History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 6/Chapter 13

by Hubert Howe Bancroft

 

CHAPΤER XIΙI.

IMPERIALISM CAGED.

1867

Mariano Escobedo — His Physique and Character — Imperial Lines — Skirmishing — Convento de la Cruz — Marquez Sent to Mexico — New Ministery — Miramon — Besiegers Reënforced — Assaults and Repulses — Maximilian Decorated for Bravery — Starvation — Marouez Suspected of Treachery — Salm-Salm Prepares to Go in Search of Him — Plans to Break through the Lines Defeated

Mariano Escobedo, who held the chief command of the besieging forces at Querétaro, was a lean man of fair stature, forty years of age, with a dark complexion, full black beard, and enormous ears, which had procured for him the nickname of Orejon. He had served with credit since his first enlistment during the United States invasion of 1847-8, and displayed considerable administrative ability; he had also earned a reputation for severity, united with a decided aversion for foreigners, and a temper that easily exploded under provocation. His blemishes were offset by strong patriotic instincts and rare unostentatiousness.^[1] Second to him stood the equally severe Corona, a finelooking man, somewhat bronzed in visage, whose vivacious energy had raised him foremost among north-western soldiers.^[2]

Régules was a Basque who had served under Don Cárlos as sergeant. Riva Palacio stood distinguished for ability both with sword and pen, and the humane sentiments conveyed in his poetry he practised as a soldier. Treviño, tall and of fair complexion, also possessed a heart and an admirable integrity. Antillon of Guanajuato, Echeagaray, so prominent ten years before, Paz, the artillerist, Velez and Rocha, old companions of Miramon, Guadarrama, Juan Mendez, Joaquin Martinez, Aureliano Rivera, Jimenez, and the Highty Carbajal figured among the ablest leaders, under whom ranged the usual disproportionate mass of inferior officers, who, in guerrilla or militia service, or by intrigue, had acquired titles, from general down, which they flaunted with no small bravado. The imperial officers could safely be rated a grade higher as military men, on an average, and the record of their four leading generals with the initial M could hardly be equalled so far by the leaders of the siege.

 

The imperialists, who at first extended their batteries to the slopes of San Gregorio, soon confined their north line along the southern bank of the river, from Cerro de la Campana, an oblong hill some seventy feet high, which formed the western apex of the defences, to the eastern line skirting the slight elevation on which rose the Convento de la Cruz. Thence the line of fortifications ran parallel to the river, along the southern edge of the town, turning from its south-west corner toward the Cerro de la Campana. Only a part of the walls and earthworks had been constructed before the siege began, and the remainder had to be done often under a galling fire. The southern and western lines were more regular; but elsewhere house-walls and barricades formed a considerable part of them, and wholly so for interior lines. The elevations of La Cruz figured as the key to the place, the points next in importance being the bridge of Miraflores street, crossing the centre of the town, the Campana hill and the Pueblito gate at the south-east corner, where rose the strongest batteries.^[3]

The hills surrounding these lines, and commanding the entire town, had, with the exception of San Gregorio, been passively left to the Juarists for their batteries, with which they soon began to rake the place.^[4]

Skirmishing begins a few days after the arrival of the besiegers, a score or two of horsemen approaching from either side and commencing at long range with volleys of epithets, one seeking to excel the other in this species of savagism, varying it at times with a shrill vibrating cry. Soon the bravest gallop forward a distance, discharge their rifles, and turn rapidly back. Others imitate them, until they tire or till the loose firing inflicts some harm. The party first to retreat is generally pursued by the other, and the latter as readily takes to flight in case of a rally by the pursued. The republicans having extended their lines eastward, the emperor passed on the 13th of March from Cerro de la Campana, and his headquarters became henceforth the Convento de la Cruz, the centre point for attacks, and exposed especially to the battery on Cuesta China.^[5] The convent had once been occupied as a a Franciscan propaganda fide college, famed throughout the north, and dating from the days of Cortés.^[6] It was a stone edifice of great strength, standing at the lower end of the convent-grounds, which were enclosed by heavy stone walls, and had at its higher eastern extreme a somewhat smaller but equally strong building known as the pantheon, the burial-place of the convent.

The following day the republicans made a general attack on the town, in three divisions, against the bridge of Miraflores, the convent, and the line west of the Alameda, a fourth movement against the Campana hill being a feint. The assaults were executed almost simultaneously under cover of batteries; the cavalry being directed against the south side, there Mejía received them with similar forces, driving them back in disorder. A second attack resulted still worse, and in the pursuit the reserve was overthrown with great slaughter. Castillo defended the bridge line with equal spirit, the cazadores distinguishing themselves, and earning the title of zouaves of Mexico; but the summit of San Gregorio was nevertheless occupied by the opponents, under the direction of Treviño. The main struggle took place at the convent, however. The pantheon having most unaccountably been left unprotected,^[7] it was carried at the first advance, and turned to advantage by the republicans. The importance of this commanding structure now became evident to the negligent imperialists, and Marquez led in the struggle to recover it. In this he succeeded, although at no small sacrifice. By five o'clock the repulse was concluded at all points; and it is not unlikely that with a more sustained effort to follow up advantages the besieged might have obtained better results. As it was, the day cost them about 600 lives, while the more exposed republicans counted their losses above a thousand, including several hundred prisoners.^[8]

Then followed days of inaction,^[9] during which the besiegers hemmed in the town closer than ever, afterward directing their batteries against the houses. At first the inhabitants kept in retirement as much as possible, but gradually they became so used to the whizzing messengers that the women and children returned to their accustomed haunts, notwithstanding the casualties, and the cafés were thronged with newsmongers, especially after a day's struggle.

