21,437 kilogrammes of powder, and that the capital possessed at this time 34,741 shot of different caliber with the needful powder, at the rate of 300 charges per piece; also a reserve of 500,000 cartridges, besides the supply held by the Austro-Belgians. Max., 315. Nevertheless the destruction of available ammunition-estimated by one authority at 14 million cartridges — L'Interven, Mex., 313 — was wanton; and the sale of horses, etc., for the benefit of the republicans may be termed even worse. After abandoning the empire to its fate, this material should at least have been surrendered, as promise in the joint note of Nov. 9th, from the French representatives. Maximilian expresses himself bitterly on the point. Basch, ii. 75; Niox finds it 'difficile d'expliquer.' Expéd., 695; and Détroyat, 309-16, blames the French government, which had left orders for remitting such armament to the 'head to be legally recognized.' None such appearing to Bazaine, he could not act otherwise than he did. A Juarist decree stamped all effects sold by the French army as just booty. Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., x. 2.
4. He sold, for instance, for private benefit, the furniture of his residence, placed merely at his service by the government; and also a carriage belonging to Santa Anna, as Maximilian himself puts it. Basch, i. 173, ii. 75. A writer in Pap. y Corr. Fam. Imp., 74-80, adds that Col Boyer was his agent in all manner of speculation, including dealings in army pay warrants. See also Mex., El Imp., 18-20; Allenet, Bazaine Acusado, 1-4. Aspirations are also hinted at toward a position as supreme ruler over Mexico; but these Détroyat, 314, will not entertain. He considered that the favors received from Maxi milian could not have been forgotten by him. Kératry also defends him, and states that this refusal to take extreme steps against the empire without positive instructions brought upon him the anger of Napoleon, wlio objected to commit himself in writing. Jax., 280. This anger was increased by the effort of Bazaine to justify himself before his officers, to whom he revealed a portion of these instructions. Arrangoiz echoes Kératry, by pointing out that with all the accusation against Bazaine his conduct was not investigated. Méj., iv. 248. Later we find him in a responsible command, during the war with Prussia. Salm-Salm insists, nevertheless, that his conduct was more brutal than it should have been. My Diary, i. 16; and so does Basch, who assumes that his failure to carry out his (Napoleon's) plans roused anger and 'liess nun der Marschall die Maske... fallen. Loc. cit.
5. Which involved the recognition of French claims 'la cual deseché por no recerme honrosa,' says Diaz. Lefèvre, Docs, ii. 376. The offer implied the previous abdication of Maximilian. The sale of arms to Diaz was to take effect only after his acceptance of the presidency had been settled. So Kératry very reasonably explains it. Max., 248-51. The agent was the U.S. consul Otterburg, who had pecuniary reasons for favoring a new govern ment with French aid, and also a Frenchman named Thiele, employed by Diaz. Salm-Salm asserts himself somewhat too positively on mere hearsay.
6. Diaz refused, however, to surrender the Austrians. Kératry publishes several of the letters exchanged on this subject. Not having enough military prisoners, says Arrangoiz, Méj., iv. 245, political offenders were included in Bazaine's delivery.
7. Burying their gold and 'les boutiques se fermèrent comme des tombes.' D'Héricault, 83.' No friendly word, no farewell, greeted the hated oppressors,' writes Salm-Salm in prejudiced as well as contradictory manner. My Diary, i. 17. Even the Ère Nouvelle of Feb. 5th, while alluding to sympathy, admits that no demonstration took place. It may be well to remember the kind and sociable intercourse between them and the people, the good behav. ior of the soldiers as a rule, and the many friendships formed, to understand that the silence must be attributed mainly to momentary political motives. Frenchmen are the most favored foreigners in Mexico. Bazaine camped for the night not far from the city, leaving there a force till the morrow. He had removed the cannon from the ramparts into the citadel, under pretext, says Niox, of preventing the enemy from suddenly carrying them off. Expéd., 695. Détroyat, 318, believes rather that Bazaine feared a hostile movement. In his proclamation of Feb. 31, bidding them farewell, the marshal assured the people that the object of France had never been to impose on them any government opposed to their wishes. This expression, as well as the absence of any reference to Maximilian, could not be regarded as complimentary to the latter. In the address to the army he spoke flatteringly of their five years of victorious campaigns. A distribution of medals, nominations for the legion of honor, and promotions took place before embarking. On assuming military command of the city, Marquez also issued a proclamation, wherein occur the words 'ya me conoceis y no tengo que decir mas' — you know me already, and I need say no more — a phrase which became proverbial. Le Saint, Guerre Mex., 202-4.