Marquez again brought to bear upon Maximilian his project for a retreat to Mexico, sustained to some extent by Mendez and Mejía, who felt discouraged at the prospect of a long siege;^[10] but Miramon and others stoutly opposed him in a council held on the 20th of March, in which it was finally resolved to continue the defence, taking advantage of every favorable opportunity for attack, and seek reënforcements from Mexico.^[11]

The latter task was intrusted to Marquez, with full power to act as he thought best; and to this end he was appointed lugarteniente, locum tenens, of the emperor.^[12] The ministry which had shown so little desire to carry out its promises was to be reconstructed. The loyal and able Vidaurri should formally assume the finance portfolio, together with the presidency, assisted by Iribarren, who was to take charge of the interior and fomento departments. Of the existing ministers, Portilla, Murphy, and Aguirre were confirmed, the latter assuming charge also of Lares' portfolio of justice.^[13] At the same time Maximilian provided for a case of captivity by an abdication, and for a possible death by appointing as regents Vidaurri, Lacunza, and Marquez, who should be governed by the organic statute of the empire, and convoke the congress, by which the form of government must be determined.^[14] Marquez should strain every nerve to obtain funds, war material, and men, and he might abandon Mexico if thought best; but Querétaro must be reënforced — this was a matter of the very first importance.^[15] In order to distract the attention of the besiegers, Miramon, on the 22d of March, led an expedition down the valley, which captured a quantity of provisions.^[16] This enabled Marquez to depart unobserved during the night, across the hills to the south, with 1,200 horsemen,^[17] and attended by the new prime minister, Vidaurri. The well-instructed Castillo took Marquez' place at Querétaro^[18] and Miramon, now acknowledged as the leading general, rapidly gained favor and influence with the emperor.

With the additional inroads of desertion and bullets, the garrison was soon reduced to less than 7,000 men,^[19] while the besieging forces were at this time increased by the arrival of Riva Palacio, Martinez, and others with nearly 10,000 men.^[20] Thus strengthened, they made another determined assault on the 24th, this time only against the south line, between the Alameda and the Pueblito corner gate, defended so far by the cavalry, for the fortifications were not completed. The newly arrived troops were mainly employed under the direction of Corona, second in command. After a simulated charge, and amidst the play of batteries from every direction, Martinez' column fell upon the line immediately west of the Alameda; but Miramon was here, assisted by Mendez, and ere-long it was driven back in disorder, with the loss of numerous prisoners.^[21] Meanwhile Riva Palacio had with still larger force moved against the Casa Blanca, the main point of attack. Mejía directed the reduced cavalry with great spirit, notwithstanding a severe wound in the face, and succeeded in repelling the first charge. The republican officers bravely rallied them, however, and onward they rushed, carrying all before them. It was a critical moment; but Arellano saw the danger, and hastened in person to direct the guns upon the densest masses. The effect was overwhelming. Once more the attacking column wavered, giving time for reënforcements to come up from the now liberated Alameda; and then the cavalry led the return charge by the imperialists with resistless impulse, with the inspiring cry of 'Viva el emperador!' It was an acknowledged and costly defeat for the republicans, who admitted a loss of 2,000 in killed and wounded, besides several hundred prisoners.^[22]

Arellano, whose prompt and spirited action had probably saved the day, was made a general, and the rare bronze medal for valor was bestowed upon the leading officers, gold and silver medals being distributed among the lower ranks. At the conclusion of this ceremony, Miramon took a bronze medal and asked permission of the emperor to decorate him in the name of the army, as worthy above all to receive the token, for his fearless conduct, noble endurance, and self-denying and sympathizing participation in the dangers and hardships of his soldiers. Deeply affected, Maximilian accepted it, and wore the medal ever after as the most valued of his decorations.^[23]

 

After this the republicans decided to waste no more blood in regular assaults, but to await the fall of the securely invested city by starvation, while submitting it to a continual bombardment. The latter proved not an unalloyed torment, however, for the missiles were welcomed by the besieged as additions to their scanty war material, rewards being paid to those who brought them in^[24] The energetic Arellano, chief of artillery, had established factories for powder and projectiles, assisted by the stock of raw material in the warehouses, and by that obtained from church-bells, roof covering, and other sources.^[25] Work at the fortifications was carried forward with increased activity; and to this end were impressed the prisoners, and also citizens,^[26] who had often to expose themselves to heavy fire, especially from American sharpshooters.^[27]

The troublesome proximity of the besiegers on the north side^[28] induced Miramon to make an attack upon them before dawn on the 1st of April; but while the cazadores pushed their way to the very summit of San Gregorio, and gained a decided advantage, capturing two guns, they were not properly supported by the other forces, and the movement proved futile.^[29] An equally vain and costly attack was undertaken against the Garita de Mexico, east of the Convento de la Cruz,^[30] the day after celebrating the anniversary of Maximilian's acceptance of the throne.^[31]

Notwithstanding the boastful tone of the speeches on this occasion, it may be imagined that their spirit was rather forced, and mainly owing to the absence of news from Marquez. Everybody had felt confident that the expected reënforcements would arrive within a fortnight, but three weeks had passed without a sign. The numerous enemies of the general began openly to hint at treachery, and to rouse suspicion even among his adherents, Maximilian not excepted.^[32] More than one messenger had been sent to communicate with him, but the corpses left conspicuously dangling by the besiegers created a fear that none had penetrated their lines.