8. Notice had been given that republicans must not approach too near. A troupe did so, however, near Chalco, and was severely punished — a lesson not lost to the rest. Arrangoiz, Méj., iv. 249, alludes to insults heaped on the retreating soldiers, and sneeringly intimates that an agreement seemed to exist with the republicans for occupying the abandoned towns.
9. A certain amount of arms and other effects were left there; and the admiral was induced to cede 30 quintals of powder, against a check for 150, 000 fcs, 'qui n'a jamais été payée.' L Interv. Franç., 318. Bazaine sought even to promote the sale of a not very desirable gun-boat, but failed. See his letter to the admiral of March 7th, Kératry, Max., 316-18.
10. Castagny reached Orizaba with the last troops on the 21st of February. They were spread out from Paso del Macho to Soledad, so as not to crowd the port. From the latter place they were brought in daily by railway, up to a certain hour, and after camping during the night, sent on board before 9 A.M., thus exposing them as little as possible to risk from fever. Including three vessels which in the middle of Dec. and Jan. took about 3,000 men, there were 41 in all assisting at the embarkation; 3 of the squadron received none for conveyance; three transports took mainly war stores, one was sent to New Orleans, two received merely a score of men, but the rest took from 200 to 1,250 each; seven were mail steamers and thirty may be called transports. The total force embarked numbered 28,693, including about 2,900 Austro-Belgians and 169 superior officers. See table in Niox, Expéd., 761.
11. Both the Belgian and Austrian ministers having opposed their stay, as I have shown. See also Pap. Var., cxxx., pt ii. p. 38; Basch, i. 113-4. Salm Salm sought in vain to enroll Austrians; but Count Kherenhüller succeeded in forming the hussars, and Baron Hammerstein the infantry, both of which rendered good service. My Diary, i. 15-16 Niox places them at 400 and 200 men respectively. Expéd., 703-4.
12. Napoleon had certain reasons for dissatisfaction with him; yet he was aware that the blame lay almost wholly with himself.
13. The 1st payment was made on April 2d, and deposited on board Le Phlégeton, which remained at this station. Le Saint, Guerre Mex., 201.
14. The figures of expenses are as follows: In 1861, 3,200,000 fcs; 1862, 63,400,000; 1863, 97,619,000; 1864, 69,074,000; 1865, 41,405,000; 1866, 65,147,000; 1867, 23,310,000. Total, 363,155,000 fcs, of which 231,990,000 pertained to the war department, 116,873,000 to the navy, 14,302,000 to the treasury, besides 13,000,000 extras, 2,250,000 loss of war stores, and 20,000,000 for return charges. Against these sums and the loans France received only 61,975,000. Add to this the thousands of lives sacrificed in battles and hospitals, the latter being placed at over 5,600. Payno mentions among the sums paid by Mexico $1,013,358 for quartering French troops and other expenditures. Cuentas, 379-408, 599-674, 733-40. Figures vary somewhat as given in Niox, 703-4; An. Econ. Polit., 1898; Diar. Ofic., Aug. 17, 1866; Constitucional, Jan. 28-9, Feb. 8, Mar. 2, 1868, with allusion to a pressure on France for Jecker's claim.
15. Among the members present were the archbishop and the prelate of San Luis Potosí. There were 36 in all, of whom a bare majority sustained the empire, yet not without some wavering; the rest either abstained from voting or declared for abdication. Remembering that the council was composed almost wholly of friends of the ministry, whose interest it was to uphold the empire at any price, the value of the vote is obvious. Marquez said there were enough men and means to continue the fight; the present aspect was but a phase of civil war. Cortés y Esparza asked pertinently where the eleven millions could be found, and whether the 26,000 men were soldiers or only armed men. Aguirre declared that men could be levied and money extorted. Marin maintained that the country really desired imperial rule. Bazaine intimated that he had found it different, and impossible to gain the end in view with the superior forces at his command. The two prelates would not express an opinion on a point involving civil war. Both Rivera, Hist. Jal., v. 703, and Domenech, Hist. Mex., iii. 411, intimate a vote in the affirmative of two thirds. The Ère Nouvelle, Jan. 18, 1867, etc., after a full account of the proceedings, places the affirmative, against any change, at 25. La Sociedad gives the opposing vote at only 4 or 5; Cronista avoids figures. Kératry, 289, assumes that 4 only opposed the empire. See also Lefêvre, Doc., ii. 362-3. Pájaro Verde, Jan. 17th, quotes briefly other journals. Arrangoiz, iv. 232-8, is non-committal, and wastes his pages on a vapid speech of Arango. 'Mismo dictámen,' is Maximilian's comments on the result. Basch, i. 165.
16. The foreign representatives protested in vain, and alluded to the struggle as vain. See comments in Constitucional, Dec. 20, 1867. The finance measures proposed at Orizaba, as enumerated by Basch, i. 136-7, remained in abeyance.
17. On Jan. 27, 1867. Gov. Auza was not sufficiently strong to resist the 2,500 men of Miramon, including 350 Frenchmen, and beat a retreat, covering the escape of Juarez. Republicans claim an orderly retreat with artillery. Estrella de Occid., March 1, 1867. Not so imperialists. Salm-Salm, Diary, i. 35-6, speaks of French excesses. A large contribution was exacted. Aguascalientes had yielded without resistance. Gonzalez, Hist. Aguas., 375.
18. Yet it has been generally assumed that the news of approaching troops led Miramon to retire. He would have been cut off had he remained.
19. The blame for this was widely laid on Bazaine because of his recall of French soldiers who had enlisted under Maximilian, depriving of French protection those who remained. Escobedo excuses himself partly by pointing to excesses by these men at Zacatecas. Arias, Reseña, 114-18, 352. In this work is given a plan of the battle. Salm-Salm gives an elaborate account of needless cruelties attending the execution. Diary, i. 37-8. Miramon's brother Joaquin was shot, though half dead with wounds. The general had not counted on the improved discipline of the republicans. His own men were partly impressed, and many showed signs of defection; 700 of them were incorporated with the victorious army. Diar. Imp., Feb. 6, 13, 1866, etc.; Estrella, Voz, etc. '(8ᵉ régiment de cavalerie) qui tralhit,' bought by Escobedo. D'Héricault, Max., 105-6; Arellano, Ult. Horas, 24-8.
20. Captured Jan. 26th by Antillon and Rincon, Liceaga escaping with a remnant of his 600 or 800 men to Querétaro. The prisoners are variously given at from 150 to 400. Estrella de Occid., Mar. 1, 1867, etc. Gen. Guzman was the new Juarist governor. Arias, Reseña, 103-7, 112. Herrera attacked Castillo on the way at La Quemada, and was defeated — an imprudence by which Escobedo failed to intercept the latter, and then capture Querétaro ere succor came. Id., 122.
21. Corona had compelled Chacon to evacuate Colima by honorable capitulation Feb. 1st. The 300 men chosen to accompany Chacon to the nearest imperial army deserted. In Michoacan Régules had in Jan. made Pátzcuaro his headquarters and begun to encircle Morelia after taking Zamora, whereupon Mendez thought it better to mass his troops with these collecting at Querétaro, influenced by the defeat of Miramon. He left Feb. 13th with nearly 4,000 men. Hans, Queret., 9 et seq.; Estrella de Occid., Mar. 15, 22, 29, 1867; Diar. Imp., Feb. 20, etc.
22. Basch relieves Fischer and Baron Magnus from the charge of having influenced the step, but casts the blame especially on the 'plutting' Marquez. So do Arellano, Ult. Horas, 27, Peza, Jax., 18-19, and others; yet Marquez disclaims any hand therein. Refut., 28-9. One of his motives is said to have been a desire for Miramon's loss of independent command. Lacunza, president of the council, and many leading people objected. Arrangoiz, Méj., iv. 249-50.