Days passed in ever-increasing suspense; eyes and ears strained in vain for the sound of battle in the rear, which should prove the welcome signal. At last it was decided to send a leading officer in search of him, attended by a picked band of horsemen. The task was dangerous; for, aware of all movements, Escobedo kept close guard, and had not only warned republican leaders in all directions to watch especially the route to Mexico, but he had detached considerable forces to check the advance of any relief expedition.^[33] Mejía being too ill to move, the mission was intrusted to Prince Salm-Salm and General Moret, with instructions to return at once with reënforcements and funds, the former being secretly charged to arrest Marquez and evacuate Mexico if desirable.^[34] They made the attempt early one morning to break through the lines in the direction of Sierra Gorda, but seemingly informed of the project, the republicans mustered in such force as to defeat it.^[35]

This failure increased the discouragement, and several officers manifested it so far as to write to Mejía, urging negotiations for surrender. The prompt arrest of the leaders served to check a desire which seems to have been wide-spread.^[36] Shortly after, as if in accord with the other, came a proposal from Escobedo for capitulation, offering to let Maximilian depart; but it was rejected,^[37] with the assurance that there was no lack of resources, of which proof was tendered in a lively reply to the bombardment.^[38] This was intended also to distract the attention of the soldiers and citizens, to whom crumbs of comfort were distributed in the form of fabricated news, amidst ringing of bells, of important victories by Marquez.

As if in derision of the effort came seemingly reliable news of the annihilation of Marquez' forces and the fall of Puebla. This was naturally kept a secret among the most trusted officers^[39] of Maximilian, who now began to entertain the project of fighting his way out with the army. Preparatory for this, Miramon planned an attack on the Cimatario hill, commanding the south line of the town, and early on the 27th of April he advanced against it with about 2,000 men, another less strong column being led by Castillo against the Garita de Mexico, to divide the opponents. So unexpected and determined was the charge, that the republicans fell into disorder, and within an hour their entire line was in full flight, guns, ammunition, and provision trains being abandoned to the victors, who made an immense havoc, and captured more than 500 prisoners, raiding to the headquarters of Corona. Thousands of the fleeing dispersed, never to return. The joy of the soldiers at this unprecedented capture was intense, and joined by the famished towns-people, they began to carry in the booty. Even Miramon seemed dazed by his success, and joined by Maximilian, he strutted about the battle-field speculating on the effect and on the next best movement. In this manner more than two precious hours were lost; and when at last he collected his troops and resolved to pursue this advantage, sweeping the summit of the hill and thence falling in the rear of the adjoining lines, the more active Escobedo had managed to bring forward his choicest reserves,^[40] and gain the best position. So severe was the repulse now met, that the late victors turned in flight, heedless of the daring example of the emperor and their generals, who rushed into the thickest bullet showers to cheer them. Several hundred were slain and captured, including marauding citizens, and a large part of the store trains was retaken.^[41]

This turning of victory into defeat was undoubtedly due to a lack of promptness on the part of Miramon, to a neglect to follow up his advantage. The besieged appear to have been animated by a report that the attack was in cooperation with Marquez arrival in the rear. Now came the double disappointment, and dejection settled upon all, as manifested also among the soldiers during the subsequent unproductive attacks against Garita de Mexico and San Gregorio.^[42]

The misery was becoming too apparent in every direction to be covered any longer with false hope. Desertion and bullets had reduced the garrison to 5,000 men, whose remuneration had long been but half-pay for the men only, with slim prospects for its continuance.^[43] The cavalry was for the greater part unmounted, their horses having died of starvation,^[44] or been consigned to the butcher. Other meat was almost unknown, save when brought in by some raiding party; and flour and maize were rapidly disappearing, provisions of every description commanding enormous prices. Frijoles, the staple dish, still remained to ward off actual famine, yet hungry-looking faces were visible at every turn, and mothers wandered in eager search for a tortilla and a pinch of salt. In order to equalize the condition somewhat, strict orders had been issued for the surrender of all stocks of produce, and seizures were besides made of moneys as well as food in exchange for worthless drafts. Every conceivable means was brought to bear for procuring funds, from poll, window, and balcony taxes, to weekly payments from all classes who wished to buy exemption from the hard and dangerous work on the fortifications.^[45]

It cannot be said, however, that discontent was very marked. Mexicans are a long-suffering race, and the Queretanos submitted with fair grace to the inevitable. The emperor assisted not a little to maintain a good feeling by sharing freely in every hardship and danger, visiting the crowded hospitals^[46] to cheer the wounded, exposing himself recklessly in the trenches to encourage the soldiers, and seeking to alleviate as much as possible the suffering of the poor, among whom dysentery was making havoc. Whatever bitterness existed was directed against Marquez, now classed as a traitor by Maximilian himself.^[47]

 

Mendez and other generals had long objected to the sorties of Miramon as achievements worse than useless, since they served only to sacrifice valuable lives, weakening the army, and disheartening the soldiers, as shown by increasing desertion. The project of breaking through the siege lines must evidently be energetically taken in hand while means yet remained, and before the demoralization became dangerous. It was accordingly decided^[48] to seek the ranges of Sierra Gorda, which, passing about seven leagues north-westward, stretched over a vast expanse of country filled with strong passes and impregnable strongholds, and occupied by a sturdy race of mountaineers who were enthusiastically devoted to General Mejía. A march direct to Mexico would place them with wavering troops between two overwhelming forces, but in these mountains they could plan future movements at their ease, strengthened by Olvera's battalions and other recruits, and even reach the coast.^[49]

In justification of this step, the leading generals signed a manifesto, reviewing the siege operations, and pointing out the neglect of Marquez in not attacking the republicans before they had united, and in failing to lay in a greater stock of provisions. Capitulation with the foe before them not being deemed reliable, it was suggested to attack them, and, if defeated, to cut their way through, after spiking the guns.^[50] Mejía promised to use his influence among the townsfolk for enrolling sufficient men to protect the rear for a few hours. He did not succeed so well as expected, partly owing to lack of arms,^[51] and the departure, already fixed for the 12th of May, was deferred till the night of the 14th. At the last moment came another postponement for the 15th, at the suggestion of Mendez,^[52] which found ready acceptance with the too sanguine Miramon and the vacillating Maximilian.

All stood prepared for departure. The last scanty distribution had been made of beans, with some maize, horse-meat, and red wine, other effects being reduced to the smallest compass so as not to impede the march. Only light field-pieces were to be carried away on mules, and nineteen portable bridges. Picked men formed the escort of the emperor. Although the departure had been deferred, all were ready on the night of the 14th to fall in line, the horses remaining saddled.^[53]

 

 