23. To show that he now relied wholly on national arms. Basch, who is somewhat unreasonable on these points, accuses the ministry of seeking the Austrians for their own protection. The best among the troops were the municipal guards, containing a slight sprinkling of Austrians; half were unreliable recruits. Peza y Pradillo, Max., 20, gives a list of Maximilian's force.
24. Foreign representatives, said the ministry, would not recognize the government unless it held the capital. Marquez, Refut., 33. Basch, Erinn., i. 54-5, and others blame Marquez severely for letting the emperor depart so poorly provided.
25. At the opening of the year it stood as follows: Lares, minister of justice and president; Mazin, gobernacion; Mier y Teran, fomento; Pereda, in charge of foreign affairs; Aguirre, public instruction and worship; Campos in charge of finances, and T. Murphy of war. After the decision of Jan. 14th, several councillors resigned, and now Murphy received the foreign portfolio, Sanchez Navarro, the rich land-owner, became minister of the household, and Gen. Portilla figures after this as war minister. Fischer, who had replaced Pierron in the private cabinet, stayed at Mexico, while Ramirez, Escudero, Robles, and others hastened to leave the country, in view of the impending crash. See Arrangoiz, Méj., iv. 209–28, 239, 284; Domenech, Hist. Mex., iii. 412.
26. His party had two skirmishes on the way, one with Tragoso, near Cuautitlan, the other near Calpulalpan, in both of which Maximilian freely exposed himself to danger. Miramon and other generals came forth to meet him at Querétaro, and the city appeared in gala attire. During the reception ceremonies Gen. Escobar closed his speech with the declaration that posterity would undoubtedly bestow upon the emperor the glorious title of Maximilian the Great. Basch, ii. 2. Salm-Salm observes that Maximilian's horse stumbled on entering the place — omen enough to settle his fate.
27. A striking feature was the massive aqueduct entering the eastern border. On the nothern bank lay the suburb San Luis, its gardens rising on the slopes of the range. For plan with military positions, see Arias, Reseña, 192. It once bore the term 'Ciudad levitica,' for its church tendencies.
28. D'Héricault doubts if the number much exceeded 500. Max., 112. Salm-Salm absurdly intimates that 'not less than 6,000' deserted from Bazaine's ranks before he reached Vera Cruz. Diary, i. 19, 42. The best Mexican infantry is said by him to have been the veterans of Mendez, and of the cavalry, the men who served under Vidaurri when he opposed the other parties. Peza, Max., 29, declares the Empress and 5th the best. For details of Mendez' forces, see Hans, Querét., 14 et seq.
29. It was even announced in the council of Feb. 22d that Marquez should be the general-in-chief. Miramon made several remonstrances against being subordinate to Marquez, as he had been president of the republic, and superior to Marquez also in the army; yet he had served under the latter before. Trouble was avoided by Maximilian continuing to act as chief of the army. Arellano, Ultimas Horas, 33–7; Marquez, Refut., 38-45; Peza y Pradillo, Max., 25 et seq., give a roster, showing officers commanding battalions and regiments, and contradict Salm-Salm's version. They rate Marquez as quartermaster-general. Casanova was soon removed for inefficiency.
30. Basch, i. 176. Maximilian had nicknames for all, partly to avoid uttering names. Miramon was known as the young general; Mejía, as the little dark one; Mendez, as the little stout one, etc. Salm-Salm, i. 124. Arias speaks highly of Mejía's military talent, of Mendez as a rude, severe soldier, and of Marquez as ferocious and persevering. Reseña, 107-8. See also Lefévre, Doc., i. 398-403. Peza, 13, objects to Salin's statement that Marquez figured best as an organizer of troops.
31. Maximilian is also said to have remarked at this time that Miramon needed watching. D'Héricault, Max., 114.
32. The only remittance made was a paltry $19,000. Maximilian reserved for the civil list only $10,000 a month. Salm-Salm, ii. 49. An offer was made to send cannon, etc., but on condition that troops from Querétaro advance half-way to receive them.
33. "Ich finde in der Kriegsführung einen grossen Reiz,' writes he to a friend. Basch, ii. 72, 24-5, 95-6. He attended the hospitals to soothe the sick, and personally inquired into the comforts of the soldiers.