1. Although belonging to a wealthy family, says Arias, his mind had not been directed to learning. He possessed a good imagination, with much practical sagacity; his habits were temperate. Reseña, 145-6, etc. He was born at Galeana, Nuevo Leon, Jan. 12, 1827, and had been devoted to trade from an early age-muleteering, say others, followed by a superficial reading of law. During the reform war he was captured, and narrowly escaped execution. He shared as brigadier in the defence of Puebla, 1862. Foreign writers return his antipathy by alluding to his ferocity, as in Salm-Salm, wherein he is declared to be little of a soldier, and careful of his person. Diary, i. 202; ii. 113. D'Héricault commends his 'art d'achetér les généraux ennemis.' Max., 70. Hans says he resembled a Jew trader. Quer., 75.
2. Born at Tuscueca, Jalisco, and employed in a hacienda shop near Acaponeta about the time that the reform struggle began. Inspired by some guerrillas, he abandoned trade for fighting, and with intelligence and bravery rose rapidly. He affected great simplicity, and for a long time dressed in a red cotton shirt, with a red band round his hat. Diaz, Biog., MS., 500–2. Vigil and Hijar speak of him as 'administrador de una negociacion de minas,' when in 1858, at the age of 21, he was induced to join a small party which seized Acaponeta from the then triumphant conservatives, and began a reaction for the liberal cause. Corona rose rapidly from a petty officer. Ensayo, 1-5 et seq. Marquez de Leon, Mem. Post., Ms., 139, is severe upon his father's character. He applied himself to study in leisure moments, and passed among many as educated in Paris.
3. Several other lines of guns appeared at different points. See Salm-Salm i. 49, 77, etc. In D'Héricault, Max., 151-6, is given a detailed account of the line of defences, and several other books bring in descriptions when referring to siege operations, as Peza and Pradillo, Max., 31, etc.
4. The abandonment of San Pablo, on the north side, was especially regretted, and an abortive attempt made to seize it on the 10th of March. A skirmish on the following day procured for Salm-Salm the colonelcy of the cazadores regiment.
5. Arellano in weighs against what he called this useless and criminal exposure of the imperial person.
6. The name came from a miraculous cross erected here in commemoration of the conquest. Hist. Mex., ii. 543-4, this series.
7. Another evidence of Marquez' hellish design to sacrifice Maximilian and the empire, says the rabid Arellano. Ultimas Horas, 60-1.
8. Arias admits 264 killed, 272 wounded, and 419 captured and missing. The report in Bol. Noticias, April 12th, says 750 captives. For details, see Arellano, Ult. Horas, 56-65; Peza and Pradillo, Max., 33-8; Hans, Quer., 89-98; Salm-Salm, Diary, i. 56-72, with special attention to the bridge fight; Marquez, Refut., 69-4. Medals and promotions now came freely, and SalmSalm claims to have obtained the command of a brigade for his share, but this Peza denies. The general of division, Casanova, and the brigadiers Herrera and Calvo, were removed for inefficiency, or rather because they were Miramon's friends, says Arellano, the enemy of Marquez. Arias avoids disagreeable details, and in Vigil the account is too partial.
9. A proposal to act upon the demoralization among the besiegers before they received further reënforcements was opposed by Marquez, yet Miramon carried his point for a movement to recover the hill of San Gregorio, although it was deferred for the 17th. When the time arrived for the sally, a false alarm came that the convent was threatened, and confusion during the march of the reserves arose to prevent the manœuvre, greatly to the disgust of Miramon, who felt sure of a triumph. Hans, Quer., 108-9. Maximilian was equally angry, and caused Mendez to be transferred from the reserves and placed under Miramon direct, in command of Casanova's late division. The traitor Lopez was promoted to the reserve. Arellano, Ult. Horas, 74, claims that both the failure of the movement and the change of commanders were part of Marquez' plot. The latter ridicules the whole charge, and declares that he objected to Lopez. Basch, Erinn., Ï. 52, writes that Miramon was allowed to oversleep himself, and thus he failed to coöperate, adds Arrangoiz. Méj., iv. 275.
10. Arellano maintains that Maximilian had been persuaded to prepare for evacuation, but that Miramon, and above all himself, managed to overrule the 'suicidal' plan. 'Behold their wisdom!' observes Marquez, in alluding to the fall of Querétaro and its results.
11. In a copy of the original proceedings published by Salm-Salm, it is shown that five projects were submitted: to retreat with artillery and train; to retreat with army alone, spiking the guns and leaving the war material; to continue the defence with the whole army; to send half the force to Mexico for reënforcements wherewith to compel an abandonment of the siege; and last, to let one general as commander-in-chief attack the enemy with all the army, save a small reserve for guarding the enıperor. The latter was Arellano's view, although he also advocated the final plan. There was plenty of ammunition for a considerable time. Mendez refused to express any opinion. Castillo and Mejía favored a defensive attitude for some time, but after an attack by the foe, their repulse should be availed of for gaining an advantage. Vidaurri added that attention should be given to destroy the besieging lines to the west so as to secure the way for a later retreat. These last views were approved by Miramon and Marquez, the latter alluding, like Mejía, also to the need of reënforcements. The emperor now rejoined the council and sided with the latter, whereupon it was resolved to disembarrass the left wing of the Cerro de la Campana, to direct the mounted guerrillas against the rear of the enemy, to consider the question of reënforcements and funds. Diary, i. 80–7. Arellano, 80-97, who acted also as secretary to the council, gives the report less fully. He states that Marquez prevailed upon Maximilian to let him go to Mexico. Marquez claims that his proposed retreat was a strategic movement to draw the foe from an advantageous position to a field where the imperialists with increased force might have crushed them. Refut., 81. Maximilian speculated afterward that, victory achieved with the aid of reënforcements from Mexico, he would establish the government in the centre of the country, evidently Guanajuato, and there summon the projected congress. 'Nach Nueva Leon...eine Stadt,' writes Basch, ii. 73, somewhat confusingly — meaning no doubt Leon, not the capital of Nuevo Leon, though he repeats the latter form.
12. Marquez gives a copy of the commission, 'investido de plenos poderes segun las órdenes verbales que ha recibido.' Refut., 200.