34. Hans, Basch, Salm-Salm, and others, all combine in blaming Marquez for this neglect. The quarrel then rising between him and Miramon is supposed by some to have contributed to it; yet the latter in subsequent council openly charges Marquez with the sole responsibility, and no satisfactory excuse was tendered. Arellano, 41-3; Basch, ii. 56. A letter signed somewhat later by the leading generals confirm Miramon's charge, and this Arias, Reseña, 215, also publishes.
35. Marquez, who claims this as a brilliant plan, expected to have 17,000 to 20,000 men on reaching Mexico. He assumes that Mejía and Arellano alone opposed it, the latter secretly. Mejía urged that in case of a retreat, artillery and cumbrous baggage should be abandoned, and a mountain route taken. Vidaurri believed that Monterey would offer better advantages than Mexico for obtaining men and means. Refut., 55-8. Maximilian preferred to gather confidence and try the foe by a series of sorties. Arellano, Ultimas Horas, 49. Marquez this time objected in vain, says Hans, Quer., 68. Vidaurri's proposal for a campaign in the north had found utterance already on the way to Querétaro, in a proclamation by Maximilian to his army, wherein he also alluded to the inspiring sense of being freed from foreign pressure, and of being able to lift high their banner, Arrangoiz, Méj., iv. 250-reflections by no means pleasing to the French.
36. Treviño had two infantry divisions under Rocha y Arce, and a large body of cavalry under Aguirre. A third division under Aranda was placed with Corona, who also controlled the Sinaloa division under Vega, that of Jalisco under Manuel Marquez, and Régules' Michoacan forces. Arias, Reseña, 151-6.
37. The estimates vary from 15,000 to 18,000. Although this number was more than doubled in the course of the siege, yet desertion and withdrawal reduced it to about 32,000 by the close, with 100 cannon. Hans, Quer., 83.
38. Hans intimates that the cavalry was imposing chiefly in number; but this expression may be due to the general feeling of contempt which one side sought to infuse against the other. Salm-Salm, Diary, i. 108, 265-6, speaks of maltreatment and neglect among the republicans, as reported by the men. They received only now and then a half of the promised pay of one real a day; their food was the invariable tortillas and frijoles, with thin coffee and cheap sugar; meat came rarely. Before battle a real and a glass of liquor served to cheer them. Those who complained were flogged, and close watch was kept to prevent desertion. While superior officers paraded in glittering uniforms, with heavy gold chains, subalterns stooped to importune prisoners and citizens for gifts, glad to accept even small coins.

    Emil Graf Kératry, Kaiser Maximilian's Erhebung und Fall. Original-correspondenzen und Documente in geschichtlichem Zusammenhange dargestellt. Leipsic, 1867, 8ᵒ, pp. vi., 328. The greater part of this work was first published in Paris in the Revue Contemporaine. Several documents, not allowed to appear in that periodical, were inserted in the Leipsic editions — for it was also published in French at that city in the same year in 12ᵒ form. The volume contains a history of the intervention from the first causes down to the evacuation, and is a clear exposé of the unfortunate expedition. It is replete with valuable documents, and in his preface the author assures his readers that the greatest reliance can be placed on such as are in strange contradiction to public opinion, and at variance with political utterances. This assertion, he says, is guaranteed by the high reputation of the Revue Contemporaine for conscientious investigation and impartiality in regard to foreign matters under the management of Vicomte de Colonne. These documents bear on the relations that existed between Maximilian and Bazaine, and include correspondence with the U. S. government relating to the withdrawal of the French troops. Count Kératry, who was an aide-de-camp of Bazaine, speaks in complimentary terms of the army, which, he says, had little chance of displaying brilliancy of action in so vast a field. His language with respect to Napoleon and the French government is different, and he exposes the double-faced policy of the former. Attention is also called to Maximilian's unlucky choice of advisers.

    Kératry published in Paris the same year L'Élévation et la chute de l'empereur Maximilien. Intervention française au Mexique 1861–1867. Paris, 1857, 8ᵒ, pp. xx., 372. In 1868 there was published in London The Rise and Fall of the Emperor Maximilian. A Narrative of the Mexican Empire 1861-67. From Authentic Documents. With the Imperial Correspondence. By Count Émile de Kératry. Translated ... by G. H. Venables. London, 1868, 12ᵒ, pp. viii., 312, plate. Other works by Kératry are, La Créance Jecker, les indemnités françaises, et les imprunts Mexicains, Paris, 1868, 8ᵒ, pp. 2, 158; and La Contre-guérilla française au Mexique. Seconde édition. Paris, 1869, 16ᵒ, pp. 4, 313.

    Revista Filosófica de la Historia Política, Monterey, 1866, 8ᵒ, 96 pp. A philosophical review, or rather, a very sketchy account, of Mexican history from the Spanish conquest to the end of the French intervention, said to have been issued in New York by an American citizen. The present copy is a Spanish translation of the English original by I. G.

    El Imperio y la Intervencion, n. p. n. d., 8ᵒ, pp. 83, contains particulars and documents relating to the intervention and the establishment of the empire. The last page bears the date Feb. 2, 1867, and is signed Un Mexicano. The writer was evidently a strong conservative, and defends Maximilian's policy, explains the reasons why monarchy ought to be preferred to a republican form of government in Mexico, and deprecates the withdrawal of the French troops, which, he says, was a dishonor to the court of Paris and a harm to Mexico. Fear of aggression on the part of the U. S. is the prominent feature in this production, and the author sums up the result of the French expedition by remarking that it had left the U. S. more arrogant, the Mexicans more divided, French interests more insecure, the influence of France nullified in the new world, her debt increased, and her arms less respected. pp. 81-2.

    Charles D'Héricault — Maximilien et Mexique — Histoire des Derniers Mois de l'Empire Mexicain, Paris, 1869, 12ᵒ, pp. 419. The author, an uncompromising supporter of the intervention, regards it and all events connected with it from a thoroughly French point of view. He denounces the execution of Maximilian, which, he says, was instigated by savage feelings of hatred, and not by patriotic desire to save Mexico. He compares the Mexicans with the Apaches in ferocity and rapacity, but admits that among them there are great characters of pure and elevated sentiments. After the fall of Maximilian he could see no future for the country. Liberty and independence, he says, can no longer be spoken of in reference to Mexico. By liberty was meant the right to overthrow a government that was not ready to make promotions to any desired extent; by republicanism was meant the right to impose a forced loan on a town the morning after losses at monte; and by independence the right to impress and arm hordes of Indians whenever the spirit of warfare or pillage instigated. D'Héricault predicts that Mexico will be gradually absorbed by the U. S., which he speaks of with much bitterness. He reviews the consequences of the intervention to France, and sketches a vivid picture of the humiliating failure, in every respect, of the expedition. Then he discusses the causes of the failure, attributing them to the blindness and want of prevision of the French government, which did not recognize the difficulties attending the conquest of an extensive country like Mexico, with its great diversity of physical features, and its inhabitants of a warlike character but wanting in compactness, thereby precluding their subjugation by one great victory. As a climax to these difficulties was the jealous attitude of the U. S. and the pressure applied by that nation. The French government, D'Héricault remarks, instead of having espoused the Confederate cause when the North was weak, insidiously bit its talons when it had become strong. His work includes the period from the autumn of 1866 to the departure from Mexico of the last French soldiers in Feb. 1867. The 22d chapter is devoted to reflections on the expeditions of which the above is an outline.

    J. Passama Domenech — L' Empire Mexicain, La Paix et les Intérêts du Monde. Mexico, Setiembre 1866, 8ᵒ, 98 pp. The author enters into an explanation of the advantages of establishing a monarchy in Mexico and thereby securing its independence, which he considers to be a necessity for the peace and interests of the world. He discusses the Monroe doctrine, which he pronounces to be a law of despotism on the part of the U. S. over the rest of America, and an attack on the rights of European nations. The attitude of the U. S. towards Mexico, and their gradual absorption of her territory, next occupy his attention. Domenech declares the empire to be the only counterbalance to their aggressive intentions and a solution of the Mexican question, and maintains that France ought to sustain it, and not evacuate the country. He argues that there would be nothing to fear from a war with the northern republic.