13. Navarro also remained as head of the household, but only for a while, Salm-Salm obtaining this office. See p. 226 for composition of ministry hitherto. Basch, Erinnerungen, ii. 53-4. Arrangoiz, Méj., iv. 278, 284, defends the dismissed members, and asks if Vidaurri achieved anything more than Lares. Arellano, who again hints at Marquez' machinations in this change, is not well informed about the appointments.
14. As soon as the congress could be installed the regency expired. Marquez should act as chief of the army till the regency met. As substitute regents were named Lares, Mejía, and Councillor Linares. This document is dated March 20th. Several copies have been published. Those in Arrangoiz, iv. 324, and Masseras, 425-9, differ somewhat in form. In Hall's Life Max., 133, is given only the earlier draught of the document of March 11th, naming Lares instead of Vidaurri. Masseras has wrong dates, and many copies give May instead of March. Lacunza failed to publish the abdication in due time, instigated by the false reports of Arellano, says Marquez, 197. Many confound this with the regency document, and others, like Masseras, conclude that it never existed, but a solemn assurance was made before the later courtmartial that it did. Max., Causa, and Lefèvre, Docs, ii. 442. See also Palacio's statement in Max., Mem., 9-11. The date given by Marquez to his appointment as lugarteniente is March 19th, which, if correct, would indicate that he had prevailed on Maximilian to take the present step before the council met.
15. Marquez denies that his instructions, wholly verbal, required him to return with reënforcements, as generally declared. He was to hold Mexico as the capital, and as a centre in case Querétaro fell, sending to Maximilan funds and war material, and reports, so that he could receive further orders. His sole statement, however, is opposed by overwhelming testimony on the other side. See his Refut., 93-7, and Manifiesto. Maximilian's instructions at this time to Navarro indicate that Mexico might be left less protected, and that his archives and other valuable effects should in such a case be placed with Marquez and the army, except such as could impede the movement of the troops, Schaffer, the officer in charge of the palace, having to bring the effects most needed for a long campaign. A letter to this Schaffer, written by dictation to Basch, indicate still more strongly that Mexico might be left wholly without troops, in which case Schaffer and others would accompany Marquez and his army, bringing to this place' (Querétaro) certain needful effects. This bringing' is repeatedly mentioned. These remarks do not exactly define what option Marquez had, but they prove that his own declaration is false. See full text of letters in Basch, ii. 60–4; Arrangoiz, iv. 280-3. Basch adds, he knows for a certainty that Marquez was instructed 'in any case to return with aid to Querétaro,' 'was in 14 Tagen geschehen musste;' his only option being to take all or a part of the troops at Mexico. ii. 54-67. Marquez states that it was understood he should go to Puebla from Mexico, but the absurd manner in which he seeks to prove this side issue tends only to confirm his unworthiness of belief. Salm-Salm declares that he was forbidden to undertake any other expedition than to bring troops from Mexico, and before all the generals assembled, Marquez 'gave his word of honor to return to Querétaro within a fortnight, coûte que coûte.' Diary, i. 91. But this open promise is doubtful. Salm-Salm was not at the council. Peza and Pradillo assert, however, that at parting Maximilian in presence of several witnesses said: '; General; no olvide vd. que el Imperio se encuentra hoy en Querétaro!' — 'Descuide V. M.; antes de quince dias estaré de vuelta,' was the answer. Max., 110. The united declaration of the leading generals at a later council twice alludes to a relieving army from Mexico, which might be abandoned, Marquez' chief mission being to return to Querétaro with all the troops possible, Maximilian having confided to Marquez the glorious mission de venir á auxiliar,' for which sufficed '15 6 20 dias para llegar.' Arias, 217, 220. This seems most conclusive testimony, confirmed also by Lago, to whom among others Maximilian related his instructions to Marquez. Domenech, Hist. Mex., iii. 437. Arellano, the bitter enemy of the general, weakens it, however, by intimating that the plans of Marquez were to be kept a secret even from the other generals, and that no combination was arranged for operating against the besiegers. Ultimas Horas, 97. Marquez naturally takes advantage of this to state that as none knew his instructions, he cannot be accused. It might also be supposed that Maximilian's revelations to Basch and others were intended for effect to inspire confidence. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that whatever Marquez had to do, he certainly had to send or bring reënforcements of men as well as funds and material. This becomes evident from the subsequent attempt to send after Marquez and arrest him, and from the very fact that the already meagre garrison was despoiled of its best troops to aid Marquez in the plan for relief — a plan which could not have meant operations in the southern districts where Diaz was. Maximilian's projects for a congress, in the centre of the country, and his orders for bringing archives and valuables from Mexico to Querétaro, show that the latter was now regarded as the key-point. Marquez' evident fabrications should therefore have been made to prove that he was unable to bring or send the required troops, etc. As for his motives, the desire for bitter vengeance — for what is not explained — attributed by Arellano, resolves itself rather into strategic efforts, with blunders and overweening ambition to retain the autocratic position of locum tenens, etc.
16. According to Basch, 22 wagons of provisions and war material, 60 oxen, and 200 sheep and goats; but Peza, Max., 46, reduces them to 6 wagons and some goats. The large train reported by spies had been mostly distributed by this time. Salm-Salm claims great credit for his share in the sally. Diary, i. 87-90; which Peza disputes.
17. Including Quiroga's regiment, from Nuevo Leon, and No. 5, 1,100 men, says Salm-Salm. The bronze medal for military merit was fastened on his breast as he left. Arellano, Ult. Horas, 99.
18. Valdez succeeding to his division.
19. Salm-Salm fixes it as low as 6,500.
20. They arrived March 23d, the other generals being Juan Mendez and Martinez, Arrangoiz, 285, names the subordinate Jimenez and Velez, and Salm-Salm gives Carbajal instead of Mendez. He now estimates the liberal force at above 40,000, with 70 to 80 guns. Diary, i. 92. Basch, 68, who confirms this number from deserters' statements, places the forces brought by Palacio and Martinez at 2,800 and 5,000 respectively; Arias, while avoiding numbers for Martinez, allows Mendez 2,500 men. Ensayo, 163–5. Arellano, 110-11, places the imperialists at a little below 7,000 and the republicans at over 30,000.
21. Taken mainly by Col Gonzalez with his Emperatriz regiment.
22. Arias places the latter at mas de 200.' Ensayo, 170. The repulse of Palacio, not acknowledged as a defeat, was attributed as a consequence of Martinez' rout. Basch, ii. 71, puts the captives at 400, and Salm-Salm the dead at 1,500, the imperial losses being comparatively small, owing to the position of the republican lines, which prevented a free play of their fire-arms, and to their reliance on the bayonet. Diary, i. 98-9. He speaks highly of Malburg's charge with a body of cavalry. Riva Palacio alone is assumed to have brought 10,000 men against the Casa Blanca line.
23. So far he had worn the knight cross of the Guadalupe and Eagle orders. The medal was accompanied by an appropriate letter signed by the commanding generals. Basch, Erin., ii. 78-9, 92-3. On the 24th an attack had also been made on the convent, which the emperor repulsed, not without danger, for a grenade exploded close to him. On such occasions le bore himself with a coolness that surprised the bravest. Arellano speaks very modestly of his own deed, Ultimas Horas, 109; but Hans, Quer., 120, among others, accords due credit.
24. At the rate of two reales for cannon-balls, says Basch. Salm-Salm, i. 75, allows a dollar for shells and half a dollar for a shot.
25. Caps were made from stiff paper, Arellano, 109–10, and the cannon were promptly repaired. For funds granted him, etc., see Quer., Caida, 173-8.
26. Between the ages of 16 and 60, says Lefévre, Docs, ii. 384, who exaggerates the severity used. Hans, 124-6, states that Maximilian interfered to spare the prisoners from exposure.
27. Such as Green's legion of honor.
28. Two slight attacks had been made on the Miraflores bridge on the 25th and 26th, under the direction of Antillon, subordinate to Mendez, who commanded the north line, Treviño having now taken charge of the west line. Arias, Reseña, 171-3.
29. Arias admits a defeat for Antillon, and a heavy loss, but the final result was that the republicans advanced their lines. Ensayo, 172-4. Salm-Salm, i. 119-18, 124, who led the cazadores, intimates that he was left in the lurch by Miramon; and the frequency with which the latter exposed him and his men roused a suspicion that the foreigners were to be sacrificed. Peza and Pradillo, 32-5, attribute the failure to Salm-Salm's disobedience of orders.
30. The line was held by Riva Palacio. Jimenez repulsed the attack. Arias, 177. Salm-Salm had remonstrated. Peza and Pradillo agree. The object was to favor the departure of couriers. Hans, Quer., 139.
31. In the speeches on this occasion the empire was still declared to be the choice of the people; Mexico has not been deceived in Maximilian. The latter assured his adherents that a Hapsburg would never desert his post in danger — a somewhat difficult thing to do at this juncture. Basch, ii. 85-8. Perhaps the subsequent sally was part of the celebration, snarls Arias.
32. Several times he was caught with a half-checked utterance of doubt. Basch, ii. 54-5, 65; and Salm-Salm, i. 31-2, etc., now remembered more than one instance when Marquez had been found by them with sinister, conscience. stricken countenance, doubtless laying the devilish plots of which Arellano is foremost to accuse him.
33. Olvera was even then holding forth in the mountains north-westward, with fully 1,000 men, but checked by a republican columın; Diaz and other generals round Mexico were observing Marquez, and Guadarrama had advanced with 4,000 cavalry to meet him. Arias, Reseña, 171-2.
34. Miramon and Arellano urged Maximilian to start with 1,000 cavalry, but honor and duty bade him stay. Moret was proposed by Miramon as a personal friend, much against Maximilian's wishes. Miramon had to be courted, and so it was decided to send both, with equal command, but the former received merely instructions to find Marquez and return with him and his troops, while Salm-Salm carried additional secret instructions, with orders to Marquez to place at the disposal of the prince all cavalry in and round Mexico, or on the way to Querétaro. With this he was to return within 24 hours, unless Marquez promised to come to their relief. At least $200,000 must be brought, including the emperor's private money. He might arrest Moret if he thought best, and also Marquez, should the reports of his treason prove reliable. The European troops at Mexico must obey him alone, and Olvera, then in the Sierra Gorda, should give him his cavalry. The diplomatic corps should be invited to send some of their members to Queretaro to induce the Juarists to act humanely, and to announce that the emperor would not yield unless he could surrender his commission to a legal congress. The public should be cheered with good news, and Vidaurri and Marquez alone informed of the true state of affairs. It was to be stated that all the generals had desired the emperor to leave Querétaro with all the cavalry. Mexico should be abandoned if all the troops there were needed for the relief. Salm-Salm might negotiate with the republican leaders. Decorations and a mass of private effects were to be brought. Salm-Salm, Diary, i. 133-40. Basch, who wrote out the instructions, gives them less fully, Erin., ii. 97, 102, but he adds at length a letter to the U. S. consul Otterburg, presenting certain cruel deeds of the republicans, and urging more humane treatment, like that accorded to the 600 prisoners at Querétaro. The letters are dated April 16th and 17th. See also Arrangoiz, iv. 291-7; Globo, July 28, 1867; and Arellano, 114-24. The latter adds that the proposal for Maximilian to leave, made on April 11th, was intended to save him. If no aid could reach the remaining troops, they would then break through. The illness of Mejía delayed the project for eight days. On the 19th the council finally determined as above, the town having to be held till news came from Mexico, or till all resources were exhausted. Marquez accuses Miramon and Arellano of a desire to get rid of Maximilian at any cost, exposing him to rout and death in the effort to break through the lines. Refutacion, 121-8.
35. Salm-Salm suspects that the traitor Lopez had already begun his machinations, but he blames especially Moret, who led the van, for his indecision at a moment when the break might have been effected, and he hints at more than carelessness in Miramon for selecting him. A daring guerrilla named Zuazua did penetrate with about 50 men, and Peza and Pradillo point to this as proof that the prince failed in energy and duty on the occasion. Max., 59-60. There seems to be some truth in what they say. Salm-Salm indicates that the attempt was made after midnight on the 18th, but Basch says the 220; others are divided.
36. Mejía and Mendez are said to have been in favor of capitulating. Arellano, 128. The object of the letter to Mejía, sent by 15 officers, says Salm-Salm, may have been to sound the prospects. Those arrested were Gen. Ramirez, Col Rubio, and Maj. Adame. At this time Maximilian was startled by the report that Miramon intended to arrest him; but even Salm-Salm doubts it.
37. Made on April 1st. Basch, ii. 102-3.
38. Especially on April 24th, from the new fortifications at the convent, attended by a sally. Ammunition was plentiful enough so far, thanks to Arellano's energy.
39. Embracing on this occasion only Miramon, Castillo, and Salm-Salm, now chief adjutant.
40. Bearing the name of Supremos Poderes, assisted by cazadores from the northern states. Maximilian is said to have directed this second charge up the hill. Peza and Pradillo, Max., 67.
41. Escobedo's report announced 300 killed and over 100 captured. Estrella de Occid., May 31, 1967. Salm-Salm says that 230 were killed on the way to Casa Blanca alone. He gives the result of the first success at 547 prisoners, 7 colors, and 15 guns, together with 6 guns brought in by Castillo, who had taken a first intrenchment in his direction, but failed at the following. The ammunition proved acceptable, and the provisions, including cattle, lasted for a few days. Arias admits a loss of over 20 guns. The report ran that the republicans lost 10,000 by desertion, and that some of their generals favored raising the siege. Basch, Erin., ii. 109-13, writes as if the movement had been intended merely to call attention from the north side of the town, where it was proposed to break through, and he alludes to a planned attack against the San Gregorio hill for the preceding day, which failed to be carried out, through some misunderstanding. Salm-Salm also declares that everything stood packed and prepared for departure, but by what direction is not stated, although he says that after the victory at El Cimatario 'nothing prevented 119 from leaving the city.' But the success changed all plans, Miramon evidently persuading Maximilian to remain and 'annihilate the rest of the enemy's forces;' yet he confesses that the exact plans for that day were unknown, save to Miramon, and perhaps Castillo. He calls Miramon the bad spirit of Maximilian, though willing to believe him blinded by illusions rather than guilty of deception. Diary, i. 154-68. Maguña says in Quer., Caida, 86-7, that false messages purporting to be from Marquez caused the loss of time. Peza and Pradillo, Max., 64, 78, doubt the project of breaking through, while misinterpreting it as intended to save only a part of the army. Arellano, Ultimas Horas, 123, assumes that it was intended to beat the besiegers in detail. The packing-up, which at first created unpleasant suspicions in Hans, Quer., 136-50, and others, is indicated by later accounts, by Salm-Salm and others, to have been merely a precaution in case of a disaster during these preliminary operations.
42. On May 1st and 3d; the republicans retaliating on the 5th, the anniversary of their victory at Puebla in 1862, with a sharper cannonade and an attack on the Miraflores bridge. The death of the popular Col Rodriguez during the first of these attacks increased the gloom.
43. 43 The officers received hardly anything. The number of men was insufficient for the length of the lines, that between the Pueblito gate and Campana hill being very poorly defended. Salm-Salm, Diary, i. 170-1.
44. Chopped brushwood and leaves formed the main fodder.
45. Varying from 25 cents to several dollars weekly, according to the standing and revenue of the citizen. In Arias, Ensayo, 195-212, 213-21, and Lefêvre, Docs, ii. 381-9, are instances of these exactions and the outrages suffered by many leading people. From 41 persons alone $253,000 was obtained. See also Hans, Quer., 160, etc.; Quer., Caida, 171-2; Basch, and others. Salm-Salm, i. 177-8, relates that about this time the republicans sent a lean ox to the lines of the imperialists, urging them to maintain the sparks of life till the town fell. The latter replied by sending a starved horse wherewith the besiegers might overtake them when they cut their way through.
46. Basch, ii. 82-3, 95, was appointed inspector-general of the hospitals, and strove to improve the arrangements. There were about 800 wounded in the hospitals. Quer., Cuida, 101.
47. He might let Lopez go, he remarked later, but 'ich liess... Marquez hängen.' Basch, Erinn., ii. 183. He still sent messages to him early in May. See letter in Arrangoiz, Méj., iv. 300.
48. On the 12th, by decision of the 10th. Arellano, 127, 120. Basch observes, ii. 129, that the foreign officers had long ago recommended the break.
49. Summoning the Austrian corvette Elizabeth and other means of transport. Basch, Erinn., ii, 127.
50. This document, reproduced in Arellano, Arias, Arrangoiz, etc., is dated the 11th of May, although adopted several days earlier. Mejía signed it also, although he is said to have favored capitulation. The phrase 'if defeated' appears to have been added for saving appearances.
51. Arellano states that he pretended to have obtained only 160 men, intent as he was to force a capitulation; but this is open to doubt. Hans, Quer., 172, also writes that only a small number volunteered, but other witnesses declare that 1,000 or more were enrolled, the lack of arms and organization proving the main obstacle. Peza and Pradillo, Max., 80; Quer., Caida, 88, 108, 117; Basch, Erinn., ii. 132.
52. So Basch, Peza, and Arellano declare the professed object being to rise from his sick-bed and animate his brave battalion, so as to promote the success of the break. Salm-Salm attributes the delay still to Mejía, who had not finished the organization of his recruits. Castillo supported the proposal, whatever it may have been, and it was adopted, unfortunately for Maximilian. Miramon was ready enough to delay, filled as he appeared with illusive beliefs in sorties and in the resources of the place; and Maximilian still had his scruples of honor and duty about abandoning the inhabitants and yielding a valuable place, for Marquez might yet com. See Basch, ii. 128-9; Salm-Salm, i. 165, etc. He expressed a preference for the 15th as being the nameday of his mother, and therefore of good import for him.
53. Basch, 127-8, gives the composition of the escort. Mogaña adds important details. Quer., Caida, 88; and Hall, Life Mar., 85, speaks of magazines to be flooded, etc.